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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the policy process of adoption of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), replacing the EU Directive 95/46/EC, the global “golden standard” 
setter in the field of privacy and data protection. The GDPR was proposed in January 2012 
and was adopted in April 2016 following a highly politically charged process lobbied 
against to an unprecedented extent by certain commercial and political interests. The 
policy process is looked at through the lens of consociationalism, which draws attention to 
the importance of national governments, policy networks, which stress non-linear policy-
making dynamics, and institutionalism, which highlights the significance of institutions. 
On the whole, the GDPR as approved strengthened the ICT users’ rights, although not to 
the degree originally envisaged. The study proposes that institutional factors were decisive 
in determining policy outcomes, either acting in coalition with different policy networks or 
reacting to external developments, notably the Snowden revelations in 2013. The 
institutional factors, amongst others, included strategic actor self-interest of preserving or 
even expanding their spheres of influence, sociological dimensions such as ideological 
adherence and diverse national and institutional cultures, and important earlier institutional 
and policy developments. As the thesis shows, the impact of institutional factors on the 
policy outcomes was particularly evident in the European Parliament’s position during the 
process. The EP’s influence demonstrates the strong political will of this institution and its 
overall defence of citizens’ rights against lobbying by the industry. At the same time, the 
reform process brought around many gains to the national Data Protection Authorities at 
the cost of the initially foreseen Commission’s remit. This thesis argues that the powers 
retained by these national supervisory authorities, alongside the numerous derogations 
following difficulties to reconcile diverse national positions, make the GDPR a tangible 
case of state-centrism. The Member States’ sovereign decision-making concerns posed 
breaks to the level of Europeanisation that the GDPR could potentially bring about in this 
issue-area. This work makes a significant contribution to knowledge by, amongst others, 
offering a political science perspective in on-line privacy and data protection research 
dominated by other disciplines, by applying the consociationalism theory – a less explored 
paradigm in the EU studies as compared to other approaches – and by providing a policy 
process analysis of the newly adopted data protection instrument with global rules-shaping 
significance.  
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is dedicated to analyse the policy process of adoption of the Regulation 
2016/6791 or General Data Protection Regulation (thereafter GDPR), which can be termed 
the EU biggest legislative dossier of recent years both in size and in terms of political 
tensions surrounding it, not the least because of the EU’s global role, in the words of 
Hijmans (2016), “as a constitutional guardian of Internet privacy and data protection”. The 
GDPR deliberations took place between January 2012, when the European Commission 
(thereafter the Commission) tabled the proposal (Commission, 2012e), and its finalisation 
by the European Parliament (thereafter EP) and the Council of Ministers of the European 
Union (thereafter the Council) in April 2016. It has entered the EU policy-making history 
as a proposal that attracted unprecedented amount of lobbying, as quite likely “the longest 
EU [law] on the statute book” (Buttarelli, 2015), and as a central piece of the EU data 
protection reform package that has pioneered comprehensive enactment of fundamental 
rights since the entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (thereafter 
EUCFR) in 2009 (FRA, 2013:104). Moreover, the vote on the GDPR in the EP plenary in 
2014 has seen a rare circa 95% majority in favour of the data protection reform proposals 
(Commission, 2014a). As evidence of the significance, complexity and tensions 
surrounding it, some aspects of the making of the GDPR prompted the production of two 
                                                          
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).  
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documentaries2. This reform has been a landmark development and, despite a lot of 
pressures, has gone far beyond a mere upgrade to an earlier law: 
“Is this law ground-breaking? Absolutely. Europe has created the notions of a ‘right 
to be forgotten’ and of ‘data portability’, and created fines for data breaches that are 
on a scale equivalent to fines for antitrust violations. No other region has done that 
before” (Phil Lee of Fieldfisher quoted in Gibbs, 2016). 
“This is the most significant development in data protection that Europe, possibly 
the world, has seen over the past 20 years” (Phil Lee of Fieldfisher quoted in Gibbs, 
2015). 
Threats to privacy and personal data in relation to the advancing media and communication 
technologies are not new issues, but go back as far as to the nineteenth century (Gutwirth, 
2002:5; Batra, 2008: 45-46). Persons profiling deriving from private enterprise intrusions 
and state surveillance have been known for more than 150 years. Nevertheless, the 
beginning of the electronic era in the second half of the twentieth century, bringing along 
digital data storage and processing facilities, endangered privacy and data security to 
unprecedented extent (Marquis, 2003:226-248). Electronic communication channels have 
been subject to continuous governmental and corporate monitoring for decades (Chadwick, 
2006:257-288). The latest advances of ICT technologies enable ubiquitous tracking 
devices as well as instantaneous processing and transmission of collected personal 
information. In the cyberspace, all activities are constantly registered in order to harvest 
information about users, which is used in various ways, including trading it. Data-mining 
and digital intelligence have become enormous thriving industries (e.g. Chadwick, 
2006:257-288; Lyon, 2003; Van Dijk, 2012:18, 122-126; Batra, 2008:43-122) and a 
fundamental layer in the contemporary economy, where personal data is perceived as a 
                                                          
2 Peter Brem’s “Privacy for Sale” of 2013 and David Bernet’s “Democracy” of 2015. 
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“core asset” by the commercial entities (OECD, 2011:3-50; Edwards and Howells, 
2003:207-222). Such state of play was termed by Clarke (1988) as the age of dataveillance.  
From the Internet users’ perspective, behavioural and predictive analytics, broadly 
practised by businesses, mean unanticipated secondary usage of personal information, 
making individuals hardly in control of their own data (Naughton, 2013; Van Dijk, 
2012:122-126; Batra, 2008:91-122). The current trend of promotion of Big Data as an 
economic driver and a high degree of opacity in data processing operations pose serious 
challenges for privacy and other fundamental rights (González Fuster and Scherrer, 
2015:5). Risks to privacy have not ceased to be one of the greatest concerns among 
Internet users for decades now (Tapscott, 1996c:274; Eurobarometer, 2015). 
The potential loss of control over personal information due to advancing electronics did 
not remain unnoticed in the policy-making circles. Since around the 1970s, countries 
around the world started adopting data protection laws. The EU regional data protection 
instrument – the Directive 95/46/EC3 – stipulated in 1995 had become the most influential 
law internationally. Currently, the European privacy protection model, encompassing 
mandatory rules (“hard law”), is rated as the most rigorous and comprehensive one 
globally (Farrell, 2008:386-395; Prins, 2006:170-173; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:173-177). 
It is therefore not surprising that, considering this background, the process of replacement 
of the above Directive with the GDPR – an even more comprehensive legislation4 – caused 
so many tensions between different interests, as will be analysed in this thesis. 
                                                          
3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995.  
4 The final version of the GDPR is made of 99 Articles and 173 recitals as compared to 34 Articles in the 
Directive. 
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However, controversially to its reputation of the golden standard setter in privacy 
protection, Europe is not immune from state surveillance practices undermining its 
citizens’ rights. The so-called Snowden revelations in 2013 and later revealed not only 
extensive interception of communications by the US secret services, but also exposed 
involvement of some EU countries. Europe has a long history in spying on 
communications. While the Snowden revelations helped enhance privacy and data 
protection promoting policy debates and, in addition, had some impact on the GDPR 
deliberations, not long afterwards a series of terrorist attacks in Europe since January 2015 
paved the way to reinstate national security and surveillance agendas. Somewhat oddly, the 
revived EU Passenger Name Record (thereafter PNR) Directive was adopted in the EP on 
the same day of the finalisation of the data protection reform in April 2016. That is, the EU 
policy course aimed at protecting people’s fundamental right to privacy does not prevent 
privacy undermining state surveillance measures such as the PNR from coming into being 
simultaneously. 
Finally, and most centrally to the academic inquiry in this study, the GDPR needs to be 
looked at as part of the overall EU politics.  
“Whereas the ʻEU’ or ʻBrussels’ appears as one monolithic institution from outside, 
it is in fact a plethora of differing institutions with different prerogatives and 
priorities, and this applies internally to these institutions also” (Sean Kelly, MEP 
and ITRE rapporteur, 2014). 
“European governance possesses some distinctive characteristics. It is a polycentric 
system, which is split into multiple, overlapping arenas that are characterised by 
loose coupling. Moreover, the organising principle of political relations is 
consensual, relying heavily on interaction and communication between its entities” 
(Princen and Knodt, 2003:204). 
Although “their influence has been constrained by EU-level actors and by the strong 
institutional framework that shapes interactions between” them, in the EU, Member States 
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(thereafter MSs) remain dominant actors in the decision-making processes (Princen and 
Knodt, 2003:203-204). The state-centric perspective chosen as the basis for this research 
was tangibly reflected in the GDPR case study. Integration and MSs sovereignty-related 
aspects have strongly shaped the course and the outcomes of the GDPR stipulation process. 
While the passage from a Directive to a Regulation – a directly applicable set of rules – did 
introduce a greater degree of harmonisation, at the same time, the abundance of 
derogations left a lot of issues heavily within the realm of national discretions. Similarly, 
the Commission’s aspiration to gain more powers in the EU data protection governance 
was unsuccessful as was the proposal for a more streamlined and centralised enforcement 
mechanism in the form of one-stop-shop which was modified to ensure that individual 
Data Protection Authorities (thereafter DPAs) retain their powers within their jurisdictions. 
“We are very actively engaged with [DPAs] across Europe. If anyone has 
interacted with that regulatory community you come to understand they have a 
sovereign interest in protecting the privacy of citizens in the respective [MSs] they 
represent. That was never going to go away with GDPR” (Keith Enright, legal 
director for privacy at Google, quoted in Macrae, 2016). 
Overall, while the GDPR after a very intense political process was a mixed outcome for the 
various stakeholders, with, for instance, some wins and losses for both ICT users’ rights as 
well as business interests, this study finds that the DPAs can be viewed as actors with most 
gains from the reform in terms of their power base. Interestingly, this DPAs’ “star hour” 
was made even more prominent by some Court of Justice of the European Union 
(thereafter CJEU) rulings in 2015, i.e. in concomitance with the data protection reform, 
giving a favourable explanation of the DPAs’ powers already under the existing law. In 
one of those judgements in October 2015 (Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner) the 
CJEU stated that the national DPAs can question the compliance of transfers of personal 
data to third countries with the EU law, despite existing EU-level adequacy decisions on 
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the data protection regime in those countries,. The above is related to another key finding 
of this thesis – the significance of the institutional factors in the policy process, which were 
more decisive in shaping the GDPR than such factors as lobbying. For example, amongst 
others, the EP was instrumental in defending many pro-privacy provisions in this law, 
including the earlier-mentioned unprecedented level of fines. Its strong stance on the 
GDPR was determined by a number of variables of its internal institutional dynamics, 
ranging from institutional legitimacy building to the ideological views of the MEPs in 
steering positions, and many others.   
In the remaining part, this chapter outlines the aims and methods of this research. 
1.2 Aims and contribution to knowledge 
This thesis aims to explore the interplay of various interests that intersect in the EU 
Privacy and Data Protection policy process. It investigates which political, economic and 
social forces, how, why and to which extent determine the course of the policy process and 
policy outcomes, i.e. the actual degree of balance between the conflicting or concurring 
goals and values of different stakeholders (e.g. state, industry and citizens). The purpose of 
this thesis is therefore not normative (how the policy process should work), but analytical 
and explanatory (how the policy process actually worked). Some normative discussion is, 
however, inevitable (for instance, in the contextual background part) to inform this 
research. 
The policy process remains an under-researched area in the media and communications 
studies, whilst communication policy research that has sound theoretical foundations is 
rather scarce (Just and Puppis, 2011:22-24). Scholars working in the area of the EU media 
policy “do not often provide a systematic analysis of the actual process of EU media 
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policy-making as such” and a wider application of political science is desirable as it “can 
help to explain EU decision-making in the area of media” (Van den Bulck and Donders 
2014:19). The dominant approaches, such as ideological5 or technological6, for example, 
leave significant research gaps. Also, it would be too reductionist to think that policy-
makers embrace the preferences of powerful interests by default, hence the understanding 
of the “institutional fabric” generating different contexts is required (Galperin, 2004). 
At the same time, more studies into information privacy that would be embedded in the 
discipline of political science are also still needed. Privacy matters have been mostly 
addressed within the realms of sociology, law, or computer science, and journalism and 
civil-rights advocacy outside the academia, while privacy “is an issue of political theory, of 
public policy-making, of political behaviour, of public administration, of comparative 
politics, and of international relations” as much as it is a legal or technological one 
(Bennett and Raab, 2006: xv- xx).  
The main objectives of this research are: 
- To examine the nature and explain the source of conflict among different EU 
policies related to on-line privacy issues as reflected, for instance, in the policies on 
data protection, digital economy and data retention; 
- To analyse how far the interests of citizens with regards to privacy and data 
protection on the Internet are likely to influence the EU policy-making process; 
                                                          
5 In this paradigm explanation of policy choices is centred on prior beliefs and established ideas (Galperin, 
2004).  
6 This approach draws on technological change as the main determinant of a policy course (Galperin, 2004). 
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- To examine the power dynamics in the decision-making process between the 
various stakeholders; and lastly 
- To examine how the preferences of different stakeholders are reflected in the EU 
Privacy and Data Protection policy debates and proposals. 
The research aims have resulted in the following research questions: 
1) What EU policy process dimensions and which actors can be identified in the debate 
that surrounded the formulation of the GDPR between January 2012 and April 2016 (i.e. 
between the tabling of the proposals by the Commission and the final adoption of this 
law)? 
2) What were the interests and the strategies of the policy stakeholders and why were they 
trying to influence the EU data protection review? 
3) How were the interests of the various stakeholders balanced and why (what determined 
the outcomes of the GDPR drafting process)? 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge. In particular, it:  
• Provides a prompt, comprehensive and systematic scholarly exploration of the 
recent policy process of the stipulation of the GDPR that will constitute the 
main European Union-level privacy and data protection legislation. This study 
is based on the originally conducted empirical research (document analysis and 
interviews) in turn informed by a contextual background specifically developed for 
this work. 
• Considers the implications for the different interests of EU policy in this core 
area of Internet governance which, given the historical significance of the EU 
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in the field of privacy, will determine respective policy developments not only 
within the EU, but also beyond the EU. 
• Aligns political science approaches that have been used for the study of the EU 
with the specific (and currently high-profile) on-line privacy and data 
protection issue-area, and applies an originally constructed analytical 
framework to explain the policy process of adoption of the GDPR. 
Consociationalism, one of the theories that forms this framework as a macro-level 
tool, while very applicable to the EU politics7, is featuring in academic research 
somewhat less as compared to other theories in the EU studies. 
• In doing the above, the thesis advances (EU) communication policy studies. 
1.3 Analytical framework and research methods 
Communication policy research belongs to the realm of social science studies, which 
“consists of the disciplined and systematic study of society and its institutions” (Hansen et 
al, 1998:11). Scholarly enquiries into communication policy should be based on a 
combination of theoretical and empirical approaches (Just and Puppis, 2011:16-17). This 
field of studies overlaps with a range of disciplines, such as philosophy, law, economics, 
political science or other (Hansen et al, 1998:11-12; Just and Puppis, 2011:2).  
Communication policy research looks into the broader dynamics of the approaches of 
public authorities towards “the structure and organisation of communication systems” and 
the management of change of such systems, examining also “the ways in which policies 
are generated and implemented”, including their impact on “the field of communication as 
                                                          
7 The EU political system encompasses all properties of a consociational polity: shared decision-making 
power, consensus-seeking and accommodationist politics, proportional representation, the veto right of the 
MSs and their high degree of autonomy, etc. Thus, “[p]aradoxically, consociational theory may be more 
relevant to the EU than to the states for which it was originally developed” (Andersen et al, 2001:37). 
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a whole” (Hansen et al, 1998: 67, 87). Therefore, it requires a more profound level of 
investigation into “historical evolution, policy debate, lobbying, policy formulation” as 
well as “a contextualisation of the emergence of ideas, technologies and policies” (Hansen 
et al, 1998:67). Policy is a greatly nuanced realm, which does not necessarily consist of 
coherent statements or strategies, or they may be not visible, may have unforeseen 
consequences, may be contradictory across different sectors of the same policy area or 
across different institutions (Hansen et al, 1998:67-68). Policy-making is constituted of a 
complex interplay of forces, and different clues to it will derive from different documents, 
statements by the officials and institutions or other sources of information “as well as 
looking into the relationship between interested parties, connections between events and 
the context within which all this takes place” (Hansen et al, 1998: 68, 87). In addition to 
this, the context of communication policy processes has been increasingly acquiring an 
international character and strongly affected by the technological convergence underway 
(Just and Puppis, 2011:16).  
Considering the complexity of policy-making, the related research should comprise a 
comprehensive study of the relevant literature on historical developments concerning the 
researched issue, as well as political, social, economic or other dimensions together with an 
analysis of a wide range of documents produced by the public institutions, and lastly, 
where possible, the interviewing of policy actors. The collected data are to be explored 
referring to an analytical theoretical framework to enable the insight into essential 
processes and relationships (Hansen et al, 1998:87-88). 
This thesis blends three analytical strands – consociationalism, policy networks and new 
institutionalism as its analytical framework. The analytical framework is developed in 
Chapter III. The combination of these approaches enables a multi-level analysis (macro, 
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meso and micro), necessary for an investigation of a policy process. The EU is taken as a 
unit of analysis. This study examines the policy process at the supranational level and 
focuses on the time span from the release of the Commission’s GDPR draft proposal in 
January 2012 till the adoption of the law in spring 2016. Some preceding developments 
and processes are occasionally looked into only to draw a clearer contextual picture.  
The empirical part is designed as a case study of the policy process that underpinned the 
formulation of the GDPR. A case study is understood as “a very detailed enquiry into a 
single example of a political process, organisation or collectivity seen as a political unit in 
its own right” (Versluis et al, 2011:88). Case studies attract criticism regarding their 
deficiency to produce generalisable knowledge. At the same time, reliability of 
generalisation in any social science enquiry can be questioned due to its interpretive nature. 
Case studies offer different kind of value and knowledge than generalisation (Thomas, 
2011). Their purpose is deductive rather than inductive. In particular,  
“[A case study] permits a deeper understanding of causal processes, the explication 
of general explanatory theory, and the development of hypotheses regarding 
difficult-to-observe phenomena. Much of our understanding of politics and political 
processes comes from case studies of individual presidents, senators, 
representatives, mayors, judges, statutes, campaigns, treaties, policy initiatives, and 
wars” (Buttolph Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff, 2008c:154) 
Two common policy research methods – document analysis and interviews – are deployed 
here. These methods used together allow for the necessary triangulation of data (Van den 
Bulck, 2011:221). The empirical research is based on document analysis, as the main 
research method, and interviews as a complementary fieldwork method.  
Document analysis 
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“A document is ‘any symbolic representation that can be recorded or retrieved for 
analysis’” (Altheide, 1996:2 cited in Karppinen and Moe, 2011:180) and “remains not 
produced or generated by the researcher” (Syvertsen, 2004a:215 cited in Karppinen and 
Moe, 2011:180). Documentary sources – reports published by public bodies, official and 
unofficial records, statistical reports, private papers – are often a “major source of data in 
social research” (Finnegan, 2006:138). They do not embed “neutral asocial” self-evident 
data per se, as their selection and interpretation are determined “not only by practical 
constraints like access and timing, but also by the researcher’s aims and viewpoint” 
(Finnegan, 2006:139). 
Both primary and secondary sources, relevant to the topic under investigation, are 
important in order to conduct thorough research. However, primary sources are of 
particular significance as “the basic and original data for study” (Finnegan, 2006:142).  
“[P]olicy documents and other official documents represent reliable sources of 
factual information about policy processes, whereas secondary sources are useful 
for establishing the background and the importance of events and for evaluating the 
process after the manifest events” (Karppinen and Moe, 2011:181).  
Conventionally, materials that are regarded as primary sources are those that were 
produced “by the people directly involved and at a time contemporary or near 
contemporary with the period being investigated” constituting “the basic and original 
material for providing the researcher’s raw evidence” (Finnegan, 2006:142). Secondary 
sources are “somewhat removed from the actual events” by being brought into being at 
some later time and by containing judgement and interpretation of the “material to be 
found in primary sources” (Finnegan, 2006:142). In other words, they provide 
“information about primary sources” (Finnegan, 2006:150, original emphasis). 
  24 
 
A researcher “can look at how organisations have documented their activities, strategies 
and decisions”, i.e. various official records offer a vast pool of sources of data (Deacon et 
al, 2010:14). Sources that can be categorised as documents, where ideas and actions are 
recorded, include a wide variety of formats and materials, apart from those written and 
printed (Deacon et al, 2010:14-15, 41). All these forms can be used as primary sources and 
are important in information gathering for research (Finnegan 2006:138-143). One of main 
situations “where research may centre mainly or wholly around the analysis of available 
documentation” occurs when “access to people or situations we wish to study is restricted 
or denied” (Deacon et al, 2010:16, 41). “Direct access is a particular problem when 
research focuses on key centres of control over communications”, in which cases 
“researchers have to fall back on information and commentary available in the public 
domain” and these can be useful in tracking the structures of power (Deacon et al, 
2010:17).  
Referring to materials as sources of evidence the criteria of authenticity, credibility and 
representativeness must be considered (Deacon et al, 2010:30-33). Documents come into 
being in particular political, social, cultural, historical or administrative contexts, by which 
they are shaped, i.e. conditions, in which they are embedded and produced, generate 
various pressures or possibilities. In interpreting their sources of information, scholars 
should beware of potential omissions, hidden agendas, inconsistencies, manipulated 
definitions and rhetoric to grasp implicit meanings, apart from direct messages at the 
surface (Deacon et al, 2010: 21, 34; Finnegan, 2006:139, 143-145, 149).  
But even though “analyses of documents may give only limited information on the 
intentions and motives of political actors, they can often help us understand the process of 
creating political definitions and meanings and thus clarify the policy process” (Karppinen 
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and Moe, 2011:189). “Documents can also be considered important statements intended to 
communicate political actions” (Karppinen and Moe, 2011:185). Traditionally, in policy 
analysis documents are used as sources documenting a process, assuming that they 
“somehow reflect the interests or actions of their authors or in some other way represent 
the facts of the policy process they refer to” enabling to “uncover political interests or 
forces and determinants behind policy developments” (Karppinen and Moe, 2011:185). 
For this study, document research has been carried out through an analysis of several 
hundreds of textual documents, most of them from official sources. They included formal 
documents produced by the relevant institutional players and other stakeholders, such as 
draft proposals of the law, positions, opinions, press releases, transcripts of speeches, direct 
quotations from the media sources, and others. Some “leaked” documents have been also 
available. Besides, a vast pool of audio and video materials have also been examined, e.g. 
recordings from the meetings, press briefings and other events, providing considerable 
primary data. A very valuable source of data during this research has proved to be 
recordings from the conference panels and the notes from attended conferences, where 
important policy-related statements were made by the stakeholders, many of which have 
not been available in other sources, as this was still an on-going process. 
Interviews 
The second research method is interviews. “An interview is an encounter between a 
researcher and a respondent, where the respondent’s answers provide the raw data” 
(Harrison and Deicke, 2001:90). 
While in policy research accounts given by the actual political elites, i.e. the actual 
political figures exercising “high influence on the outcome of events or policies” in a 
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certain research area (Pierce, 2008:118) play an important role, in the context of academic 
research the notion of elite is not limited to these, and “elite status depends not on their role 
in society but on their access to information that can help answer a given research 
question” (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002c:320-321, original emphasis). Therefore, 
while people targeted by academic policy research “are often persons of political, social, 
or economic importance, they need not be” (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002c:321, 
original emphasis). Rather, “in qualitative research, all interviewees are regarded as 
‘experts’, that is, they have information in which […] researchers are interested” (Harrison 
and Deicke, 2001:98). As respondents in political research usually (and at times uniquely) 
possess knowledge about some specific aspects of the subject of study, each conversant 
requires an individualised treatment, i.e. a different set of questions (Manheim, Rich and 
Willnat, 2002c:320-321; Harrison and Deicke, 2001:98).  
“In Politics research, the most widely-used type of interview – especially in elite 
interviews – is the semi-structured interview” based on “a limited number of topic-
related questions and, pre-determined, alternative supplementary questions (which 
question further aspects of the answer received)” (Pierce, 2008:118, original emphasis). 
These interviews unfold in a conversational (“question-and-discussion”) mode, where the 
roles of interviewer and interviewee may interchange (Pierce, 2008:118).  
“[I]n elite interviewing, the researcher is interested in learning what the respondent 
perceives as important and relevant to the research and lets the respondent’s 
observations suggest what questions should be asked in order to gain useful 
information. The interviewer is concerned with discovering facts and patterns 
rather than with measuring preselected phenomena” (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 
2002c:321). 
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“Qualitative researchers tend to ask open questions” where open, lengthy answers are 
sought, “concerned with why and how, beliefs, opinions, forecasts and narratives”, etc. 
(Pierce, 2008:118). 
Similarly to dealing with documents, interviews as sources of information are not immune 
from biases and various shortcomings. The accounts provided by the respondents may not 
be objective, offer a distorted or very narrow perspective of the events, contain deliberate 
or unintentional omissions, thus compromising the scientific validity of the obtained data. 
Hence, conclusions should be based on comparison of accounts from different respondents 
as well as other sources, and be theoretically grounded (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 
2002c:321-323).  
However, despite the above limitations, elite interviews may be a valuable part of policy 
research. 
“Many important research questions in political science can be answered only if we 
can learn how certain individuals or types of individuals think and act. For 
example, whereas we can always speculate about reasons for the passage of a 
specific piece of legislation, we can learn the actual reasons only by finding out 
what the legislators thought” (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002c:320). 
Interviews potentially allow access to information about political processes that is 
unavailable elsewhere, but is very useful for a greater understanding of documentary 
materials, events or personalities and related contexts. (Harrison and Deicke, 2001:90-94; 
Pierce, 2008:119-120).  
For the fieldwork undertaken for this study, 19 interviews were conducted with policy 
stakeholders and most of the interviews took place in Brussels. The number of interviews 
exceeded the initial expectations of potential access to the interviewees, especially as far as 
institutional actors are concerned, and included almost all categories of stakeholders 
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(presented in Chapter V). A very rich, multi-faceted body of data has been gained through 
this part of fieldwork. Many similar points were spontaneously made by the interviewees 
coming from different realms of interests, indicating validity of those data. The interviews 
were conducted in the semi-structured mode and the set of questions in each case was 
individually-tailored, due to the differing background of the interviewees and specific 
aspects of the process that needed to be addressed. The interviews lasted between 30 
minutes and 1 hour and 30 minutes, and were performed face-to-face. The respondents 
requested full anonymity. All views expressed during the interviews must be regarded as 
made in personal capacity and not representing any official positions of the respective 
institutions. Access to the interviewees was gained mainly via publicly available contact 
information, such as organisational personnel charts or contact lists, and through 
encounters while attending relevant events such as conferences. Some experts were 
referred to by previous interviewees. Some interview requests were declined or remained 
unreplied, but only a few. Audio recording of the conversations was permitted in several 
cases, but only for a possibility of later review and reflection. In other cases, notes were 
being taken during the sessions. The interviews were conducted between 2014 and 2016. 
There were some follow-up meetings. While, as explained above, subject to variations in 
each case, the interviewees were asked to comment upon the following main themes with 
regard to the GDPR policy process:  
- interaction with other actors (institutional and non-institutional); 
- internal dynamics within institutions and/or other fora; 
- factors that were having an impact on the course and outcomes of the process; 
- actor interests, strategies, constraints and position formation; 
- reasons behind or meanings of certain identified controversies, issues and 
significant developments. 
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The list of interviews is provided in the Annex. 
1.4 The structure of this thesis 
Next Chapter II constitutes the contextual background for this thesis. It covers the concept 
of privacy and the issues arising from the on-line business models. It also discusses 
Internet governance, the US and EU privacy protection regimes as competing paradigms, 
and state surveillance. This Chapter provides an understanding of the issues underlying the 
tensions between different interests in on-line privacy protection-related policy processes. 
Chapter III presents the analytical framework of this study, where the features of the EU 
political system drawing on the chosen theoretical strands (consociationalism, policy 
networks and new institutionalism) are explained. It also includes a discussion on what 
interests are likely to succeed in the EU policy process. Chapter IV provides an analysis of 
the stages of the GDPR stipulation process. It maps the main legislative developments and 
identifies the major areas of tensions between different interests. It explores the shifts in 
the balance between civic and business interests as well as between the interests and 
powers of decision-making actors. Chapter V maps the different levels of policy process, 
the stakeholder constellation, their interests, assets and constraints, as well as strategies. 
This Chapter offers a more in-depth analysis of the actors’ motivations, and how they were 
channelled into the GDPR adoption process in order to explain the processes behind the 
developments discussed in Chapter IV. Chapter VI examines some specific factors that 
shaped the adoption of the GDPR identified during this study and explains what impact 
they had on the process and why. This discussion is necessary to gain a better insight into 
the specific context pertinent to this policy dossier and to make links between some of the 
actors’ behaviour and the related developments in the process that Chapters IV and V 
address respectively. The implications of the choice of instrument (directly applicable 
Regulation), the impact of the Snowden revelations, lobbying, some examples of domestic 
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politics, time dimension, and the role of the CJEU are looked into. The findings of the 
research are synthesised and the main conclusions are presented in the final Chapter VII. 
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CHAPTER II 
The state of privacy in the data-driven environment 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to set out the contextual background for the EU data protection reform. 
The first section (2.2) engages in a conceptual discussion regarding the place of privacy in 
the technology-saturated environment of the twenty-first century. It juxtaposes the political 
economy of the Internet that relies on the monetisation of personal data with the notion of 
privacy as a fundamental right. Section 2.3 looks into the specific privacy-related issues 
arising from the current uses of available digital technologies deployed for commercial 
surveillance. Section 2.4 covers in broad terms the on-going debates on the feasibility of 
Internet regulation and related privacy protection implications in the context of the Internet 
governance. It explains that harms to privacy on-line are not technologically inevitable, but 
are the result of corporate and political decisions. Section 2.5 elaborates on the tensions in 
the field of privacy and data protection deriving from the different privacy protection 
regimes and philosophies between the USA and the EU, and, especially, from the EU 
global prevalence in setting privacy protection standards, which strongly affect the US tech 
industry that dominates the global digital market. Finally, Section 2.6 focuses on the 
Snowden revelations of mass surveillance that began in 2013 and that had a significant 
impact on the process of the EU data protection reform (discussed in detail in Section 6.3). 
This section analyses the impact of state surveillance on privacy and other citizen rights as 
well as the EU response to the Snowden revelations. This contextual chapter informs the 
analysis in the empirical Chapters IV, V, VI and VII. 
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2.2 The concept of privacy versus the political economy of the Internet 
Despite the difficulty of framing the concept precisely (Tapscott, 1996c:272), “privacy” is 
of enormous societal importance. 
“Privacy is [...] an emotional and psychological need, the need to be left alone so 
that a person can reformulate and re-create himself without anyone noticing the 
process. It is this creative aspect of privacy, the inner state of mind that allows a 
person to think about, tinker with, and re-create [her] his personality, which is 
important not only to an individual but to society” (Batra, 2008:75). 
“In Western democratic societies, privacy is the concept that embodies individual 
freedom. As such, privacy touches the foundations of our project of society. It is 
the reason privacy has an impact on a whole range of situations” (Gutwirth, 
2002:113).  
Privacy is understood as “the ability to regulate the flow of information about self. When 
regulation is tight, there is privacy” (Deighton, 2003:138). Privacy consists of several 
dimensions – corporeal, informational, relational, etc. – that refer to various societal 
situations (Edwards and Howells, 2003:214; Nicoll and Prins, 2003:289; Braman, 
2006:126; Van Dijk, 2012:121-122). Corporeal or physical privacy comprises the body and 
its closest surroundings (also known as spatial privacy). Relational privacy is perceived as 
“the right to select contacts without observation and intrusion” (Van Dijk, 2012:122). 
Informational privacy is “the right to selective disclosure”, i.e. the control the individuals 
have over their own “personal data and over the information or decisions based on these 
data” (Van Dijk, 2012:122). “Data protection” originates in the latter (Van Dijk, 2012:121-
122). While informational and relational aspects of privacy have been primarily affected 
by the use of the ICT, bodily privacy has been more and more co-opted into the cyberspace 
as well through various technological developments, such as DNA tests, body scanners, 
digitised biometrics, electronically administered health records, CCTV, drones, etc. These 
allow turning the characteristics of physical body and physical space into data that can be 
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collected, processed and exchanged, as it is the case with the Internet of Things and 
wearable fitness technology, for instance. While for long time data protection was viewed 
as a subset of the broader right to privacy, current academic debates have started 
distinguishing the two concepts, especially in the light of institutionalisation of the right to 
protection of personal data as an autonomous right in the EUCFR, Lisbon Treaty and 
earlier in the Convention 108 of the Council of Europe of 1981. At the same time, it is 
recognised that these two rights remain closely intertwined and overlapping (Gellert and 
Gutwirth, 2013; González Fuster, 2014), for which reason the emerging separation 
between privacy and data protection does not have an impact on the analytical perspective 
of this study that will rely on the two concepts as interchangeable terms.  
In continental Europe, the concept of privacy as a right matured in the nineteenth century 
when privacy related laws started emerging (e.g. in France and Germany), linking the need 
to protect it to the notion of personality rights and individual autonomy, that is human 
dignity (or honour) in a broader sense, perceived as fundamental values. The creation of 
explicit legal protections was prompted by evolving means of communications – 
liberalisation and growth of the press, and later photography and other technologies 
(Lindsay and Ricketson, 2010:133-136). Anonymity is deemed to be an essential condition 
in many circumstances to enable one’s private life, and protection of privacy to a great 
extent depends on whether a person’s interactions on-line can remain anonymous (Nicoll et 
al, 2003; Van Dijk, 2012:128).  
Gradually, apart from national law and constitutions, the right to privacy has been 
enshrined in a series of international documents (see box.1), designed to establish and 
harmonise the universally accepted human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
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Box. 1. Some of the main documents establishing international protection of the right 
to privacy and/or personal data protection 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948;  
European Convention on Human Rights 1950;  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; 
OECD Privacy Protection Guidelines 1980, 2011, 2013; 
Council of Europe Convention 108 (for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data) 1981; 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
The EUCFR formulates the right to privacy in the Article 7 as “everyone has the right to 
respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications” (EUCFR, 2000). 
“There is universal recognition of the fundamental importance, and enduring relevance, of 
the right to privacy and of the need to ensure that it is safeguarded, in law and in practice” 
(UN, 2014:3). The right to privacy is also “an enabler for other democratic institutions and 
rights” (Irion and Luchetta, 2013:31; see also Section 2.6). It is the “the most 
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized man” (Brandeis, 1928 cited 
in Brown and Marsden, 2013c:48). Nonetheless, it has to be noted, that the right to privacy 
is not absolute and is limited by other social needs and rights, with which it competes, 
including security, the freedom of expression, and economic efficiency. (Van Dijk, 
2012:127, 131; Batra, 2008:44). The latter is linked to in particular the “interests-based” 
approach to the protection of privacy that has been developing in Western societies with 
common law tradition, e.g. England, USA and Australia, in parallel to the continental 
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“rights-based” approach situated in the civil law system. The “interests-based” approach 
resulted in a fragmented legal privacy protection landscape and a market-led self-
regulation mechanism practised to address privacy-related issues. Countries with this 
tradition lean towards lesser governmental intervention in the regulation of the economy in 
general. Consequently, such jurisdictions treat the disclosure and use of personal 
information for commercial purposes, e.g. direct marketing, more liberally (Lindsay and 
Ricketson, 2010:136-144). The political economy of the Internet embodied the shift 
towards this paradigm.  Monetisation of personal identity has been a consequence of the 
wider process of commodification of information, communication and the media (Mosco, 
2005:170; Braman, 2006:13-15). Information, its processing and flows in the late twentieth 
century began to be treated as “services” that in economic terms act as products and can be 
exchanged, i.e. traded alike material goods (Braman, 2006:13-15). Overall, in the modern 
economies information and communication flows turned from being only one of the 
economic layers into being the predominant economic activity, more important than 
physical artefacts. This new kind of economy has been vehicled through ICT networks 
(Van Dijk, 2012:69). Threats to privacy derive from this wider context of the political 
economy in the cyberspace that led, for instance, to the use of tracking software by 
commercial entities, e.g. Internet service providers. Customers profiling through gathering, 
packaging and sharing information on their choices on the Internet can be understood as 
another stage of commodification of content and audiences (Mosco, 2005:170-171). 
Conceptualisation of information, including personal, as a commodity and a policy shift 
away from public good, societal function and value paradigm of the role of 
communication, when “messages are exchanged in the process of building and sustaining 
community” (Braman, 2006:14), coincided with digitisation which enabled precise 
measurement and monitoring of each information transaction to help the delivery of 
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targeted audience to advertisers (Mosco, 2005:157-158). This translated into an aggressive 
push towards “personalised web”, independently from user preferences (Hoofnagle et al, 
2012), demanding more and more access to personal information needed to customise 
products and services. While some favour the benefits of customisation (Acquisti, 2010:7-
11; Privacy Laws & Business, 2015a), one of its critics Morozov (2013) points out the 
emergence of the “solutionism” culture or the exaggerated urge to solve problems before 
they are even formulated and most likely to a far greater extent than needed, imposed by 
the Internet companies. In more economic terms, “solutionism” refers to creating and 
selling goods of questionable necessity or utility to the consumer and the society at large 
(Morozov, 2013). Moreover, web content-tailoring, when content is diverged through 
filtering based on individual profiles, can actually disadvantage users, preventing them 
from access to certain types of information (alternatives) or making such access very 
difficult (Roosendaal, 2013: 145,148,152). Pariser (2011) termed this “the filter bubble”. 
While even the effectiveness of targeted advertising is still questionable, the massive data 
collection may affect data subjects (individuals concerned) in numerous ways (Roosendaal, 
2013: 150-151), as Sections 2.3 and 2.6 elaborate. Big data economy created and 
strengthened informational power asymmetries (EDPS, 2014d). 
The users’ attitudes proved to encompass a paradox. While seriously being concerned 
about the privacy risks on-line, at the same time they have demonstrated readiness to give 
up personal information in exchange to minimal of even nihil benefits (CNIL, 2013b:15). 
The phenomenon of self-exposure on social media is to illustrate such behaviour (Irion and 
Luchetta, 2013:35-36). “Serious questions arise, however, about the extent to which 
consumers are truly aware of what data they are sharing, how and with whom, and to what 
use they will be put” (UN, 2014:6; see also Sections 2.3 and 2.6). This in addition 
combines with the factor that the digital economy largely, although not exclusively, draws 
  37 
 
on so-called “free” services. Such business models deploy behavioural economics that 
emerged in the 1970s and looked into how something positioned or depicted as “free” may 
drive irrational economic behaviour, when the reality of the costs of the “free” being built 
into prices of something else the consumers directly or indirectly will ultimately pay for, is 
overlooked. The psychological effect of “free” determines people’s irrational choices 
(Anderson, 2010:63-66). The “freeconomics” is based on “cross-subsidies”, i.e. “shifting 
money around from product to product, from person to person, between now and later, or 
into non-monetary markets and back out again” (Anderson, 2010:20). This means that at 
some point the user of “free” products and services will find themselves paying for them in 
one form or another in the overall cycle of exchange of goods and services. For example, 
the access to free content supported by advertising will result in paying for more expensive 
goods, for which the advertising was needed (Anderson, 2010:20, 25). It is one of the on-
line business models that encompass the three-party or two-sided market, where one 
customer class subsidises another. “In each case, the costs are distributed and/or hidden 
enough to make the primary goods feel free to consumers” (Anderson, 2010:25). 
Therefore, the claim that personal data are being exchanged for “free” services is half-true 
and paying with personal data means paying twice for the same product or service. But as 
for many Internet companies maximisation of participation in the on-line platforms they 
run is “the matter of death and life” (Van Dijk, 2012:98), the public is encountering a 
strong encouragement to release their personal information for what is offered as more 
convenient (“smart”) life. Although even privacy-preserving data-mining exists, these 
technologies are not much spoken about as they “imply a shifting of cost and 
revenues between data holders and data subjects” (Acquisti, 2013). Conversely, the voices 
coming from the biggest beneficiaries of data business, such as Google and Facebook, 
have been attempting a push of a new ideology that dismisses or even deviates the value of 
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privacy and people’s individual prerogative of constructing their identities (Finley, 2014). 
Among many arguments that can be made to contrast the view that privacy has become an 
irrelevant social value, such standpoint can be juxtaposed with a comment by a reader of a 
BBC article, saying: 
“So what’s wrong with being gay? Nothing. Now. Not in this country. Fifty years 
ago, you’d have gone to jail for it. 
 
In Austria at the start of the 20th century there was nothing wrong with being 
Jewish. 40 years later it carried the death penalty. 
 
People have the right to a certain level of privacy, because who knows what the 
future may bring?” (JonnyBoy, on-line comment in Cellan-Jones, 2014). 
Although these are not yet without pitfalls themselves8, the popularity of various services 
that offer privacy enhancing features of some kind, such as private messaging platforms 
WhatsApp, Snapchat, or “anti-social” or secretive apps, reveal the tendency of longing for 
more private communication on-line and a lifestyle with more possibilities to remain 
unnoticed, when the need is (Gittleson, 2014; BBC, 2014c; Fitzgerald, 2014). The 
importance of privacy, therefore, is not vanished. Some studies also show that users would 
pay a fee for more control over their data and opt for more privacy-friendly products when 
they have such choice (Irion and Luchetta, 2013:35-36). At the time of writing this work 
(2013-2016), a certain shift of paradigm has been tangible in terms of the public’s 
propensity to give away their personal information that exploded in particular in the decade 
of the rise of social networking. A number of comments have been emerging, pointing out 
                                                          
8 Such private messaging is mainly offered by small start-ups, some of which have been purchased later by 
large Internet companies with poor user privacy-related reputation. This was the case with WhatsApp’s 
acquisition by Facebook in 2014 (Rawlinson, 2014) and Blink’s by Yahoo! in 2014 (Fitzgerald, 2014). In the 
latter case Blink’s services were ceased after the acquisition. Besides, data privacy and data handling by the 
companies offering these apps are not without issues, either. For example, Snapchat, one of the most popular 
of such services, has been subject of several breaches and charges of misrepresentations of how the product 
actually worked in terms of advertised ephemerality of communications (FTC, 2014; Olivarez-Giles, 2014). 
Failings in dealing with user personal information is a broader problem concerning almost the entire apps 
industry (Rice, 2013; ICO, 2014). 
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the crest of such attitude and that availability of personal data is about to decline and to 
become more expensive in terms of users personal input (BBC, 2014c; Ward, 2014; Kobie, 
2015). However, more personal data will be generated through other sources, i.e. through 
more and more devices being connected to the Internet (see Section 2.3.1).  
Furthermore, given the enormous significance the Internet has acquired in the society, a 
discourse has been emerging regarding the conceptualisation of the medium itself. Is it a 
human right and should be treated as a public utility or is it a business to be driven by 
market forces and to function as an oligopoly, as it is now? (Siegelbaum, 2014).  
“Despite the specific challenges posed by the increasing use of digital technologies, it is 
essential to ensure that fundamental rights are promoted and protected on-line in the same 
way and to the same extent as in the offline world” (FRA, no date). The arrival of such 
now primitive technologies as an analogue photo camera contributed to the notion of 
privacy becoming enshrined in law. The arrival of gadgets that include “an embedded 
camera, microphone, GPS, mini-screens and a touchpad […] with access to the Internet” 
(CNIL, 2013a), should thus be an indicator of the need for a sound progression, rather than 
regression of privacy safeguards. 
2.3 What endangers privacy on-line 
2.3.1 Main changes in the technology and privacy landscape since mid-1990s 
The time span of roughly two decades between the drafting of the previous major EU data 
protection instrument in the first half of the 1990s – the Directive 95/46/EC – and the 
recent data protection reform 2012-2016 encompasses enormous changes in 
communication technology, its diffusion and uses. At the time of adoption of the earlier 
legislation in 1995, the Internet uptake in Europe amounted to less than 1%. In 2012, when 
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the proposals of the reform were published, there were 250 million daily Internet users in 
the EU (Commission, 2012a; Commission, 2012b). Not only this. A whole range of new 
devices, services and applications has emerged leading to an exponential growth in data-
rich transactions. These novelties include e-commerce, e-government, e-banking, 
electronic signatures, smart payment and customer loyalty cards, the “apps” industry, 
widespread use of search engines and Internet browsers, social media, GPS, smart mobile 
telephony or other mobile platforms with direct Internet connections, CCTV, digitised 
biometrics, cloud computing, “fitness tech”, smart household appliances, etc. As it can be 
seen, administrative, business and personal communication has largely shifted onto digital 
systems. In addition, the on-line and off-line lives have been steadily merging, referring to 
the above-mentioned CCTV, fitness data, location registering applications, amongst others, 
as well as various physical movement trackers or even facial recognition used, for 
example, by retailers (Hudson, 2013b; Datoo, 2014). The fact and extent of being 
monitored often remains unknown to the involved individuals, like it was in the case of 
smartphone trackers placed on the street bins in central London (Miller, 2013). Such 
environment is only expected to evolve further, with increasing transmission of personal 
data over networks as well as its storage and processing at remote locations (servers). 
Accordingly, it has posed a lot of risks to the safety of personal information and requires 
adequate safeguards (EDPS, 2014e:5). Besides, the longer-term effects of so much 
personal data generated through pervasive use of technology and of these data being 
available to often random parties, unknown to data subjects, are yet to be uncovered. 
Social media, for instance, can exemplify how the use of technological innovations may 
lead to unpredictable outcomes. People “think they are engaging in personal conversations 
but actually they are public” (Van Dijk, 2012:185). A study established that “if on 
Facebook you share posts with friends of friends, an average of over 150,000 people can 
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read it” (Hudson, 2013a). Another research found out, that users’ religion, political 
leanings, race, sexuality and even intelligence can be fairly accurately inferred through an 
analysis of the “likes” on Facebook. Moreover, the same is applicable “to all digital 
records - from browser histories to search queries” (BBC, 2013a). Under the EU data 
protection Directive 95/46/EC, such characteristics as race, religion, political views and 
sexuality are treated as highly sensitive personal data, granted even stricter protections than 
other types of personal information. Not less alarmingly, in June 2014 Facebook was 
reported of having “conducted a psychology experiment on nearly 700,000 users without 
their knowledge. The test saw Facebook ‘manipulate’ news feeds to control which 
emotional expressions the users were exposed to” (BBC, 2014k). While the breach of 
ethics in this case was heatedly debated, it is also disturbing that the experiment carried out 
in 2012 emerged only in 2014, i.e. two years later. During this time Facebook was free to 
do whatever it wished with the findings of the study. Also, the fact emerged only because it 
was published as an academic study. Facebook, reportedly used by about half of world’s 
Internet users (Hope, 2015), may not necessarily publicise all such activities and they may 
remain beyond control and scrutiny. Tracking and profiling of web users by Facebook that 
do not even have an account with it also emerged in some studies (Roosendaal, 2013:133-
138,148; Acar et al, 2015). In the meantime, many people perceive social networking 
platforms such as Facebook as “just the latest extension of the Internet” (GSMIS, 2013). 
In recent years, breaches of private information stored in digital databases or circulating 
around digital networks escalated to such levels that they have been making daily 
headlines. The sources of these disclosures of personal data vary, including human errors, 
negligence, indiscretion of malicious insiders as well as hacking9 (Batra, 2008:74; OECD, 
                                                          
9 An unauthorized access of a device, platform or system in order to obtain or alter information. 
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2011:38; Big Brother Watch, 2014; BBC, 2014b; Tufnell, 2014; Smith, 2016). Hacking, 
for instance, has been affecting networks in such an exponential manner that was 
commented upon by some as “a new normal” (Lee, 2014). Only between autumn 2013 and 
spring 2014 several of the most popular digital consumer platforms faced cyber-attacks or 
uncovered vulnerabilities. These cases, amongst others, involved Adobe (BBC, 2013g), 
Facebook, Google, Yahoo, Twitter, LinkedIn (BBC, 2013h), US retailer Target (BBC, 
2014f) and eBay (Kelion, 2014b), summing up as exposure of details as sensitive as 
names, email addresses and encrypted passwords, physical addresses, phone numbers and 
dates of birth, credit card information of several hundreds of millions of users. While not 
even the largest players, with bespoke IT security forces, can guarantee a 100% security 
(Kelion, 2014a), smaller firms often lack the very resources and expertise to exercise 
adequate measures needed for data protection (Tufnell, 2014). Along with these problems, 
there are many issues affecting users’ rights, related to the use of technologies preventing 
people from shielding themselves from the collection of their personal information in the 
pursuit of commercial monitoring. This is discussed in the next subsection.  
2.3.2 Commercial surveillance and how it is aided by technology 
As earlier covered in Section 2.2, the commercial value of information is immense for the 
Internet economy and personal data have become a core asset for on-line businesses. Often 
obtaining such data is the main purpose why on-line services are provided. Normally 
personal data are collected and processed not only to optimise companies’ own services 
but are also sold to other businesses (Edwards and Howells, 200:207-222; Batra, 2008:100, 
OECD, 2011). All actions performed by users on the Internet leave a so-called “digital 
footprint” allowing constant tracking of on-line activities. The enormous amounts of 
personal information collected and stored by business entities often comprise real names, 
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age, marital and financial status, off-line contact details and e-mail addresses, individual 
lifestyle patterns, and so forth (Edwards and Howells, 2003:207-222; Van Dijk, 2012:4, 
18, 122-127). The currently available technologies enable almost instantaneous processing, 
linking and transmission of vast volumes of data, that is they allow data-mining – 
production and trade of the newly inferred information from the originally available 
(Chadwick, 2006:257-288; Van Dijk, 2012:121-122). In most cases, information can be 
gathered “invisibly” through monitoring on-line activities without users’ awareness and 
consent. This is covered in more detail bellow. 
One pervasive way to perform on-line tracking is “cookies” – a technology of placing 
small text files on the Internet users’ devices (Edwards and Howells, 2003:216-218, 234-
235; Van Dijk, 2012:124-126; Batra, 2008:99).  “Cookies” contain a string of numbers 
acting as unique identifiers of a concrete computer. Commonly, distinction is made 
between first-party “cookies”, issued by the visited website, and third-party “cookies”, 
installed by companies that have no relationship with the visitors of a given website. The 
latter are usually used to track users across different websites, so the majority of this type 
of “cookies” derive from web advertising firms seeking on-line profiling for the sake of 
targeted marketing. The placement of third-party “cookies” is allowed by most websites 
(Hoofnagle et al, 2012:275-276, 279-281). Some technical means (e.g. blockage or 
deletion of “cookies”) are available for users, but commercial actors are known to engage 
in covert collection of information through digital interfaces, even when their users opt out 
of data sharing with other parties. For instance, a developer GoldenShores Technologies 
running the Brightest Flashlight app on Android devices was caught sharing details, such 
as ID and location data, from all users with ad networks without informing the users about 
this practice and regardless of whether they agreed or not. This incident involved tens of 
millions of Android users (BBC, 2013i). In another case a user detected personal data leaks 
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through a LG Smart TV portal that persisted even in opt-out mode. Not only the family’s 
TV content preferences where monitored, but even the children’s names were identified 
and sent to the LG servers, i.e. travelled through the Internet backbone (Kelion, 2013). A 
very important circumstance in this case was that the user who detected private 
information leakage from his home through a “smart-tech” item is, in fact, a worker in the 
IT sphere, possessing certain expertise that enabled him to read the technical data on his 
smart device. This implies that “average” users in most cases would very likely remain 
unaware of such breaches while using their devices. 
As an extensive study by Hoofnagle et al (2012) shows, a number of new methods, 
adopted by advertisers in recent years, that are more difficult for users to detect and avoid, 
have been identified. These technologies, known as ETags, Flash “cookies”, HTML5 local 
storage, and Evercookies, are significantly more persistent than standard HTTP “cookies”, 
as they are based on respawning tracking mechanisms, in order to resist user attempts to 
delete or block “cookies” or other unique identifiers. Consequently, users can be tracked 
even when a browser is set for the private mode (Hoofnagle et al, 2012: 277, 281-290).  
Another category of tracking technique, called digital fingerprinting, uniquely identifies 
users by recording specific attributes on a device that constitute browser configuration. As 
such mechanism is enacted on servers, it is rather difficult for users to trace. To avoid it, 
they would have to disable such key functionalities of websites as JavaScript and Adobe’s 
Flash (Acar et al, 2014). An on-line tracking company BlueCava was reported in 2010 as 
having fingerprinted 200 million devices and aiming “to have catalogued one billion of the 
world’s [then] estimated 10 billion devices” within the following year “to sell this 
information to advertisers” (Angwin and Valentino-Devries, 2010).  
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One more common practice is that popular sites are designed in a way that sensitive and 
identifiable personal information entered by users is directly leaked to third-party 
aggregators, despite statements in privacy policies of those website about not sharing data 
with such third parties. It also occurs that “third-party tracking sites disguise themselves as 
first parties”, rendering “consumers’ attempts to block third-party cookies ineffective”, 
because, as a result, they are not recognised as such but instead as first-party “cookies” 
(Hoofnagle et al, 2012:280-281). 
The application of the above described methods means that individuals can be uniquely 
and continuously tracked even if they have taken “reasonable steps to avoid on-line 
profiling” (Hoofnagle et al, 2012: 283). This empirical evidence reveals that users’ choices 
are persistently and pervasively invalidated by the commercial players involved in targeted 
marketing. On-line tracking, driven by behavioural advertising, is “the offer you cannot 
refuse”: consumers’ preferences are overridden in most sophisticated ways, enabled by 
bespoke technologies (Hoofnagle et al, 2012: 278, 290-295). Tracking related intrusions 
concern not only individual users and their devices but also extend to unauthorised 
interferences with the policies and operation of other commercial players. In one such case 
it was discovered that the e-mail addresses of LinkedIn users were exposed through an 
add-on tool Sell Hack on the Chrome browser. The company who created and ran this 
extension commented that it was aiding marketing professionals, and doing “the heavy 
lifting and complicated computing to save you time” without doing anything wrong to 
LinkedIn (BBC, 2014d). Third-party extensions or apps, often can upload private 
information kept on social networks without notice and explicit consent (BBC, 2014d). In 
another of such cases, Google has been sanctioned by the US federal and state authorities 
and has seen a lawsuit filed against the company in the UK for bypassing privacy settings 
of Safari browser (BBC, 2015c). This browser is set by default to automatically reject 
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tracking “cookies”. “But Google got around this block by adding code to some of its 
adverts to make Safari think that the user had made an exception for its cookie if they 
interacted with the ad” allowing “the firm to track people’s web-use habits even if they had 
not given it permission to do so” (BBC, 2012a). To continue the list, the Microsoft’s 
browser Internet Explorer has also been subject of circumventions of its privacy design, 
offered to the users. This browser by default blocked any third-party “cookies” from the 
sites if a machine-readable privacy policy was not detected. As it was discovered by some 
researchers, thousands of websites were overcoming this barrier by posting fake machine-
readable policies, thus “misrepresenting their privacy practices […] misleading users and 
rendering privacy protection tools ineffective” (Leon et al, 2010 cited in Hoofnagle et al, 
2012:291-292).  
Another technology that raises privacy concerns is the use of the Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI) by the ISPs. This is when the inspection of the data packages travelling over the 
Internet is not limited to the reading of the IP addresses (headers), necessary to route 
packets (i.e. for the transportation and delivery of messages), but involves the examination 
of the content and application data, that enables insights into users’ web activities, 
compromising their privacy expectations. Namely, this “may encompass interception, 
collection, observation, analysis and storage of application-level data” (Cooper, 2011:145). 
This technology can be used to address network congestion and security threats. It can also 
help to examine how networks are being used to carry out appropriate upgrades. At the 
same time, and most importantly, “DPI is among a set of tools that can provide ISPs with 
the new revenue streams, whether by funnelling data about users to advertisers, selling 
expedited delivery to content providers or levying extra fees on heavy network users” 
(Cooper, 2011:140). E-mail providers such as Google and Yahoo! have been criticised for 
keyword-scanning e-mail messages. While the firms claim this is being done to tackle 
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spam and viruses, they admit that the same process is being used to target their users with 
tailored advertising (BBC, 2011; BBC, 2013c). 
Apart from advertisers and Internet businesses, there are other industries interested in 
having less restrictions on data-sharing and more access to it. These are pharmaceutical 
companies, insurers and retailers, for instance, seeking to exploit what is called Big Data 
(Datoo, 2014; Wall, 2014; Batra, 2008:44). Recently, in the UK, for example, the 
government’s scheme to create a national health care database that would grant access to 
commercial actors has challenged the longstanding institution of patient confidentiality 
(Ramesh, 2014a). The scheme was later scrapped due to the public outcry related to data 
protection issues. 
The stress by the industry is on the use of aggregated anonymised or pseudonymised data 
that, allegedly, are disconnected from identifiable real persons. However, it is more and 
more questioned whether anonymity of digital data can be really assured, as a number of 
methods are known that allow easy identification of real people and matching them with 
their profiles by cross-linking various personal information available from different 
sources (Ohm, 2010; Hoofnagle et al, 2012:292-3; Roosendaal, 2013:99-153; Burn-
Murdoch, 2013; Ramesh, 2014b; Rutkin, 2015).  This can be as far-reaching as combining 
on-line and off-line data (Roosendaal, 2013:143-146). Presently, there is far more 
investment directed into development of technologies enabling fusion of data than into 
privacy-enhancing methods allowing “to obscure personally identifiable information 
within large data sets […] re-identification is becoming more powerful than de-
identification” (White House, 2014b:54). 
2.3.3 How commercial surveillance affects the Internet users 
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Advancements in data processing software allow most sophisticated analysis of personal 
information producing a whole new tier of digital intelligence, which is secondary or 
inferred information obtained through behavioural and predictive analytics. These 
technologies and methods are able to provide insights into even as private and sensitive 
sides of one’s life as the fact of pregnancy, sexuality, religious beliefs, or health conditions, 
through analysis of individual digital data (Naughton, 2013; see also Subsection 2.3.1). 
“New, non-obvious, unexpectedly powerful uses of data” are enabled by Big Data 
technologies (White House, 2014b:54). Personal information “may end up being shared 
with or passed to persons or companies who were never contemplated by the data subjects 
when the information was originally collected” (Edwards and Howells, 2003:209). 
Therefore, “it is increasingly difficult for individuals to understand and make choices 
related to the uses of their personal data” (OECD, 2011:5). Apart from serious ethical 
questions deriving from the notion that privacy is a matter of human dignity and from here 
the need was to have it established as a fundamental right, various forms of tracking and 
profiling may have a number of tangible consequences in the off-line life. This may affect 
the employability of concerned individuals and their access to social and financial services 
(such as insurance or loans), or expose them to fraud, etc. Moreover, decisions about 
persons, without their knowledge, can be made referring to the incorrectly inferred or 
recorded information (Deighton, 2003:137-139; Batra, 2008:91-122; Edwards and 
Howells, 2003:208-222; Van Dijk, 2012:122-126; Naughton, 2013; Kelion, 2015). In most 
cases the information processing is automated (OECD, 2011), deploying algorithm 
computing, without involving individuals concerned or checking that information. This 
poses a substantial risk that unfair conclusions about persons can be drawn (Edwards and 
Howells, 2003:208-222; Van Dijk, 2012:122-126; Batra, 2008:91-122). As explained by 
Lyon (2003; 2007c:99-108, 115-117), who laid foundations for surveillance studies, 
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profiling inevitably leads to social sorting and discriminatory treatment of categorised 
individuals or groups. In the meantime, people categorisation is a widespread practice, 
seeking customisation of services and products, in order to maximise commercial gains 
(Edwards and Howells, 2003:208-222; Van Dijk, 2012:122-126; Batra, 2008:91-122). 
Risks to privacy are one of the greatest concerns among Internet users, according to a 
number of surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2011; Eurobarometer, 2015; GSMA, 2014; 
Symantec, 2015). In addressing the need “to mitigate the privacy risks to individuals posed 
by monitoring, unanticipated secondary usage, and data security breaches” (OECD, 
2011:5) such elements as operators’ accountability, data minimisation, purpose limitation, 
privacy-by-design, explicit informed consent, breach notification, and others, are 
articulated in the policy debates. While many safeguards had been already enshrined in the 
EU law, they needed to be upgraded in the light of the proliferated use of advanced 
technologies that have made control over one’s personal data very difficult. The GDPR 
was aimed at delivering such an upgrade. 
2.4 How privacy and data protection on-line is affected by Internet governance issues 
2.4.1 Internet governance and the implications for the data protection on-line 
The Internet operates as a network of networks where data are transmitted in small 
packages. The emergence of the Internet and its exponential growth posed a new 
regulatory frontier and a number of challenges to centralised models of control. Primarily, 
it represented “a major disruption in the way we regulate communication and information 
technology” (Mueller, 2010:4). Digital convergence brought together different media 
forms onto this new platform. Press, telephony, broadcasting and postal correspondence, 
previously were regulated with different approaches. As the Internet embraced all these 
forms of communication, the distinction between public and private as well as between 
  50 
 
mass and interpersonal communication has blurred, bringing along various regulatory 
perplexities (Van Dijk, 2012:153). Privacy is one of the dimensions directly affected by 
this dynamics, as the secrecy of telephone and mail communications, perceived as private 
and interpersonal, traditionally was protected as a value and a right (Van Dijk, 2012: 153). 
This societal institution of communication privacy contrasts with how potentially many 
parties may gain access to monitoring of private communication on the Internet. 
There are other challenges, too. As the Internet, due to its architecture, has made the scope 
of communication global, “any attempt to impose a jurisdictional overlay on it requires 
additional (costly) interventions” (Mueller, 2010:4). Besides, the sheer volume of 
transactions and distributed decentralised control puts pressures on the traditional 
governmental processes in responding to this rapidly evolving environment (Mueller, 
2010: 4-5). At a certain stage, these novelties even prompted the idea of non-regulable 
Internet (or cyber-libertarianism), that was seen as a dawning of a new era of liberalisation 
from the centralised governmental control (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006: 11-27). Such 
paradigm, though, proved to be a short-lived fallacy. “There has been a counter- 
revolution, as states and other incumbent powers have fought back against these 
disruptions and innovations, asserting their sovereignty and coming up with new ways to 
border or regulate the Internet” (Mueller, 2010: 4). While networked governance, 
attributed to the Internet, may be seen by some as undermining the traditional hierarchical 
authority (Mueller, 2010: 31-48), it should not be overlooked, that governments can 
network, too, and “create their own networked organisations and avail themselves of the 
capabilities of networking to defend and advance their own interests” (Mueller, 2010: 48). 
States are not static entities. States are transformative and adaptive, and can draw on 
various sources of capacity to cope with domestic and external changes. Most importantly, 
states themselves are catalysts of those changes (Weiss, 1998). Morozov (2011) reminds us 
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that governments are not excluded from taking advantage of what the new medium 
embeds. In fact, electronic networks provide them with another platform through which 
control is exercised, enabling citizen surveillance (as covered in Section 2.6). In some 
cases, the Internet can facilitate, not hinder, enforcement of the territorial law (Goldsmith 
and Wu, 2006:10). It is also worth remembering that citizens’ access to the Internet, the 
technologies involved (e.g. fiber, satellite or wireless) as well as the conditions within 
which service suppliers operate, all significantly rely on political decisions such as the 
rolling out of communications infrastructure that requires costly investments (BBC, 2014j). 
It also has to do with the management of such scarce resources as radio frequencies, among 
a vast number of other factors. Looking further into this point, the very inception of the 
Internet was actually fostered and financed by governments and the technology was born 
in the late 1960s as a pursuit of a military asset (Brown and Halter 2010:281-291), alike 
many other communication systems or technologies (e.g. see Harford, 2016). Although 
since then the medium has become available to billions of users that engage with it in most 
mundane ways, the original purpose of the creation of the Internet is still present in the 
speculations on the cyber-war (Van Dijk, 2012:101) as well as in the debates surrounding 
surveillance (see Section 2.6). The fact that the creation of the Internet was subsidised by 
the government and intended for defence purposes, and that it is still subsidised by public 
money in a lot of cases, contrasts with the ideas about “cyber freedom” and its immunity 
from regulation. 
Global Internet regulation can be enacted through various methods, such as treaties, like in 
the case of cybercrime convention, WTO governed trade disputes, like in the case of web 
gambling, regional pressure drawing on the market power, like in the case of the EU 
privacy rules, and Internet technical architecture, like in the case of the US dominated 
ICANN. (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006: 176). The latter, also known as “Code as a law” 
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concept, was most famously developed by Lessig (e.g. 2006). The preferences of the 
“code-writers” – the actors that are engaged in the engineering of the technical architecture 
of the cyberspace – determine the way the Internet operates. The “code-writers”, however, 
fall under the authority of other actors that have the decision-making power within their 
jurisdictional competence. Thus, they can impose their preferences on the “code-writers”. 
This perspective is particularly important in discussing data protection on-line. “Privacy 
harm is no technical inevitability; it is a matter of deliberate design by governments and 
corporations” (Van Dijk, 2012:297) pursued instead of implementation of the “privacy-by-
design”10. Although some technological boundaries exist, what is regulated and in which 
ways is ultimately a matter of political will (Tambini, Leonardi and Marsden, 2008:14-16). 
“The Internet is the product of state and corporate governance choices, not solely the result 
of the choices made by the scientists and engineers who designed it” (Mansell, 2012:156) 
and even in such a complex environment as the cyberspace and the context of global 
economy, i.e. acknowledging more distributed power dynamics, the governments still hold 
the ultimate decision-making power and are able to exercise it, when they consider it 
needed (Drezner, 2007:91-118). Indeed, the Internet did not emerge as all-privacy-
unfriendly and was gradually shaped as a privacy undermining environment (Harper, 
2011:129-134). Such features as the use of “cookies” or DPI, e-mail scanning or facial 
recognition, to make some examples, were all introduced at a certain point with 
commercial or political goals. “Technological changes do not determine social interactions, 
but they do have distinctive effects that are derived from the way their unique capabilities 
interact with the interests of specific actors and the institutional environment” (Bendrath 
and Mueller, 2011:1143, original emphasis). 
                                                          
10 Privacy-by-design is a concept of “building privacy and data protection up front, into the design 
specifications and architecture of information and communication systems and technologies, in order to 
facilitate compliance with privacy and data protection principles” (EDPS, Privacy by design). 
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Although, as covered above, the ungovernability of the Internet is an outdated orthodoxy, 
the debate around privacy issues on the web is heavily fuelled by scepticism promoted by 
commercial actors, such as American Internet giants and also some Silicon Valley-inspired 
European companies, depicting regulatory attempts as pointless or even harmful, and a 
privacy-poor Internet environment as the reality that needs to be accepted (BBC, 2012b; 
Brown and Marsden, 2013c:62; Cellan-Jones, 2014). However, the behaviour of the 
Internet firms is inconsistent with their narrative that the way the medium operates cannot 
or should not be altered. As Goldsmith and Wu wrote (2006:1-10), Yahoo!, for example, 
had a controversy with the French authorities over the Nazi content on their website in the 
late 1990s. The American firm initially rejected the demands to remove hate speech 
content from the French version of the website. They claimed that France had no 
jurisdictional power (i.e. the Internet is global), that it was not technically possible to 
differentiate between the visitors of the website from different countries, and that they 
valued the freedom of speech. Soon, it turned out, that the French version of the website 
was managed through the servers located in Europe, allowing France to exercise certain 
authority. Besides, it became evident that Yahoo! could effectively screen out up to 90 
percent of French users. What is more, not long afterwards, in sharp contrast to their earlier 
statements about the impossibility of geographical screening, the company started 
delivering geographically-targeted advertising. Finally, the previously stated Yahoo!’s 
attachment to the values of free speech and democratic freedoms were not an obstacle to 
collaborate with the Chinese government a few years later in censoring the access of 
Chinese citizens to on-line content. It also complied with the Chinese authorities’ demand 
to help identify the sender of an anti-governmental memorandum. The journalist, who did 
so using a Yahoo! e-mail account, was sent to prison for ten years. Yahoo! (in contrast 
with their earlier attitude towards the French demands) commented, that they had to follow 
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the local law (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:1-10). Google is another American company with 
a similar Chinese track record (Amnesty International, 2006; Lessig, 2006:61-80). The 
firm’s response to the CJEU ruling in spring 2014 imposing the so-called “right-to-be-
forgotten”11, i.e. the references to unfeasibility, harm to innovation and democratic 
freedoms (Cellan-Jones, 2014; BBC, 2014h; Toobin, 2014) resonates with the above-
described Yahoo!’s case pre-dated by more than a decade. Companies themselves show 
that there is nothing inevitably inherent about the way the web functions, by “adding or 
subtracting at least one feature per week” (Morozov, 2013:20).  
2.4.2 How privacy protection on-line can be enacted 
Overall, a sound privacy protection on-line requires a complex approach that would 
encompass self-regulation, legal protection, technical measures and privacy-by-design 
(Van Dijk, 2012:127-136;163-170; Edwards and Howells, 2003:222-244).  
Self-regulation, or the prerogative to shape behaviour granted to private actors, would be a 
desirable mode of privacy governance in that it could save regulatory and enforcement 
costs and is associated with efficiency. Yet, in practice the evidence has shown that self-
regulation is unlikely to work on its own (Koops et al, 2006:123-126; Gellman and Dixon, 
2011) and generates market failures (Mansell, 2012:150). There will hardly be any market 
force in an unregulated market to balance the commercial pursuit to collect as much 
personal data as possible (Deighton, 2003:137). For instance, controversially, the long-
standing poor consumer confidence in e-commerce due to privacy risks (Edwards and 
Howells, 2003:207-248) did not prove to be a market force for businesses to acquire more 
                                                          
11 More precisely, the Court ruled in favour of the right to de-listing from a search engine’s results 
(judgement Google Spain SL), which in essence concurs with the logic of the “right-to-be-forgotten” in the 
GDPR (Article 17). “The-right-to-be-forgotten” is not, however, a new right in the EU, but just a new name 
of an old right to erasure (or deletion) that has been upgraded (Zanfir, 2013). The right to erasure (of personal 
data) has been already enshrined in the Directive 95/46/EC that the GDPR is replacing. The CJEU ruled in 
May 2014 based on this right to erasure present in the Directive 95/46/EC. This right does exist in some 
forms even in the USA (at state level) as well as in various forms in other jurisdictions.   
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privacy respectful attitudes. Self-regulation often lacks “proper procedures for oversight, 
and enforcement, and amount to little more than declarations of good will” (Tambini, 
Leonardi and Marsden, 2008:4). As it was discussed in detail in Subsection 2.3.2, most 
companies demonstrate no motivation to respect Internet users’ privacy and related choices 
made by them. Similarly, this tendency can be very tangibly seen in the response by many 
websites to the so-called “cookie law” (Directive 2009/136/EC) – an EU attempt to grant 
the users more control over tracking, obliging websites to obtain consent for the placement 
of “cookies”. The most common “cookie message” reads as “by using our services/website 
you agree to our use of cookies”, offering the visitor a “take-it-or-leave-it” option. The 
following dismissive responses to this law can also be found: 
“Annoying message about cookies:  Like 90% of websites, we use cookies to 
help us improve the site, and to help you click around. These are small files that are 
stored on your computer. EU regulations mean we have to point this out, hence the 
annoying pop-up, which will only appear on this visit. Happy to continue?” 
(www.londonist.com).  
While “cookies” are no technical necessity, most sites are crafted in the way that they 
simply do not function if cookies are disabled (Edwards and Howells, 2003:235). Privacy 
policies can be mentioned as well to make yet another example of the commercial 
companies’ attitudes. Privacy statements are often bogus, deliberately containing 
significant omissions or misleading wording (Garfinkel and Spafford, 2002:231; 
Hoofnagle et al, 2012:291-292), or they are formulated in a hardly intelligible to “an 
average user” legalistic language, extended across several dozens of pages (Brown and 
Marsden, 2013c:53-54; Crain, 2015). The issues behind the “notice and consent” principle, 
on which the use of privacy policies is based, has been recently acknowledged at the 
highest political levels even in such “laissez-faire” countries as the USA and the UK 
(White House, 2014a: xi, 38; UK Parliament, 2014). 
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As it was covered in the Subsection 2.3.2, the technical solutions currently available to the 
Internet users to manage their personal information on-line, such as browser privacy 
settings or deletion of browsing histories, are annulled by aggressive commercial 
surveillance practices, enabled by powerful technological tools. Another limitation of the 
technical self-regulation by users is that it requires a fair degree of “digital literacy”. In the 
meantime, many Internet users lack technical skills, e.g. are unable to identify a “cookie” 
(Lyon, 2007c:189). Privacy-by-design and the opt-in (as opposed to opt-out) mechanism 
are deemed to provide the best privacy protection for users (Van Dijk, 2012:128-129; 
Batra, 2008). 
Besides, legal protection – a set of certain prescriptive legally enforceable rules – is 
necessary to ensure effective privacy protection (Edwards and Howells, 2003:243). As 
discussed in Subsection 2.3.2, and earlier in this section, a real consumer choice is not 
possible without regulatory interventions. The policy-makers’ role is very important in 
protecting choices, made by web users, from technical circumvention (Hoofnagle et al, 
2012:278-279). “There is widespread evidence that consumers favour legislation for 
privacy protection” rather than self-regulation (Tapscott, 1996c:279-280). 
However, legal privacy protection is often contested by definitional uncertainties or 
ambiguities, resulting in grey areas or gaps that enable various data misuses and abuses 
(Cooper, 2011; Poullet and Dinant, 2010, 65-68). There are many cases when definitions 
have been manipulated in order to create loopholes or legitimise access to data (Cellan-
Jones, 2014; BBC, 2014i). Social media have been subject to particularly curious 
interpretations. An American court determined that social media encompasses a “digital 
landlord”, in order to sanction the law enforcement access to social media accounts of 
some individuals accused of benefit fraud (Miller, 2014). Definitional clarity is important 
for an efficient implementation of privacy protection legislation. In the face of fast-paced 
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technological change and convergence, another important property of future-proof 
regulatory norms on-line is the technological neutrality (Van Dijk, 2012:131, 166, 168). 
Finally, at the present privacy protection also suffers from internationally inconsistent 
approaches (Farrell, 2008c:386-95; Van Dijk, 2012:131, 164-170), as is the theme of the 
next section. Despite the various challenges, legal and regulatory efforts do have a 
significant impact. For instance, such efforts by the US regulators were successful in 
reducing certain types of spam to up to 80% (BBC, 2015e). 
2.5 The EU and the US privacy protection regimes: the origin of Silicon Valley lobbying 
against the GDPR 
Although far from being flawless or uncontroversial in itself, the EU data protection 
regulation is rated as the most advanced privacy safeguards in the global context (Van 
Dijk, 2012:131, 165-166; Edwards and Howells, 2003:233-234). In the Internet-related 
environment, the implementation of the EU privacy protection policy has to deal with the 
pressures coming from the US paradigm of market self-regulation – predominant in the 
cyberspace. These challenges are augmented by the commercial dominance of the 
American on-line giants in the digital marketplace, holding also a huge market share in 
Europe. The co-existence of these competing concepts, especially given their settlement in 
the two most powerful international players – the EU and the USA, determines a lax 
privacy protection regime worldwide, while globally-established rules are needed for 
efficient privacy protection, alike for a number of other issue-areas on-line (Drezner, 
2007:91-118).  However, the influence of the political and economic power of the EU and 
its promulgated strict privacy and data protection principles create, to a certain extent, the 
effect of “global privacy law”, according to many analysts (e.g. Farrell, 2008c:386-395; 
Prins, 2006:170-173; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:173-177). 
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While in the EU privacy is viewed as a fundamental right, broadly established in 
constitutions (Prins, 2006:173; Movius and Krup, 2009:169-179), in the US privacy 
protection is often treated as a matter of consumer rights in the context of commercial 
transactions, being merely one of the interests that strongly competes with others 
(Schwartz and Solove, 2013:1-5), with no explicit constitutional guarantees (Movius and 
Krup, 2009:174). The above approaches are reflected in the application of different 
methods to regulate privacy and data flows. In the EU, privacy protection is enacted 
through prescriptive legal rules. In the meantime, in the USA industry self-regulation 
prevails (Prins, 2006:171; Movius and Krup, 2009:169-179). The American privacy law is 
a rather fragmented system of legal acts, that addresses specific misuses of personal data or 
its processing in specific situations (Braman, 2006:126-138; Prins, 2006:171; Schwartz and 
Solove, 2013:1-5). It does not offer a comprehensive system of safeguards for this domain 
as a whole (Braman, 2006: 126-138). The norms regulating privacy issues originate from 
multiple federal agencies dealing with certain industries or activities of their competence 
(Braman, 2006: 127). In contrast, the European privacy protection draws on 
comprehensive, technology neutral, dynamic measures, comprising all aspects of data 
collection and usage, established in related Union-level legal instruments (Van Dijk, 
2012:165; Edwards and Howells, 2003:233; Schwartz and Solove, 2013:1-5). As it can be 
seen, the EU and the US approaches towards privacy and data protection are significantly 
divergent in their conceptual perception, mechanism and scope. The two actors are each 
other’s biggest trade partners. As a result, the digital economies of both markets are 
affected by the regulatory spill-over and the underlying disjunctions create a high degree of 
tensions in the processes of the international political economy (Movius and Krup, 2009: 
169-171). These tensions are not an isolated phenomenon in the transatlantic relations and 
seem to be embedded in a much broader context. The EU can be seen as an agent exporting 
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regulatory models that encompass and promote European norms, values and ideas 
(Petiteville, 2003: 125-157). Although the “European identity” is a rather contested 
concept, some common values and ideals present in the political culture of the EU 
countries can be identified (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:246). In general, in Europe the 
role of public authorities has tended to be more extensive in addressing societal needs than 
in the USA that typically has favoured the role of private actors to tackle societal 
challenges (Movius and Krup, 2009:171). In response to globalisation, for instance, most 
European governments are more in favour of strong regulation than the USA, whose stance 
is basically free-market led (Petiteville, 2003:131). Most EU MSs remain Welfare State-
oriented and see a need of a strong regulatory protection in some economic sectors (e.g. 
agriculture, environmental protection, genetically modified food, etc.) “to escape the harsh 
effects of globalisation” (Petiteville, 2003:131). The audiovisual sector is one of the cases 
where European governments succeeded in resisting the US pressure of regulatory 
liberalisation through the WTO, justifying their audiovisual policy on the grounds of 
“cultural exception” (Burri, 2014:479-492). Human rights, democracy and the rule of law 
are also the areas where values between the EU and the USA differ (Petiteville, 
2003:132,134; Richter and Albrecht, 2013). The Europeans and the Americans have very 
different feelings regarding hate speech and whether it has to be regulated, for example 
(Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:1-10; Farago, 2013; Rawlinson, 2015a). In Europe individual 
rights are closely linked to extensive social rights guaranteed through state regulatory 
intervention (Petiteville, 2003:132). In the field of consumer protection, for example, the 
European rules are more demanding than those American (DePillis, 2013), as a result. In 
afore-described ways Europe represents an agent of “meanings other than strictly 
economic norms” (Petiteville, 2003: 134), in contrast to the American market-oriented 
political mindset. To make an example, such a value clash was strongly expressed in the 
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EU commitment in promoting the Kyoto Protocol, encompassing environmental protection 
principles, while the USA opted out of this international agreement in the pursuit of 
economic interest (Petiteville, 2003: 131, 134). In the attempt to secure fundamental rights 
of citizens, Europe tends “to privilege privacy protection at the expense of data access to 
information and economic efficiency” (Movius and Krup, 2009:178). This constitutes the 
so-called “cultural gap” between the two sides of the Atlantic (Cellan-Jones, 2014; Richter 
and Albrecht, 2013) that sometimes even acquires a form of strongly expressed antagonism 
(Eger, 2014), despite the fact that the EU and the USA are long-term strategic partners and 
are both attributed to the so-perceived Western culture. It is also worth mentioning, that 
historically the USA was born as an act of liberalisation from the centralised and at the 
time oppressive European rule, determining the pursuit of divergence from what is 
perceived as “European” in constructing society (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:176-177).  
As far as trade is concerned, the EU has been accused of protectionism on various 
occasions for imposing its rules in trade agreements with third countries, or in relation to 
its regulatory actions. Data protection is one of such instances (Princen, 2003:150; Recode, 
2015). Divergent EU-US views “feed permanent transatlantic misunderstandings and even 
‘transatlantic trade wars’” in some areas (Petiteville, 2003:131).  
Privacy protection is one of the areas where the EU-US cultural gap is most strongly 
pronounced (Richter and Albrecht, 2013; Cellan-Jones, 2014). The past experience with 
the Nazis and with the communism in many European countries determined the public’s 
sentiment towards privacy in this continent, and enshrining it as a civil right that 
preconditions democracy (Melik, 2012; Movius and Krup, 2009:172). Therefore, the 
embedment of important civil safeguards around privacy and establishing a system “in 
balance between the citizen and the corporate sphere and the government” are given a lot 
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of significance (Jeff Chester of the Centre for Digital Democracy, quoted in Melik, 2012). 
In this regard, a strong stance on privacy protection, in line with other human rights, can be 
understood as a matter of European identity. But it was also a question of status quo in the 
international context, allowing Europe counter-weigh the US dominance in the global 
governance of the Internet domain names (Prins, 2006:170; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:173-
177; Traynor, 2014). “There is a global competition for regulatory prevalence [...] The 
Europeans and the Americans have been racing against each other to adopt legislation or 
regulations for their market, which as a result forces or inspires third countries […] to 
adapt to those rules” (Thomas Tindemans of Hill & Knowlton Strategies, quoted in Hakim 
and Lipton, 2013).   
 “Attempts to harmonise U.S. and EU privacy law by turning EU privacy law into a 
U.S.-style approach, or vice versa, are unlikely to succeed. Both the United States 
and European Union are deeply committed to their respective approaches. While 
policymakers and scholars have been trying for nearly two decades to bring U.S. 
and EU privacy law closer together, the new EU Proposed Data Protection 
Regulation could push the United States and European Union even further apart” 
(Schwartz and Solove, 2013:5). 
Provisions on data protection are included into co-operation agreements with many third 
countries (Farrell, 2008c:386-395) along with other “European” values and norms exported 
in this way. This works as a form of soft diplomacy that creates grounds for Europe to 
compete with the USA for global leadership (Petiteville, 2003:134). European data 
protection rules are one of the most tangible instances of export of the EU values and 
norms through regulatory standards. Global dominance in this issue-area is attributed to the 
EU by many commentators (Farrell, 2008c:386-395; Prins, 2006:170-173; Goldsmith and 
Wu, 2006:173-177; Jeff Chester of the Centre for Digital Democracy, quoted in Melik, 
2012; De Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2016:194; etc.). The USA has attempted to influence 
the development of privacy regulations in other regions, but many countries, such as the 
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members of APEC or Canada, find it in their own interests to align themselves with the 
European style approach (Brown and Marsden, 2013c:60; CNIL, 2013a). The EU is 
perceived as a creator of the global privacy rules. In promulgating more stringent data 
protection standards internationally, its market power, enhanced by its institutional 
framework and technical expertise in this field, underpins the spurring of what is known as 
the “race-to-the-top” (Princen, 2003:142-157; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:173-177; Brown 
and Marsden, 2013c:54), or the “Brussels effect”, referring to the bespoke term coined by 
Anu Bradford (2012). The regulatory “race-to-the-top” defines the process when an actor 
(e.g. a country or a multinational corporation) improves their standards as the result of 
another actor’s measures, related to the access to or operation in a certain market, provided 
the latter possesses assets enabling them to impose such measures (Princen, 2003:142-143; 
Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:173-177). It may also occur, that tailoring a product or a service 
to a specific market, where higher standards are demanded, is not feasible or is less cost 
effective than adjustment across the whole trade operation. This happened in the case of 
the American firm Microsoft, when the EU’s requirements concerning the Microsoft’s dot-
Net Passport resulted in the modification of the product globally (Goldsmith and Wu, 
2006:174-176). The EU law, thus, was applied far beyond its jurisdiction.  
Although the EU data protection Directive 95/46/EC, perceived as an axis of the EU data 
protection law package, was primarily adopted aiming to harmonise data protection 
legislation internally, it has a lot of external ramifications in regulating data flows (Princen, 
2003:149). It comprehensively covers all actors operating in the EU market, independently 
from their origin (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006:175; Directive 95/46/EC, Article 4). It foresees 
that the DPAs established at the national level with the adoption of the Directive are 
required to ban transfers of personal data to third countries where the level of protection is 
not adequate, in order to prevent personal data from being transferred to countries with 
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weaker data protection regimes, that would enable circumvention of European 
requirements. The Directive established that the adequacy of a third country’s data 
protection standards is monitored and approved by the Commission, a regulatory 
committee of MSs representatives and a working party formed of representatives from 
national DPAs (WP29) (Princen, 2003:149; Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 31 and 29). As 
the Directive was adopted, the USA was among the countries where data protection did not 
meet the adequacy level imposed by the EU, in particular, as far as predominantly self-
regulated private sector was concerned, that also lacked a sound supervision mechanism. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which had some powers to supervise data 
protection as part of its general oversight of “unfair and deceptive” commercial practices, 
that included compliance with the self-regulatory codes, did not pay much attention to data 
protection until the mid-1990s (Princen, 2003:149). 
Therefore, the Directive significantly affected the operation of the US companies that 
relied on the commercial exchange of personal information with European counterparts 
and was unwelcomed by the former, with some actors even calling for a trade dispute 
within the WTO. The dispute-level response, however, hardly seemed a reasonable 
strategy, as there was an exception for the privacy protection in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) (Princen, 2003: 150). In order to mitigate the arisen 
controversies, talks began on what was later stipulated as the “Safe Harbour” agreement12 
between the EU and the USA in July 2000 (Princen, 2003: 150-151; Commission, 2000). 
The purpose of the agreement was to put in place a scheme under which the US firms 
would satisfy adequacy requirements, imposed by the Directive (Princen, 2003: 150-151). 
As the Commission demanded active oversight by the US public authorities, in order to 
                                                          
12 Replaced by the new so-called Privacy Shield agreement in 2016 (Commission, 2016a) pursuant to the 
CJEU 2015 ruling invalidating the Safe Harbour agreement on the grounds of US surveillance of the global 
communications (see next Section 2.6). 
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enact enforcement of the agreement, a stronger role was appointed to the US FTC. 
However, as the Safe Harbour agreement was based on the voluntary self-certification by 
businesses, thus remaining self-regulatory in character, and lacking a proper oversight, it 
was deemed to be a rather inefficient attempt to reconcile the disjunctions between the US 
and the EU privacy protection regimes (Drezner, 2007:91-118). Nevertheless, the 
agreement introduced some more stringent standards as compared to most US legislation 
(Princen, 2003:151-152). 
As the discussion in this section shows, the European data protection policy pursued since 
the 1990s has had a disruptive effect on the American ICT businesses. Apart from data 
transfers rules, within Europe national DPAs, installed by the Directive 95/46/EC, have 
taken enforcement actions in relation to the breaches of the EU privacy law by the US 
firms on numerous occasions (e.g. BBC 2012a; BBC 2012b; BBC, 2013k). The 
Commission’s data protection reform proposals of 2012 were designed to align privacy 
protection with the enormous advancements in the ICT and data flows since the adoption 
of the previous data protection legislation. As in the 1990s, this was an unwelcome 
development for the American data exploiting businesses, resulting in unprecedented 
lobbying activity from the Silicon Valley and the US government against the pending 
upgrade of the European privacy rules. Along with a series of new rules, the GDPR was 
also introducing a broader territorial reach than the Directive that was applied to the non-
EU operators if they had an establishment in the EU or made use of equipment in the EU to 
process personal data. The GDPR stipulates that it would be applicable to operators even 
without an establishment in the EU, if their activities (e.g. services) are directed at data 
subjects in the EU, or if they monitor the behaviour of persons within the EU (Article 3, 
GDPR final, 2016). In early 2013, a US official warned that this EU reform could cause a 
US-EU trade war (Farivar, 2013). To circumvent the existing and forthcoming EU data 
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protection laws, the USA has been pushing for bans on localisation requirements and on 
any restrictions on data flows in the context of e-commerce in the two trade negotiations – 
on the now-defunct bilateral Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and on 
the multilateral draft Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) that constitutes an update to the 
GATS. These circumvention attempts have been disguised under the principle of 
regulatory “interoperability” and provisions on cross-border data flows (Bendrath, 2014). 
As it was discussed, the EU data protection policy is part of the contest for international 
influence between the EU and the USA. The EU privacy protection policy has tangible 
external projections, alongside internal goals, determining the presence of external 
stakeholders in the policy process. Due to these implications, the US tech firms and the US 
government were very active in the GDPR talks and lobbied for more US-like, that is less 
stringent provisions (see Sections 5.9, 5.10 and 6.5).  
2.6 State surveillance, the Snowden revelations and the EU responses 
2.6.1 Security, surveillance and fundamental rights 
The time of the EU data protection reform process 2012-2016 coincided with the timing of 
one major development that left important implications touching upon international 
relations, the democratic norms of Western societies, and global communications in 
general. In early June 2013, the world media started publishing documents leaked by a 
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden uncovering extensive mass surveillance practices 
that mainly centred on the US and the UK intelligence agencies – NSA and GCHQ, 
respectively. Amongst other, the revelations uncovered spying on millions of Europeans, 
including top officials and diplomatic personnel carried out by the US intelligence services 
(Oltermann, 2013b; Hecking and Schultz, 2013; BBC, 2013e, BBC, 2013f; Shane, 2013; 
Siddique and Holpuch, 2013). The public and political outrage erupted due to reportedly 
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bulk interception of communications carried out through direct tapping into the global 
digital infrastructure and “the development of covert relationships with 
telecommunications companies” (Borger, 2013). Working “around national laws intended 
to restrict the surveillance power of intelligence agencies” was also revealed by the reports 
(Borger, 2013). Some of the unveiled documents, however, did not leave a number of 
European governments without blemish, either (to name but a few – British, French, 
German, Swedish and Spanish) (Borger, 2013; EP, 2013b). 
The above needs to be discussed more profoundly in this study, as Snowden leaks became 
virtually inseparable from the debates surrounding the GDPR adoption process. These 
revelations turned communications privacy into a high profile political issue. The 
revelations also had a certain impact on the process of adoption of the GDPR, as presented 
in detail in Section 6.3. Nevertheless, as the discussion below illuminates, the case of 
whistleblowing by E. Snowden only reiterates an old phenomenon of governmental 
surveillance via the means of communications and its ever-expanding scope and 
capabilities. The history and landscape of surveillance in Europe, covered in this section, 
create a very controversial setting for the EU reputation of creator of the strongest privacy 
protection norms, presented in the previous section. This controversy provides one of the 
rationales of why these revelations, although sensitivising the data protection question in 
the political agenda, had only a limited effect on the course of the EU data protection 
reform, affecting mainly just Chapter V on international transfers of personal data in the 
GDPR (see Section 6.3).  
In a broad sense, surveillance can be defined as “the focused, systematic and routine 
attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or 
direction” and “it usually involves relations of power in which watchers are privileged” 
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(Lyon, 2007c:14, 15). State surveillance exists in a variety of forms, ranging from all sorts 
of registers and databases, to monitoring of physical movements via CCTV, mobile 
communications, GPS or other systems, to digitised biometrics or tracking internet 
activities, amongst others. The technology available in the twenty-first century enhances 
the state surveillance capability, making it possible to swiftly exchange, combine and 
process various types of data. Various elements of surveillance operating in parallel have a 
cumulative effect (EDRi, 2012a).    
As it derives from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (thereafter 
ECtHR), “the mere storing of personal information, irrespective of its possible future use” 
entails “interference with the right to privacy” (Goemans and Dumortier, 2003:173-174). A 
similar stance was reinstated in the UN report on untargeted collection of communications 
data in the wake of the Snowden revelations. Besides, the report noted that many countries 
lack adequate oversight and accountability frameworks (UN, 2014: 9-10, 15-16), “instead 
allowing the collection of data for one legitimate aim, but subsequent use for others” (UN, 
2014: 9). The issues emerging from such a state of play can be demonstrated through some 
incidents which occurred in Britain. In one case, police forces uploaded up to 18 million 
photos, including of people never charged, to a searchable facial recognition database 
without Home Office approval, without informing the Biometrics Commissioner and 
“despite a court ruling it could be unlawful” (Hopkins and Morris, 2015). The above-
mentioned UN document also stated that mass retention of data, exercised by many 
governments for surveillance purposes was “neither necessary nor proportionate” (UN, 
2014: 9). Necessity and proportionality as well as effectiveness are the principles under 
which security measures that limit fundamental rights are understood to be legal according 
to the norms of a democratic society (EDRi, 2012a). Therefore, any restrictions of rights 
can only be applied as exceptional measures and such dynamics must not be reversed (UN, 
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2014: 8-9). “Mass or ‘bulk’ surveillance programmes may thus be deemed to be arbitrary, 
even if they serve a legitimate aim and have been adopted on the basis of an accessible 
legal regime” (UN, 2014: 9). Surveillance-related legislation and regulations tend to be 
adopted hastily and the programmes are often run in secrecy, hence, falling beyond legal or 
democratic scrutiny and protections (Hills, 2006:196, 204, 210, 212-3, EDRi, 2012a). 
Publication of how the powers gained under such acts are exercised in many cases is 
subject to prosecution, and disclosures are prevented on “national security” grounds (Hills, 
2006:207, 210, 212; BBC, 2013b; BBC, 2014a). Some facts become public only thanks to 
leaks (Hills, 2006:210), such as the recent E. Snowden leaks or the efforts of the Wikileaks 
and others. The condition of mass surveillance does affect “law abiding citizens”, which 
was historically as well as recently admitted by the authorities (Hills, 2006:200; Chadwick, 
2006:282). In a recent case in Britain, the police requested information about one person 
from a telecoms company, but 1000 users’ data were sent to them by mistake. The police 
took a few months to even report the error and then a few months more to rectify this 
incident (BBC, 2014o). In the UK, dozens of serious errors based on access to 
communications data that led to wrongful implications in serious crime investigations, 
including property searches and arrests in 2014 and 2015, were reported (IOCCO, 2015; 
IOCCO, 2016). Even when communication content is not looked at, the aggregation of 
“metadata”, i.e. information about communicational patterns, “may give an insight into an 
individual’s behaviour, social relationships, private preferences and identity that go beyond 
even that conveyed by accessing the content of a private communication” (UN, 2014:7).   
Interference of surveillance with the right to privacy extends to its effects on other rights 
and democratic institutions, such as presumption of innocence, the confidentiality of 
communications, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of 
information, etc. (UN, 2014:5; EP, 2014c; UN, 2015). It may turn individuals into police 
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informants without their knowledge and consent (Trottier, 2012). “Justice is easily 
overturned or obscured in new surveillance systems” (Lyon, 2007c:193).  
In the meantime, there has been a radical increase in surveillance measures in recent 
decades (EDRi, 2012a). Surveillance programmes are frequently justified by governments 
on “national security” grounds, in particular – the risks posed by terrorism (UN, 2014:8). 
The limits of the reach of such programmes were tangibly relaxed following terror acts in 
New York in September 2001, which served as a pretext to deploy new surveillance 
technologies and measures in many countries that “may have been in development for 
some considerable time” (Lyon, 2007c:112). “9/11 did not introduce the surveillance 
society; it served to reinforce strongly some already existing trends” (Lyon, 2007c:195). In 
fact, surveillance of communications has very historical roots, reaching at least the days of 
the advent of the telegraph in the late nineteenth century (Hills, 2006) – the technology that 
significantly facilitated exchange of messages if compared with the earlier times 
(McMullan, 2015). European governments held control of telecommunications and the 
international treaties establishing transcontinental interconnections foresaw also the power 
reserved by them to stop or examine telegraph messages for “national security” reasons 
(Hills, 2006:196-8). But even earlier, in the eighteenth century, the principle of secrecy in 
correspondence was already challenged by surveillance of postal networks (Powers, 2015). 
The incremental state control over communications, including bans on the use of coded 
language and emergence of secret systems of monitoring, was first prompted by instability 
between the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, marked by 
multiple wars, in which the European countries were involved. Similarly to contemporary 
times, the governments thought to overcome the limitations of their own direct reach of 
censorship by delegating related tasks to private companies providing the transmission of 
messages (Hills, 2006:196-201, 211). Soon, however, the scope of censorship went beyond 
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its wholly “national security” purpose directed to both external and internal enemies to 
progress towards commercial espionage. Since 1938, a commercial section added to the 
British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), formed in 1920, engaged in 
interception and decryption of commercial telegrams sent by large foreign trade companies 
(Hills, 2006:199-200). 
While for some time the British were both politically and technologically more advanced 
in terms of surveillance, since around the Second World War the USA had started taking 
part in various international intelligence alliances encompassing interception of 
communications. A steady cooperation between the British and American intelligence 
agencies commenced in 1941. After the War such cooperation was extended to comprise 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand to form the group known now as the Five Eyes 
(Corera, 2016). Alongside, bespoke domestic structures were being developed through 
establishment of the regulatory basis13 and various bodies in the USA, including the NSA 
in 1952. The advancing or emergence of new technologies such as telephony, computing 
or satellites, were only making governmental surveillance more pervasive and 
sophisticated. For example, computers enabled much more efficient processing of 
intercepted communications in finding specific words. Interception was now targeting 
government, business and civilian realms, to gain militarily, politically, or economically 
valuable information both domestically and internationally. The Watergate scandal in 1974 
disclosed unauthorized surveillance on citizens in the USA in the 1970s (Hills, 2006:200-
205). The “Echelon” that began in the 1970s is known as one of the programmes managed 
by the American NSA and the British GCHQ and also involving dozens of so-called 
Western democracies. It was designed to monitor the channels of global electronic 
                                                          
13 Such regulations of the later decades such as CALEA of 1994 (Chadwick, 2006:287), PATRIOT Act of 
2001 (Braman, 2006:133-135) and the 2008 amendments to FISA of 1978 (Hastings, 2013a), meant almost 
unrestricted access by the American government agencies to the communication flows.   
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communications, including the Internet, for a variety of purposes, including gaining 
intelligence on international trade negotiations and diplomatic communications14 
(Chadwick, 2006:282; EP, 2014f). In mid-1990s, another similar development was the EU 
Enfopol project in cooperation with the USA and subsequently some other countries, under 
which creation of an international telecommunications tapping network was started. These 
plans were negotiated between the governments of the then 15 EU countries, avoiding 
accountability to European institutions or broader consideration at the national level (Hills, 
2006:204). 
Surveillance has not been limited to capturing electronic data and aggregation of all kinds 
of available information on citizens, e.g. located in commercial and public sources with 
consumer, health-care, employment or other data, started being practiced by the authorities 
(Lyon, 2007c:8, 18, 107, 184, 186). Social media with their personal data-based business 
model (covered in Sections 2.2 and 2.3) brought along an unprecedented potential for data-
mining and monitoring of population, be it private firms or public authorities (Morozov, 
2013:187-188), as personal information submitted through social media in one context is 
easily exploited in another (Trottier, 2012c). Monitoring capabilities of states have been 
amplified through a “delegation of law enforcement and quasi-judicial responsibilities to 
Internet intermediaries under the guise of ‘self-regulation’ or ‘cooperation’” (EDRi, 
2011:5). The governments’ reliance “on the private sector to conduct and facilitate digital 
surveillance” has been growing (UN, 2014:14). This tendency of access to and use of data 
“for purposes beyond those for which it was collected represents a substantial weakening 
of traditional data protections” (Cate et al, 2012:198 cited in UN, 2014:9). Due to their 
incremental exploitation of commercial databases, security agencies constitute actors with 
                                                          
14 “In 1992, Echelon was intercepting an estimated 2 million messages per hour”, with the capability to 
“capture almost every phone call, fax, email and telex message anywhere in the world” (Hills, 2006: 203). In 
the 1990s, spying even on humanitarian NGOs within this programme emerged (Hills, 2006: 204).  
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“significant opposition to privacy rules” that cover private entities (Brown and Marsden, 
2013c: 60-61). Business firms respond to state surveillance with a spectrum of attitudes 
ranging from opposition to it (ETNO, 2005; ISPA 2014; ISPA 2015; BBC, 2013b) to 
treating it as another source of income (Morozov, 2013:187-188). Many telecoms 
companies in Britain allegedly had been doing much more than what was legally required 
in assisting intelligence agencies with mass interception of communications (Ball, 2013). 
Moreover, there are Western companies producing surveillance technologies and selling 
them to governments around the world (FIDH, 2014). According to Amnesty International, 
“the trade in spyware used by governments is now a market worth about £3bn ($5bn) a 
year” (BBC, 2014n). Both the businesses and military environment played an equal role in 
developing and diffusing privacy-invasive technologies (Harper, 2011). There is a complex 
interplay of interests and the political economy of securitisation benefits “the military–
industrial complex of security, defence, IT manufacturing and service industries” (Hills, 
2006:213).  
However, many communications companies that do not favour surveillance began 
publishing “transparency” reports on government user data requests (Gabbatt, 2013). The 
major US tech companies, following the allegations of the NSA having the backdoor to 
their users’ data brought up in the Snowden leaks, started putting pressure on the US 
authorities to reform surveillance. Such allegations have been detrimental to their business 
(Gustin, 2013; BBC, 2013j; BBC, 2014g; Kleinman, 2014; see also Section 6.3). In their 
effort to tackle the damaged consumer trust, a number of Internet market leaders 
committed to a greater use of encryption. This development was very unwelcomed by the 
authorities on the both sides of the Atlantic (Gershman, 2014; BBC, 2015d), who soon 
played the terrorism threat card to strike back, calling US technology firms “command and 
control” network for terrorist organisations (Wakefield, 2014b). In the meantime, banning 
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encryption would be a problem for governments, as such actions would “limit public trust 
in the use of the internet for e-commerce and are therefore contrary to their economic 
objectives” (Hills, 2006:212). In spring 2015, another UN report was presented (UN, 
2015), this time specifically addressing the role of encryption and anonymity in the digital 
age with regard to the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, determining that they 
are crucial preconditions to meaningfully exercise such rights and, therefore, must be 
protected and not restricted.  
Another tendency in the recent decades has been the blurring of the conventional divisions 
between criminal law enforcement and intelligence, as well as domestic and foreign 
threats. This has been aided through an ever-broadening definition of what is treated as 
“terrorism” (Hills, 2006:207-8, 212-3), a rhetoric of “extremism” and “radicalism” (Luke, 
2011:31) that “could even include peaceful civil disobedience” (Chadwick, 2006:278). 
“[S]haring of data between law enforcement agencies, intelligence bodies and other State 
organs” is problematic “because surveillance measures that may be necessary and 
proportionate for one legitimate aim may not be so for the purposes of another” (UN, 
2014:9).  
As surveillance was increasing, the opposition to it, both in Europe and in the USA, was 
strengthening, too, for its detriment to human rights and civil liberties. (Hills, 2006:206-
209). However, the 9/11 attacks in the USA and later some terror acts in Europe dismissed 
some of such public moods (Hills, 2006:206, 210-211). In 2006, the EU adopted the Data 
Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC; thereafter DRD), which was invalidated in 
2014 by the CJEU (judgement Digital Rights Ireland and others) as exceeding the 
principle of proportionality and seriously interfering with the rights to privacy and data 
protection. Some European governments were advancing proposals for a lengthy traffic 
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data retention policy at the EU level since the late 1990s (Hills, 2006:206, 209). In the light 
of the terror acts of the 2000s, the US administration pressed for such laws in Europe, too, 
while in the USA data retention had been rejected by Congress in the 1990s (Hills, 
2006:207). Besides, Passenger Name Record (PNR) and Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program (TFTP) agreements, to gather air passengers’ data and monitor financial 
transactions, respectively, were installed between the EU and the USA.  
The difference between the interference with communication flows by public authorities in 
the era of the telegraph and today mainly consists of “the invasiveness of current 
technologies and the international institutionalization of surveillance” (Hills, 2006:196). 
Today it is multi-faceted, continuous and networked (Lyon, 2007c:175).  
2.6.2 The EU response to the spying scandal 
The reports about the US bulk spying operations on the European citizens as well as 
European top national and supranational officials spurred tensions in the EU-US relations. 
Apart from a diplomatic row (Croft and Mohammed, 2013; Oltermann, 2013b; Crowley, 
2014) some other developments followed in Europe in the aftermath of the Snowden 
revelations. The EP, in its approval of the whistleblowing, nominated Edward Snowden for 
the top human rights award (BBC, 2013d) and in 2015 called on the EU MSs to grant him 
protection “in recognition of his status as whistleblower and international human rights 
defender” (EP, 2015). Although in a non-binding capacity, this EU institution also called in 
its resolutions in 2013 and in 2014 for the suspension of the EU-US data sharing 
agreements TFTP, PNR and Safe Harbour (EP, 2013b; EP, 2013c; EP, 2014c). The latter 
contained an exception to adhere to the provisions of the agreement on national security 
grounds (Commission, 2000). Such public climate resulted in the invalidation of the EU 
2006 communications traffic DRD, adopted in the 9/11 aftermath, by the CJEU in spring 
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2014. Another CJEU judgment in October 2015 (Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner) invalidated the Safe Harbour agreement based on these revelations, as 
mentioned in the previous section, in support to the Facebook user Maximillian Schrems 
who, in the light of these revelations, argued that “the law and practice of the United States 
do not offer sufficient protection against surveillance by the public authorities of the data 
transferred to that country” (CJEU, 2015). The so-called “Umbrella agreement” on the 
protection of personal data in the field of EU-US transfers for the purposes of law 
enforcement cooperation, negotiated between 2011-2015 and finalised in 2016, also gained 
more political importance (Commission, 2016b). 
To mention some reactions at the national level, in June 2014 the German government 
cancelled its contract with Verizon, the second-biggest US telecoms firm that had been 
providing network infrastructure for some key communications interfaces of the German 
government. The step was prompted, inter alia, by the allegations of eavesdropping on 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone and the US government’s failure to 
accommodate the Germany’s demands for a “no-spy” agreement (Reuters, 2014b). A few 
months earlier, the German Chancellor had also advanced the initiative of creating a 
European communications network where emails and other data would not pass through 
the United States and where high standards of data protection would be maintained 
(Reuters, 2014a).   
However, the spying scandal did not change in essence the surveillance landscape in 
Europe.  Although DRD was invalidated, some MSs swiftly adopted national data laws, 
allowing them to continue communications data retention and monitoring (BBC, 2014l). 
While the EP nominated the whistleblower E. Snowden for a human rights award, none of 
the EU governments provided him with protection against prosecution in the USA. Finally, 
after the attack on a French newspaper in Paris in January 2015 and a series of other 
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terrorism-related incidents in the EU shortly afterwards, state surveillance policies and 
counter-terrorism discourse, after being weakened for some time in the immediate 
aftermath of the Snowden affair, returned with a new force in Europe, calling for new data 
tracking laws, with demands in Britain, for instance, to gain access not only to metadata, 
like under previous measures, but also to the actual content of communications (BBC, 
2015a). As mentioned in the Introduction and Section 5.3, the EU PNR Directive was 
revived and became law at the same time with the GDPR. 
Apart from afore-mentioned developments, the EU-US relations did not change in essence, 
either. As some commented, much different outcomes should not have been expected, as in 
the longer and broader perspective the importance of economic and strategic partnership 
with the USA creates significant pressures and makes pragmatism prevail over outrage 
(Hewitt, 2013a; Hewitt, 2013b).  Moreover, “almost all governments conduct surveillance 
or espionage operations against other countries whose activities matter to them” in any 
sense (Marcus, 2013). Allies covertly collecting information on each other is no novelty in 
world politics, either (Marcus, 2013). As covered earlier, Europe, with its highly developed 
surveillance infrastructure and operations, is no exception. Already in 2014 and in 2015 
Germany, that in 2013 protested “spying on friends” (see above), found itself at the centre 
of spying allegations on France, the Commission, US top officials and the European 
aviation firm Airbus (Oltermann, 2014; Hill, 2015). “What differs is the scope and scale of 
these operations. This depends upon the motivation and resources available”. The USA 
with its technical capabilities is positioned as having “a much longer reach than most” 
(Marcus, 2013).  
It is thus reasonable to say that, rather than anything else, the allegations of the US large-
scale espionage contributed to the resurface of the old issue of the technological gap 
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between the two sides of the Atlantic (Mörth, 2003; Michalis, 2007c:101-118, 129-131) 
and drew attention to the threat coming from dependency on foreign ICT resources in 
Europe. The Snowden revelations shed a different light onto the dominance of the 
American companies in the digital market while falling under the jurisdiction of the 
PATRIOT Act or similar US laws. As a matter of fact, a few months earlier, in January 
2013, the late Caspar Bowden, renown privacy expert and advocate, warned about the 
2008 amendments to FISA and how that combined with the oligopoly of the American 
companies in provision of cloud services: “What this legislation means is that the US has 
been able to mine any foreign data in US Clouds since 2008, and nobody noticed” (quoted 
in Hastings, 2013a). 
The discussion in this section demonstrates that citizen interests compete not only with 
commercial but also with the state interests in advancing national security agendas. 
Besides, communications surveillance by business and state actors are overlapping realms. 
The debates surrounding the Snowden revelations were an important contextual dimension 
during the GDPR adoption process (see Section 6.3). Further, surveillance-related 
considerations directly link to some concrete provisions in the GDPR – the Article 48 
dubbed anti-FISA clause and some of the derogations in the Article 23(1), such as on the 
national security grounds. Mass surveillance exercised by states both internationally and 
domestically suggests a neo-realist paradigm embedding state-centric view in the power 
landscape. The neo-realist paradigm focuses on state power and security issues in 
explaining the world politics. States seek to increase their power in relation to other state 
and non-state actors (Baldwin, 1993:5-8; Brown and Ainley, 2009:45-48). Although the 
routes in achieving so may vary, overall, states manage to maintain their power and 
ultimately are the most important actors of the international system (Drezner, 2007). For its 
state-centric perspective in the study of international relations, the neo-realism is congruent 
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with the state-centric theories of the EU integration (Rosamond, 2000:148-156), one of 
which is the consociationalism used in this thesis for a macro-level analysis (see Sections 
3.2 and 3.3). 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to explain the context of the case study of this thesis – the process of 
adoption of the GDPR. It demonstrated the importance of privacy, as a civic freedom and 
human right. Due to the salience of the digital economy, and its prevalent business model 
that is based on the monetisation of personal information, related interests have been 
attempting to erode the notion of privacy as an important societal dimension. The current 
state of play is marked by significant asymmetries of power between different players, 
such as data subjects and data controllers and processors in the era of Big Data, emerged 
from the economic model of the Internet that has led to the collection and storage of 
enormous amounts of data by the commercial operators. Individuals have been 
disadvantaged by these informational power asymmetries. While this has been enabled by 
technology, the technology does not intrinsically create such societal dynamics. Privacy 
issues on-line were determined by the political decisions related to the construction of this 
medium. The governments’ interest in surveillance generates further tensions and has been 
increasingly converging with the commercial preferences in seeking as much access to 
personal data as possible. This is applicable to the EU as well, which, however, competes 
with the USA in promoting the “rights-based” approach (in which privacy, as a 
fundamental right, overrides mere economic interests) versus the “interest-based” approach 
(in which the right to privacy is only one of many competing interests), respectively, 
determining the consistent US efforts to lobby against the European privacy protection 
  79 
 
policies. All the above is directly related to the concrete provisions of the GDPR and the 
process of their formulation researched in this study. 
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CHAPTER III 
The EU policy-making process through the lens of consociationalism, policy networks 
and new institutionalism approaches 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter formulates the analytical framework of this study. Section 3.2 introduces the 
main features of the EU as a political system and explains the choice of the theoretical 
strands applied in this thesis: the state-centric consociationalism, which draws attention to 
the importance of national governments, policy networks, which stress non-linear policy-
making dynamics, and institutionalism, which highlights the significance of formal and 
informal institutions. These strands are presented in detail in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, 
respectively. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion on the interplay of interests 
in the EU and what policy outcomes can be expected whilst links to the theories presented 
in the previous sections are also made (Section 3.6). It argues that each policy dossier is 
context-dependant and the related policy process requires a disaggregated analysis.  
3.2 A brief introduction into the EU politics 
What today functions as the European Union stemmed from a six-country economic 
partnership which emerged in the aftermath of the World War II. The European Coal and 
Steel Community and a few years later the European Economic Community (EEC) as well 
as the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)15 were established by the founding 
members Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, Germany and France that signed 
the respective agreements in 1951 and 1957. After a series of subsequent Treaties (see 
                                                          
15 Initially, however, Political and Defence Communities were foreseen, too, but the processes of creation of 
these two Communities were unsuccessful (see Section 6.4). 
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table 1) and enlargements in the following decades (in 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, 2007 
and 2013), the EU acquired its current architecture of an intensely integrated system 
comprising 28 sovereign European states. The name from the EEC to the European Union 
was changed in 1993 (Official EU website, no date). 
Table 1. The EU founding and functioning Treaties 
Treaty of 
Lisbon 
Signed: 13 December 2007 Entered into force: 1 December 2009  
Purpose: to make the EU more democratic, more efficient and better 
able to address global problems, such as climate change, with one 
voice.  
Main changes: more power for the European Parliament, change of 
voting procedures in the Council, citizens' initiative, a permanent 
president of the European Council, a new High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs, a new EU diplomatic service.  
The Lisbon treaty clarifies which powers: 
belong to the EU 
belong to EU member countries 
are shared. 
Treaty of Nice Signed: 26 February 2001 Entered into force: 1 February 2003  
Purpose: to reform the institutions so that the EU could function 
efficiently after reaching 25 member countries.  
Main changes: methods for changing the composition of the 
Commission and redefining the voting system in the Council.  
Treaty of 
Amsterdam 
Signed: 2 October 1997 Entered into force: 1 May 1999  
Purpose: To reform the EU institutions in preparation for the arrival of 
future member countries.  
Main changes: amendment, renumbering and consolidation of EU and 
EEC treaties. More transparent decision-making (increased use of the 
co-decision voting procedure).  
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Treaty on 
European Union 
- Maastricht 
Treaty 
Signed: 7 February 1992 Entered into force: 1 November 1993  
Purpose: to prepare for European Monetary Union and introduce 
elements of a political union (citizenship, common foreign and internal 
affairs policy).  
Main changes: establishment of the European Union and introduction 
of the co-decision procedure, giving Parliament more say in decision-
making. New forms of cooperation between EU governments – for 
example on defence and justice and home affairs.  
Single European 
Act 
Signed: 17 February 1986 (Luxembourg) / 28 February 1986 (The 
Hague)  
Entered into force: 1 July 1987  
Purpose: to reform the institutions in preparation for Portugal and 
Spain's membership and speed up decision-making in preparation for 
the single market.  
Main changes: extension of qualified majority voting in the Council 
(making it harder for a single country to veto proposed legislation), 
creation of the cooperation and assent procedures, giving Parliament 
more influence.  
Merger Treaty - 
Brussels Treaty 
Signed: 8 April 1965 Entered into force: 1 July 1967  
Purpose: to streamline the European institutions.  
Main changes: creation of a single Commission and a single Council to 
serve the then three European Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC). 
Repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
Treaties of 
Rome: EEC and 
EURATOM 
treaties 
Signed: 25 March 1957 Entered into force: 1 January 1958  
Purpose: to set up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).  
Main changes: extension of European integration to include general 
economic cooperation.  
Treaty 
establishing the 
European Coal 
and Steel 
Community 
Signed: 18 April 1951 Entered into force: 23 July 1952 Expired: 23 
July 2002  
Purpose: to create interdependence in coal and steel so that one country 
could no longer mobilise its armed forces without others knowing. This 
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eased distrust and tensions after WWII. The ECSC treaty expired in 
2002.  
Source: Official EU website, no date – adapted original text. 
The EU has long moved from originally mainly economic cooperation in a few sectors to 
expand into a wide range of policy areas (Versluis et al, 2011:13). Particularly, the EU 
decision-making increased in scope, volume and depth in the 1990s and with the 
stipulation of the Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) Treaties (Andersen and 
Eliassen, 2001:3-4). It is a highly complex Union, constantly evolving and underpinned by 
multiple dimensions of political process, making it unprecedented by any other political 
system. Its institutional design can be defined as “a new form of governance” (Wallace, 
1997:14-16), where continuous changes are undergoing, reconfiguring “the role of the 
central institutions, the forms of authority and the areas affected by EU policies” 
(Andersen and Eliassen, 2001:14). The EU’s status of agency can be characterised as 
hybrid (Versluis et al, 2011:13) or intermediate (Lijphart, 2012:33), presenting a 
particularly puzzling case for analysts of political science. As a voluntary Treaty-based 
formation of sovereign countries, it has features of an international organisation. But it also 
has some distinct elements of a supranational organisation in that the EU law in a number 
of areas has supremacy over the national law of its members (Lijphart, 2012: 33) and that it 
is governed by several supranational institutions, such as the Commission, the EP, the 
Council of Ministers, the European Council, the CJEU, and others. At the same time, it 
cannot fully qualify as a supranational organisation, for the power of its governing 
institutions is deemed to be limited in that respect (Taylor, 1990a:109-122). It also would 
be an atypical international organisation in terms of the high degree of integration between 
its states. The governance of the EU builds on the acquis communautaire, i.e. a system of 
shared legal and political features, norms, formalised rules and routinised practices as well 
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as such key state-building elements as citizenship, common currency and monetary policy, 
common market, etc. (Shaw and Wiener, 2000:64). However, “while the EU does much of 
what states do, it does far from everything they do” and lacks many of the power resources, 
symbols and attributes of a modern state, such as armed forces, police or customs services 
(Menon, 2008:216, 220). Attempted approaches applied to the EU include “an incipient 
federal state” (Lijphart, 2012: 33), “a quasi-federal polity” (Peterson, 2009: 107), “a 
uniquely successful experiment in transgovernmental governance” (Peterson, 2009: 113), 
etc. “The EU […] is neither a traditional international organisation nor a state” (Menon, 
2008:219) or “is simultaneously both ‘near-state’ and antithetical to stateness” (Shaw and 
Wiener, 2000:64). It implies that the EU needs to be studied as a system “in its own right” 
and, given its issue and institutional complexity, not any one conceptual framework or 
general theory can offer a comprehensive understanding of its functioning and underlying 
processes (Moravcsik, 1995:612; Ackrill et al, 2013:882; Van den Bulck and Donders, 
2014:19-35; Falkner, 2012).  
Actors participating in the policy-making processes “operate ‘wearing different hats’, in 
different political channels and in changing coalitions” (Andersen and Eliassen, 2001:14) 
where one stakeholder’s adherence “to different (even opposing) views and positions” is 
not excluded and their influence “may depend on the specific issue at hand” (Van den 
Bulck and Donders, 2014: 31) or the specific phase in the policy process. For instance, the 
Commission can be seen at times as a policy venue where stakeholders file complaints, but 
as well as a policy-broker in the bargaining between different coalitions and as an “actor in 
its own right” in other situations (Van den Bulck and Donders, 2014: 32). “Every 
institution is very powerful and influential at certain moments and very much a spectator at 
other moments” (EDRi, 2012b:1). The degree of EU integration is uneven between 
different policy spheres (Richardson, 2012). The power struggles and competition between 
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different players occur in the context of “a delicate balance of power between and within 
multiple levels, institutions and actors” (Carboni, 2009:6 cited in Van den Bulck and 
Donders, 2014:30). Several decision-making levels can be identified as history-making 
(super-system), policy-setting (systematic) and policy-shaping (technical or sub-systemic) 
(Andersen and Eliassen, 2001:9,15,16). The first dimension is associated with the 
alterations of the Union’s core institutional design and scope, such as Treaty revisions, 
major strategic decisions made by the European Council or the CJEU’s rulings related to 
the EU functioning. The second comprise the day-to-day legislation where policy-setting 
powers are shared between institutions16. The third level involves activities of the EU and 
national civil servants, committees and working groups, private experts and other 
interested private actors, participating in the process of drafting of policy proposal and 
implementation of the adopted acts (Andersen and Eliassen, 2001:9,15,16). The changes at 
one level feed into other levels. For instance, the Lisbon revision of the functioning of the 
EU (2007) was consequential to the procedure of the adoption of the GDPR in that the 
entire area of justice fell under the remit of the Community method, i.e. making the EP 
enjoy a co-legislator role. On the other hand, the sub-systemic level also affects the other 
decision-making levels, as many policy proposals emerge bottom-up (e.g. see Michalowitz, 
2004c:65; Andersen et al, 2001:26, 34). 
As this chapter will elaborate in the following sections, the interplay between the EU, 
national and even subnational levels is dynamic and cannot be clearly cut. This produces 
non-linear, distributed power dynamics – one of the main analytical lines that the analysis 
in this thesis builds on.  
                                                          
16 As in the case of the ordinary legislative procedure of stipulation of the GDPR. 
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Another analytical line deployed here is the existence of both formal and informal factors 
that have an impact on the ultimate balance of power among the actors in a concrete issue-
area, the course of the policy process and the outcomes. 
In examining the GDPR adoption process, this work applies a blend of three analytical 
strands – consociationalism, policy networks and new institutionalism, presented in this 
chapter as its analytical framework.  
The state-centric consociationalism is taken here as a macro theory, to set out the broad 
main features of the EU politics. The choice of a state-centric paradigm was determined by 
the very constitutional arrangement of the EU: the reforms to the EU (and previously EC) 
Treaties are negotiated and adopted by the so-called Intergovernmental Conferences 
(European Council, no date). The powers of the supranational institutions are defined in 
the Treaties and can be altered by the EU MSs through Treaty reforms. The essential 
directions of the EU development are decided by the European Council – the summit of the 
MSs’ heads of state and government. Thus, overall, the Union can be seen as “a tool of 
existing states”, with the real political power residing in its parts (Menon, 2008:213, 215-
6). Despite the gradual growth of the EU-level policy competences, its MSs’ sovereignty 
and autonomy are simultaneously being secured (Rosamond, 2000:150). An immediate 
example is the introduction of the new Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty on the European 
Union, explicitly enshrining the (previously implicitly perceived) right of withdrawal from 
the Treaties and the procedure thereof, which was indeed invoked by the UK in 2017 
pursuant to the national referendum on splitting from the EU in 2016. While the political 
mastery of the supranational-level institutions on some remarkable instances may have 
expanded their powers as well as taken the integration further than it was envisaged by the 
original arrangements, under the current EU institutional set-up the national governments 
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nevertheless remain crucial players (Falkner, 2012). Although functional integration seems 
to inevitably bring along also a degree of socialisation and some sense of European identity 
(Mörth, 2003), at the same time, the non-vanishing Euroscepticism and the recent rise of 
nationalism in Europe (BBC, 2014q; BBC, 2016d; BBC, 2016e) places the empirical 
reality far from the neo-functionalist vision of ever-weakening relevance of a nation-state 
as regional economic cooperation advances17. The lack of a strong common transnational 
European identity (as also evidenced by the failure of ratification of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty in some MSs in 2005) does not meet the federalist – another influential school of 
thinking on the EU integration – feature of a tangible nearing to reconciliation of regional 
differences (Taylor, 1990b:180). The predominantly consensus-based EU-level decision-
making (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:91-94) with the search for the lowest common 
denominator in order to accommodate the persisting segmental differences also diverges 
from the reinforcement of the common interest as in federalism, but reflects consociational 
characteristics (Taylor, 1990b:180-181). “Paradoxically, consociational theory may be 
more relevant to the EU than to the states for which it was originally developed” 
(Andersen et al, 2001:37) and has been unduly marginalised in the theoretical debates on 
the EU (Rosamond, 2000:148). As a state-centric concept, in the EU studies 
consociationalism is close to the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, that, as an 
integration theory, “refers to the supremacy of national governments in the integration 
process over supranational and other actors” (Dinan, 2000:297). Consociationalism, that 
allows a view of the EU as a polity, is, however, better suited for an EU-level policy 
analysis than the liberal intergovernmentalism that draws on the regime theory (treating the 
integration between the EU MSs as a form of an international regime) and is more focused 
                                                          
17 The very creator of the neo-functionalist theory, Ernst Haas, referred to his theory as obsolete in some of 
his works (e.g. Haas, 1975; Haas, 2001). 
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on the national governments as the level of analysis. Chryssochoou (e.g. 1997; 2009) 
proposed to interpret the model of the EU integration as a “confederal consociation” to 
capture both the preservation of self-rule by the composing units and the collective 
governance (i.e. the elements of transnational political integration or “stateness”).  
This thesis takes a view that the national element is predominant in the EU policy 
processes, but the analytical framework in this research builds on the moderate state-
centrism, implying co-existence of various dimensions, none of which can be neglected in 
the analysis. Supranational actors are important in everyday decision-making, since the 
MSs have delegated significant powers to them (Menon, 2008:219). “European institutions 
[…] are increasingly displacing national institutions as the principal loci of policy change”, 
but as the “EU directives are ‘soft’ law allowing considerable discretion to implementing 
officials” (Sabatier, 1998:121), the EU is “heavily reliant on these latter to ensure the 
implementation of its laws” (Menon, 2008:216). The study of the “European policy should 
pay attention to the formal and informal rationale of governmental action at the EU level, 
which ultimately often largely determines the course (and success or failure) of the policy 
process” (Versluis et al, 2011:13). This was very tangible with the GDPR which was 
strongly affected by the MSs agendas, as Chapters IV, V, VI and VII present. Some 
statistics produced by a study established that 69,3% of the analysed final EU Conciliation 
Committee18 texts in the period 1993-2009 were close to the original position of the 
Council, 30,1% were reflecting more the EP view, and 0,6 % were close to both (Mariotto 
and Franchino, 2011). While the Council’s preferences prevail in the above figures, they 
also indicate that the EP’s role in influencing legislation, that amounts here to roughly 
                                                          
18 The last stage of the ordinary legislative procedure to reconcile the differences between the EP and the 
Council positions. This phase is not always reached, since the agreement on majority of legislative files is 
usually found at earlier stages.  
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30%, can also be significant. Returning to the earlier highlighted EU complexity and the 
limitations that any single theoretical approach will suffer from for that reason, a more 
systematic explanation of the European project is only possible moving away from an 
“‘either/or’ orientation to a ‘both/and’ perspective” (Checkel, 2001:38).  
The other two theoretical approaches deployed here – policy networks and new 
institutionalism – are useful tools in developing a more profound exploration of a given 
policy process, as they allow us “to explain elements or particular slices of the EU polity” 
(Rosamond, 2000:148), i.e. they help to deconstruct the middle- and micro-level. Policy 
networking is thought to be one of the main features of the EU policy-making and cannot 
be omitted in the endeavour to understand the GDPR stipulation because of the presence of 
concrete structures in the form of epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions and 
lobbying platforms that were active in this process. The new institutionalism – a leading 
theory in the recent EU studies – offers very important insights into the motivations of 
individual actors, the impact of a number of variables on the process and the overall setting 
in which it unfolds. While the three main strands of new institutionalism are also 
understood as overlapping, the analytical perspectives coming from all of them - the 
impact of rules and strategic behaviour of the actors of the rational choice institutionalism, 
path dependencies and the temporal dimension of the historical institutionalism, and 
finally the role of ideologies, policy styles, identities, personal beliefs, etc., of the 
sociological institutionalism – are indispensable in explaining the factors that have been 
shaping the process researched in this thesis. 
3.3 Consociationalism – the EU as a state-centric polity 
The model of consociational democracy was developed and theorised by Arend Lijphart, 
whose focus on the clues underpinning political stability in divided societies moved further 
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than the mainstream pluralist approaches (Chryssochoou, 2009:75-76). His book published 
in 1968 conveyed a new perspective to the works on comparative government (Taylor, 
1990b:172).  
Consociationalism – a particular form of democracy – emerged in some plural societies 
that succeeded in installing and maintaining a stable democratic government, despite 
significant social divisions and political differences, which typically impede political 
stability (Lijphart, 1977:1). Plural societies are those encompassing nearly separate 
subsocieties with sharp divergence between them related to “religious, ideological, 
linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines” and “with their own political parties, interest 
groups, and media of communication” (Lijphart, 2012:31). Consociationalism, although to 
different extent, applies to the democracies in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Canada and a number of other countries, where the above-mentioned cross-
cutting cleavages are present (Lijphart, 1977). “Consociational forms may range from a 
relatively loose confederation of groups and states to federal arrangements with a 
recognized structure” (Apter, 1966:24 cited in Chryssochoou, 2009:75) and may draw on a 
variety of governing institutions configurations (Lijphart, 1977:25-36). 
Consociational governance is constructed as a compound political association of 
collectivities, with the Latin origin of the term “consociation” indicating association in 
fellowship (Chryssochoou, 2009: 74-75). It therefore draws on shared power among the 
subunits as well as evenly distributed central authority in order to avoid any form of 
hegemonic control. The segments of such composite polities maintain their autonomy and 
are interlinked between them on the basis of some kind of consensual relationship, 
designed as equal partnership. As a result, such political collectivity functions as a 
complex entity that does not entirely fulfil the characteristics of conventional status of 
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sovereignty of its own and has a weaker governmental apparatus as well as less expressed 
national identity (Chryssochoou, 2009:74-76). Consociation is enacted through cooperation 
of elites, i.e. political leaders of the different segments, in the form of grand coalition, 
which is “the primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy” (Lijphart, 1977: 
1, 25). Here, the elites adopt coalescent style of leadership, in contrast to adversarial, 
majoritarian model of political culture, e.g. adopted in Britain and the USA, more suitable 
to homogeneous societies (Lijphart, 1977:25-31; Lijphart, 2012:9-29). Elite interaction in 
consociational systems is driven by informal, unwritten rules of the game (Chryssochoou, 
2009:75). Thus, the political stability in such fragmented societies relies on the rival elites’ 
readiness to overcome the divisive intergroup factors that may cause political immobility 
or lead to conflicts (Chryssochoou, 2009:75-77). “Voluntary, rational, purposive, and 
contractual” approach to cooperation between the elites is a particularly important 
dimension in consociatonal democracy (Lijphart, 1977:103). Another aspect of the 
dynamics of the consociational political system is that “the leaders are faced continually 
with the dilemma of acting to preserve the general system whilst at the same time seeking 
to protect and further the interests of the groups which they represent” (Taylor, 
1990b:174). From here derives the consensus based decision-making model of such 
systems of governance, embedding politics of compromise and accommodation of 
different interests that translate into acceptance of a minimal common denominator. Policy 
outcomes reflect negotiated agreements achieved by the means of elite bargaining 
(Chryssochoou, 2009:75-77). The above-discussed grand coalitions may be settled in 
various ways in different governing systems – “as a grand coalition cabinet in a 
parliamentary system, a ‘grand’ council or committee with important advisory functions, 
or a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in a presidential system” 
(Lijphart, 1977:25). 
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Along with a grand coalition, there are other three defining properties of consociational 
democracy. The first is the mutual veto, “which serves as an additional protection of vital 
minority interests”. The second is the principal of proportionality in “political 
representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds”. The third one is 
the earlier mentioned “high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal 
affairs” (Lijphart, 1977:25). The interests and associations of segmental groups tend to be 
more inwardly oriented “than overlapping with those of members of other groups in the 
same state” (Taylor, 1990b:173). 
Consociational systems draw on legitimacy through “inclusiveness and the broadening of 
ultimate consent to government” (Chryssochoou, 2009:76). However, as reached by elites, 
“outside the realm of citizen participation in the affairs of the polity” consociational 
outcomes may seem contested by less democratic process through which they are achieved 
Chryssochoou, 2009:77). In a less positive connotation, elite coalitions are referred to as “a 
cartel of elites” (Chryssochoou, 2009: 76-77), suggesting their conspiracy “to promote 
their own interests even when these conflict with those of the segments which they 
nominally serve” (Taylor, 1990b:177). 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that in plural societies “consociational democracy […] is the 
best kind of democracy that can realistically be expected” (Lijphart, 1977: 48). Also, in all 
kinds of democratic regimes certain degree of elite predominance is the norm. “Equal 
power and participation by all citizens” remains a hardly feasible theoretical ideal, with 
which the elitism of consociational democracy should not be contrasted (Lijphart, 1977: 
50). Moreover, through empirical studies more participation has been observed at all levels 
in consociationally organised societies (Lijphart, 1977: 50).   
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The concept of consociationalism is relevant in the theory of international integration as 
well. Namely, it can be applied to the case of regional integration in Europe embodied by 
the development of the European Communities (Taylor, 1990b:172-173) that at a later 
stage evolved into the EU (see Section 3.2). It is a compound, multi-layered polity 
(Chryssochoou, 2009:80). Apart from being multi-ethnic, it is heterogeneous in numerous 
ways. Its MSs represent diverse political economies, with a spectrum of welfare and 
regulatory systems ranging from social democracies, e.g. Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, 
Finland and other, to Britain’s Anglo-American model, that applies light regulatory 
approach, low taxation levels, particularly for businesses, and relies on the market (Taylor, 
2003:99-134). The EU countries also have established different political systems at 
national level as well as institutional arrangements at subnational level and “relationships 
between the state and civil society, which is expressed in the way the state intervenes at the 
local level and the way problem definitions and policy expectations are converted into 
general political rules” (Heinelt and Smith, 1996c:4). For example, the UK and Greece are 
unitary states, France and the Netherlands - unitary-decentralised states, Italy and Spain 
function as regionalised states, Germany as a federal state, etc. (Heinelt and Smith, 
1996c:4). 
These culturally distinct and politically organised units have formed a voluntary treaty-
based association, where they have retained the right of withdrawal. Besides, they neither 
lose “their sense of forming collective national identities” nor resign “their individual 
sovereignty to higher central authority” (Chryssochoou, 2009:78-79). The states have also 
reserved the right of veto, when their vital interests might be affected (Taylor, 1990b:179). 
Nevertheless, a coalescent style of leadership has been adopted in the EU decision-making. 
The Council of Ministers and the European Council that both would qualify as grand 
coalitions in accordance with consociational logic, work in the mode of political 
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accommodation and cooperation (Chryssochoou, 2009:80-83). The principle of consensus 
in the main EU institutions in legislating helps to preserve stability. When the majority 
vote procedure is applied, the outcome of outvoting is agreed in advance with the 
dissenting states (Taylor, 2003:111-112). As progress towards integration depends on the 
convergence of the MSs preferences, agreements are often reached on the basis of the 
lowest common denominator. (Chryssochoou, 2009:81). National preferences are 
determined by domestic political economies (Drezner, 2007:64), but can also be driven by 
“geo-political and ideological motivations where economic preferences are diffuse, 
uncertain or weak” (Moravcsik, 1995:612). Accommodation of “the divergent expectations 
of the subunits” clearly reflects “the consociational principle of segmental autonomy” 
(Chryssochoou, 2009:79). Thus, decision-making in the EU should be seen as 
polycentric19. “State participation in the joint exercise of power” is institutionalised 
(Chryssochoou, 2009: 82). The EU does not threaten the sovereignty of its composing 
parts, but as it was evolving, a “less rigid understanding of sovereign statehood” or less 
“compact polity” emerged in the “‘mixed’ system of shared governance which comprises 
both consensus and majority rule and is designed to bridge the tensions arising from a strict 
interpretation of the sovereignty principle as exclusive domestic jurisdiction” 
(Chryssochoou, 2009: 79). Concurring with the consociational perspective, the integration 
process in the EU is non-linear (Chryssochoou, 2009: 83). For instance, the principle of 
subsidiarity indicates two-ways dynamics, i.e. “protection of national autonomy against 
excessive centralization, and the extension of European legislative competences” 
(Chryssochoou, 2009: 85). In the light of pre-Brexit20 debates Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
Commission President, had articulated the importance of observance of this principle and 
                                                          
19 Some even note that vertically and horizontally dispersed decision-making power in the EU has resulted in 
a phenomenon of leadership deficit (Hayward, 2008). 
20 The so-called Brexit was the name for the UK EU exit referendum of June 2016 that resulted in the vote 
for leaving the EU. 
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that the EU should refrain from interfering too much in the “domains where [MSs] [...] are 
better placed to take action” (quoted in BBC, 2016a). The EU data protection reform was, 
too, subject to the subsidiarity test (e.g. see Commission, 2012d; EESC, 2012; COR, 
2012). 
Regional integration could be seen by the political elites of segments  
“as providing a means by which their power base could be consolidated; not only 
would their capacity for rewarding as far as was necessary the collective interests 
of the distinct segments be enhanced, but their capacity to influence the definition 
of such interests would also be increased. This lends support to the view that 
integration tends to reinforce rather than weaken the nation-state” (Taylor, 
1990b:177).  
This can also be explained in such way:  
“[T]he EC does not diffuse the domestic influence of the executive; it centralizes it. 
Rather than ‘domesticating’ the international system, the EC ‘internationalizes’ 
domestic politics. While cooperation may limit the external ability of executives, it 
simultaneously confers greater domestic influence” (Moravcsik, 1994:3 cited in 
Chryssochoou, 2009:81, original emphasis). 
The last US President Barack Obama recently, while urging against Britain’s split from the 
EU, stated: “[T]he UK is at its best when it’s helping to lead a strong European Union. It 
leverages UK power to be part of the EU. I don’t think the EU moderates British influence 
in the world, it magnifies it” (quoted in BBC, 2016b).  
Such dynamics reaches even deeper than the flows between the national and supranational 
levels. Subnational level actors also strategically use the EU and even international-level 
fora to strengthen their domestic powers through transnational harmonisation of rules 
(Newman, 2007; Newman, 2011). For example, in the case of the adoption of the Directive 
95/46/EC, data protection issues were brought to the supranational agenda by the national 
DPAs that managed at the same time to contain the degree of harmonisation by preventing 
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the creation of a centralised EU-level regulator. National authorities strengthened their 
positions through a European-level law, simultaneously preserving their domestic powers 
(Newman, 2007). The non-linearity of the EU integration and polycentric decision-making 
was also clearly reflected in the CJEU judgement on Safe Harbour in 2015 (Schrems v 
Data Protection Commissioner) that held that national DPAs have the power to examine 
the compliance of transfers of personal data to third countries with the EU law regardless 
the existence of a related Commission adequacy decision. It was nevertheless pointed out 
that only the CJEU alone has the power to decide regarding the validity of an EU-level act, 
i.e. a Commission decision itself (CJEU, 2015).  
The integration in the EU is a symbiotic process between the interests of collectivity (the 
EU as such) and its parts (Chryssochoou, 2009:82-83). One of the collective interests 
holding the Union together is related to international implications. According to the 
consociational theory, in the face of external pressures and vulnerability in the 
international arena, the states benefit from being in association and are inclined to resolve 
internal tensions in order to be less exposed to the external threats. This holds the system 
together and underlies the acceptance of a “cartel of elites as a management coalition” 
(Taylor, 1990b:181). At the same time, territorial integration is not occurring, as far as 
decision-making is concerned, “state governments retain exclusive control over 
‘constitutional’ reform” (Chryssochoou, 2009: 82-83). To maintain their territorial political 
authority the elites of subunits tend to favour vertical integration. Horizontal integration 
and the potential “emergence of a transnational civic identity” is undesired by the elites, as 
it would enhance the legitimacy of the supranational sphere, and would undermine their 
domestic influence as a consequence (Chryssochoou, 2009: 81). This is, for instance, 
reflected in the discussion in Subsection 6.6.1 where the emergence of the EUCFR is 
touched upon. 
  97 
 
As it was covered in the above paragraphs, the EU political system encompasses all 
properties of a consociational polity. Consociational analogy is meaningful for an analysis 
of the EU policy process in that it suggests distributed non-linear power flow among its 
actors and explains the purposiveness of the informal principle of consensus-seeking and 
(the EU style of) accommodationist politics. These initial macro-level insights into policy-
making will be now examined more in-depth through policy networks and new 
institutionalist perspectives in the following sections. 
3.4 Policy networks: non-linear power dynamics and lobbying and “reverse” lobbying 
The policy networks debate is grounded in the argument that in the modern societies 
political decision-making is not limited to formal politico-institutional arrangements and 
the analysis of contemporary policy processes should also take into account the existence 
of informal political infrastructures that are complex actor constellations with resource 
interdependencies “formed between different interests within the public service and 
elsewhere” and are coordinated through bargaining and political exchange (Heinelt and 
Smith, 1996c: 2-3). Each actor of such a “cluster” has a “‘stake’ in a given […] policy 
sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure” (Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999:8 cited in Peterson, 2009:105). A range of different participants, including 
some representing private or non-governmental institutions, are involved in the making and 
delivery of public policies (Peterson, 2009:105). They gain access points to the policy 
process through informal networks (Jönsson and Elgström, 2004:3). Network analysis 
focuses on interaction between different organisations – “contacts, ties and connections”, 
i.e. examines relational data (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:15). Interorganisational relations 
are enacted through interpersonal links, that is through “certain individuals occupying 
certain roles in the constituent organisations”, rather than through organisations in their 
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entirety as participants (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:15). Thus, personal relationships that 
are built as a result of frequent interaction within the context of organisational contacts are 
at the core of networks. They function as informal self-organising structures that are 
coordinated horizontally and, relatively speaking, lack hierarchy. Informal dynamics and 
the interpersonal dimension of interaction generate mutual trust and efficient exchange of 
information as well as render networks adaptable (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:15-16). 
“Whereas formal channels tend to be ineffective when information is sensitive or 
politically charged, informal channels facilitate the free flow of information” (Jönsson and 
Strömvik, 2004:16; this is in line with some remarks made in Section 5.6 on the EDPS 
regarding suitability of formal avenues in certain situations). Policy networks may be of 
more permanent, coherent character, encompassing consistent values, known as “epistemic 
communities”, or of rather temporary character, as issue-based coalitions of heterogeneous 
actors, organised around a specific matter and acting as “advocacy coalitions”. Both types 
are present in EU negotiation (Jönsson and Elgström, 2004:3-4). “An epistemic community 
is a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or 
issue-area” (Haas, 1992:3). Advocacy coalitions are “composed of actors from various 
governmental and private organisations” (Sabatier, 1998:103). Most of them, apart from 
interest group leaders, are likely to include “agency officials, legislators from multiple 
levels of government, applied researchers, and perhaps even a few journalists” (Sabatier, 
1998:103, 107-8, 121). 
The need for central decision-making authorities to engage with policy networks in the 
policy formulation process arose as it was inferred that the latter might have an important 
impact on the success or failure of a particular policy in its implementation phase. 
Networks function as societal sub-systems and for that reason represent a force with a 
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potential of resistance to the imposed rules. Therefore, negotiation and coordination of 
policy proposals across policy networks tend to lead to more successful policy outcomes 
and win-win situations (Kjær, 2004:34-49). Governance through networks is particularly 
relevant in interest group politics, i.e. where opposing interests exist (Kjær, 2004:48). 
The policy networking is thought to be the most distinct feature of the EU governance 
(Bache and George, 2006:29-39). “The process of informal influence in the EU policy 
process – in other words, lobbying – is one of the most researched topics at the European 
scene” (Versluis et al, 2011: 47). Brussels, the so-perceived EU administrative capital, is 
known to be “the most lobbied city after Washington”, which can be expected due to the 
abundant amount of regulatory output formulated here (Versluis et al, 2011: 47). However, 
lobbying is not limited to the activities of the NGOs, industry and business lobbies or 
foreign governments. All types of actors at various levels in the EU, including 
parliamentarians, national and subnational governments, national and EU-level civil 
servants, and others, engage in policy networking in order to promote their ideas and 
advocate “a certain course of action (policy) that will ultimately serve their own interests to 
increase their power, in terms of money, influence, or knowledge” (Versluis et al, 
2011:231).  
Abundance of informal structures can be seen both as a condition and a consequence of the 
complexity and fluidity of the formal EU framework, characterised by “diffuse and 
overlapping competencies and responsibilities” (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:17). As the 
EU is “a system of governance in its own right”, the macro-level theories of European 
integration fail to embrace the whole complexity of the EU politics and are not able, or 
even do not aim, to explain the process of policy-making and how certain policy outcomes 
are produced by the EU system (Peterson, 2009:110-111, 116, original emphasis). Network 
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analysis is a useful tool as it provides sub-systemic meso-level insights into decision-
making and as such it complements the macro-theories of politics. In the EU, depending on 
the policy sector, power may be more concentrated at the sub-systemic level in some cases 
and less in other (Peterson, 2009:116-117). Policy network analysis is especially congruent 
with those institutionalists outlooks of the EU where the focus is on ultimate policy 
choices, for which the EU institutions largely share their authority (Peterson, 2009:110). 
Thus, extensive policy networking in the EU is related to its decentralised decision-making 
and non-linear policy-making dynamics, and its functioning as “a consensus-driven type of 
political system” where the “ability to ‘pre-cook’ decisions in the stages ‘before the 
hammer falls’ […] is fundamental to the reaching of agreement between the MSs, EU 
institutions, and other organised interests” (Versluis et al, 2011:133). “Informal EU 
networks allow for wide and flexible participation, reduce frictions and produce results that 
the formal system would not be able to achieve” (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:16 referring 
to Middlemas, 1995: xvi). Actors within the EU constantly deal with the need to prevent or 
overcome potential gridlocks that may cause impassiveness in policy-making, making the 
politics problem-solving oriented. The EU’s “capacity for agency” to a significant extent 
derives from policy networks that are “results-driven” (Peterson, 2009:110).  
European transnational networks also emerged as Europeanisation of national policy 
processes, where the goals and interests of a wide diversity of actors at national level 
moved beyond national political space. Participation in informal networks is related to 
mediation between different spheres, such as political and economic and domestic and 
international (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004: 17-19). Policy negotiations in the EU consist of 
systematic interactions between official entities, such as supranational institutions and 
MSs, and unofficial, non-state bodies. Apart from intergovernmental deliberations, these 
processes involve transgovernmental relations at the level of governmental sub-units as 
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well as transnational interactions between non-state actors (Jönsson and Elgström, 2004:3). 
The latter lobbying groups represent business interests in the form of cross-sectoral 
organisations, sectoral organisations or, in some cases, individual companies, public 
interests, such as environmental or consumer groups, territorial interests, or others. The 
mechanism of the EU policy-making process provides plenty of access points to these 
groups and some of them have accrued significant political resources (Jönsson and 
Strömvik, 2004:18). Green Cowles (1998:108-125) points out the emergence of mobilised 
interests of large multinational businesses as “new politically powerful actors” and “one of 
the most important developments [...] in the Brussels policy making process” (Green 
Cowles, 1998:108). Their agenda-setting strategies are directed at major EU institutions, 
targeting specific officials within the Commission, the Council, the EP and the media. 
They tend to be focused on specific EU issue-areas, act through “organised, well-financed 
lobbying schemes” and beyond the conventional interests representation forms such as 
industry associations that are also present in the EU political process (Green Cowles, 
1998:108-125; Coen and Richardson, 2009:5-6). “The rise of direct lobbying and […] the 
emergence of fluid issue-based coalitions” has transformed “the logic of collective action” 
(Coen and Richardson, 2009:3). The arrival of NGOs and societal interests has also been 
part of such change, amplifying the spectrum of actors involved in lobbying activities 
(Coen and Richardson, 2009:5-6). One of the EU institutions’ motivations for engagement 
in intensive policy networking is strategic and can be termed as “reverse lobbying” 
activity. For example, the “deliberate networking strategy” that involves informal sectoral 
links and building coalitions with various subnational and transnational groups pursued by 
the Commission is aimed at putting pressure on such actors as governments, business 
associations or others, to advance its policies (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:17). The 
Commission, that is known to function as the hub of different policy networks seeks 
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“to secure support for ideas by the early stages of a policy cycle. After all, the 
extent to which the Commission is successful in including the [MSs], 
parliamentarians and lobbyists in its shaping process, conditions to a large extent 
the degree of opposition that the policy will receive at the decision-making stage. 
Then, the Commission is dependent upon the Council and the MEPs to approve its 
plans” (Versluis et al, 2011:134). 
Besides, the EU being a modern system of governance, much of its policy-making is 
extremely technical (Peterson, 2009:105-106). But in stipulating the EU-level regulations, 
the Union “relies heavily on assets and expertise held at the national level, including in the 
private sector” (Peterson, 2009:108). Therefore, the concept of policy networks is 
increasingly indispensable in understanding the EU policy-making environment (Peterson, 
2009:108-109). From the perspective of policy formulation and implementation at the 
technical level the sheer amount and arcane system of supposedly apolitical working 
groups and committees play a prominent role. These, however, are not the venues of only 
technical work, but also where agreements can be brokered to “move the policy agenda 
forward” as well as influence exerted (Peterson, 2009:107). 
Controversies and infighting between the actors involved in the shaping of the EU policies 
–MSs, institutions, experts and lobbying groups – commonly take place in the process, 
each interested party “attempting to shape the final EU law to their liking”. This may 
involve even big expensive PR campaigns, deploying the media, “aiming to evoke 
emotional response from consumers”, for instance (Versluis et al, 2011:136-137). While 
the industry in such cases is typically more resourced than their opponents, in particular if 
compared to civil society representatives, the latter still have some strategies, such as 
position papers, resolutions, letters, issuing press releases or holding conferences that 
sometimes can be quite successful to influence “opinions within national governments” 
(Versluis et al, 2011:136-137). Battles for influence also include  
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“attempts to build high firewalls around policies in a given sector so that they 
cannot be altered or undone by actors from another sector. One consequence is that 
EU policy networks tend to be discrete, distinct, and largely disconnected from one 
another, even when they preside over policies that are clearly connected […] Most 
have diverse membership, extending to public and private, political and 
administrative, and ‘European’ and national (and international and subnational) 
actors” (Peterson, 2009:106).  
Policies are affected by the internal rivalry between separate services, like in the case of 
Directorate-Generals (thereafter DG) within the Commission. A new policy proposal text 
drafted by the team of the chef de dossier is then subject to amendments and re-drafting in 
the process of “‘inter-service consultation’ within and across the different [DGs]”, before 
being approved by the Commissioner in charge and finally by the College of 
Commissioners. This can be a very lengthy process, in particular if conflicting positions 
emerge. The inter-service consultation procedure is also supposed to guarantee 
coordination of policies in different fields (Versluis et al, 2011:137, 167). Therefore, 
policy networks underpin the emergence of proliferous centres of influence and control 
alongside “overtly political decision-makers such as the college of Commissioners, 
Council of Ministers, or EP” (Peterson, 2009:106-107).   
The EU networks are not “entirely ‘flat’” and there have been observed the presence and 
significant role of “so-called linking-pin organisations, which occupy central positions in 
terms of being reachable from, and able to reach, most other organisations in the network 
and may serve as brokers and communications channels” (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:18, 
original emphasis). Such quality is attributed to the Commission, which is thought to have 
a steering role amongst multiple interest representations orbiting around it during the 
process of policy negotiations. The EP is another emerging important linking-pin in policy 
networking often deemed to be “the most accessible counterpart” for NGOs, “at least on 
issues of lesser weight” (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:18-19). “Through networking and 
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coalition building it has proved capable of influencing policy-making in several issue 
areas” (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:19). A “process manager” quality would also apply to 
the Council’s Secretariat (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:26). Further, “the relative 
bargaining assets and weaknesses of states vis-à-vis other actors” need to be considered.  
“Government representatives tend to occupy central positions in policy networks 
and cannot be neglected or bypassed by other actors when negotiating an issue. In 
addition, the state still has a certain advantage in the collection and assemblage of 
information. On the other hand, states are territorially bound, whereas their 
business and NGO counterparts are transnational in character […] states also have 
lengthy decision processes, whereas many of their counterparts can make speedy 
decisions, unrestrained by public opinion or constitutional checks and balances” 
(Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:20). 
Conclusively, in the policy networks analysis view the EU outcomes should not be seen as 
wholly determined by the classical EU actors, although their power is not denied (Peterson, 
2009:116). According to the proponents of this concept, it is reasonable to reject “the 
dichotomy between ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘supranational governance’ since virtually ‘no 
[EU] administrative action can be developed without national administrative authorities 
being associated with it” (Azoulay, 2002:128 in Peterson, 2009:117). In that policy 
networks approach concurs with the consociational reasoning, presented in the previous 
section, replicating its idea of diffuse non-linear power dynamics, consensus-seeking and 
the non-ceasing significance of the national level, despite intensifying integration.   
A more profound understanding of negotiations in the EU requires investigation of 
informal structures alongside formal ones (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2004:26). In addition to 
the points touched upon within the context of policy networks, the neo-institutional theory 
in the next section offers an even more comprehensive grasp of the interplay between the 
formal and informal factors in the EU politics. 
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3.5 New institutionalism: formal and informal factors in the policy-making process 
The formation of political institutions derives from the need to direct individual behaviour 
towards collective purposes (Peters, 2012:3). “An institution transcends individuals to 
involve groups of individuals in some sort of patterned interactions that are predictable, 
based upon specified relationships among the actors” (Peters, 2012:19). The features of an 
institution include certain stability over time, capability to affect individual behaviour and 
perceived shared values among the members of the institution (Peters, 2012:128-129). 
New institutionalism draws attention to the role of “informal patterns of structured 
interaction between groups as institutions themselves”, that exist along with formal 
institutions (Bache et al, 2011:22). In the contemporary society, “institution” is a multi-
faceted concept “used to refer to social phenomena at many different levels – informal 
codes of conduct, written contracts, complex organisations”, all of which can be equally 
powerful (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013:3, 5). Institutions may have either constraining or 
empowering effects on human action. Rules, both legal and social, prevent some actions 
from being otherwise pursued. (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:3). On the other hand, 
institutions may empower directly through such mechanisms as laws and rights, and 
indirectly through informal norms such as gender stereotypes, privileges deriving from 
nepotism or patronage, narrative accounts legitimising authority of certain actors with 
regard to others, etc. (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013:201-202). “Equally, shared cultural and 
cognitive-based understandings may promote common action, whereas different 
understandings may act as a constraint” (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:3). New 
institutionalism argues that formal institutions are not neutral arenas, as their rules and 
structures favour the access to the political process of some societal groups over others 
(Bache et al, 2011:23), “while also having the potential to inform the bottom-up 
institutional building of those who seek to resist such constraints” (Lowndes and Roberts, 
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2013:201-202). Although institutions shape actors’ behaviour, at the same time, they are 
social constructs, emerging from human interaction. This means that institutions and 
individuals are mutually constitutive in terms of power and agency. “Individuals are not 
simply constrained by institutions, they are also responsible for the crafting of these same 
constraints” and “creatively engaged in the enactment of institutions” (Lowndes and 
Roberts, 2013:104). Rules and practices may be interpreted or resisted, eventually 
generating institutional change (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013:104-105). “Newly created 
institutions […] open up avenues which could not have been pursued earlier” (Aspinwall 
and Schneider, 2001:3).   
New institutionalism investigates the impact of institutions on political decisions and 
policy choices, believing that “most political action of real consequence for society occurs 
within institutions, or is heavily influenced by institutions, so it is crucial to understand 
how these bodies act and how they influence the behaviour of individuals working within 
them” (Peters, 2012: 185). For neo-institutionalists, institutions are important structural 
elements of a polity (Peters, 2012:128-129).  Political life is centred on institutions.  They 
are the variables “that matter more than anything else” in explaining political decisions in 
most direct manner and “they are also the factors that themselves require explanation” 
(Peters, 2012:184). According to this school of political science “something about 
institutions – their values, their rules, their incentives, or the patterns of interactions of the 
individuals within them” – condition decisions made by governing authorities (Peters, 
2012:184). 
There are three main strands in new institutionalist research: rational choice, historical and 
sociological. Although it is acknowledged that many aspects of analysis deployed by 
proponents of these separate trends converge, they offer different insights about how 
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institutions affect outcomes, interpreting them as intervening or independent variables 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:18; Checkel, 2001:20-21; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013:28-
40). These perspectives will be now discussed in the context of EU politics.  
Since around the 1990s, new institutionalism has become a mainstream approach in the 
European studies. The related works have been addressing the relative power of 
institutional actors, bargaining complexities between the EU actors from various levels and 
the role of norms and socialisation in the process of European integration (Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2001:6). “In the EU, formal institutions include administrative rules, legislative 
procedures and the voting rights attributed to diverse collective actors” (Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2001:3). As the previous section on policy networks already demonstrated, 
informal rules in the EU politics also saliently come into play. Institutionalist analysis 
reveals many more forms of informal institutions within the EU policy process, suggesting 
that it should be regarded as a very complex interplay between formal and informal 
practices.   
In rationalist reasoning on the EU the basic assumption is “that actors in all relevant 
decision-making arenas behave strategically to reach their preferred outcome” (Aspinwall 
and Schneider, 2001:7). Institutions can become “autonomous political actors in their own 
right” (Bache et al, 2011:23) and have their own agendas (Aspinwall and Schneider, 
2001:4-5). They are driven by self-interest (Schmidt, 2001:144) and compete for influence 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:9). Therefore, even actors formally known as “non-
political”, e.g. civil servants or courts, do not necessarily remain “apolitical” (Peterson 
1995: 74; e.g. see the empirical discussion in Sections 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 6.2 and 6.4). In 
asserting themselves, actors may rely on various strategies and power resources, from 
taking advantage of disagreement among other players, to framing issues in a certain 
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policy realm so that it results in application of different procedures and reconfiguration of 
power between decision-makers, etc. (Falkner, 2012). Many researchers have observed the 
phenomenon of “norm entrepreneurism” actively enacted by the Commission and the 
CJEU that have “constructed a European competence in important ways, through rulings, 
proposals and alliances with actors at various levels across the EU” (Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2001:4-5; e.g. see the analysis in Section 6.4 on the CJEU regarding this “norm 
entrepreneurism” in the field of fundamental rights). For instance, the Commission in 
striving “both to legitimise itself and to create a demand for European-level public goods” 
that would not have been created without the supranational agency, actively seeks to 
identify new issues, propose solutions and establish alliances (Aspinwall and Schneider, 
2001:4-5). “The legitimacy of institutions depends […] on the capacity to engender and 
maintain the belief that they are the most appropriate ones for the functions entrusted to 
them” (Majone, 1997:161). In terms of the strategic interests of the CJEU, several scholars 
argued that its decision-making does not occur without taking “[MSs’] possible reactions 
into account”, i.e. can be seen as political (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:8; see Section 
6.4). Although designed as an independent institution, implementation of its judgements 
“ultimately depends on the goodwill of the [MSs] and of their courts” (Peterson and 
Shackleton, 2012:386).   
But from the MSs’ perspective, an increasing supranational agency is likely to be 
unwelcome (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:4-5). As a way to hinder the integrationist 
strategies of the supranational institutions, MSs may recourse to the use of domestic 
institutions and attempt to gain more bargaining weight and obtain a different agreement 
through a “referendum game”, i.e. hailing unfavourable popular sentiment towards 
advancing integration during the negotiations within the European Council (Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2001:9; see Subsection 6.6.1 regarding the impact of the Brexit agendas on the 
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GDPR talks). Similarly, national governments tend to favour enactment of the EU policy 
oversight through “federated transgovernmental networks of national regulators”, such as 
the WP29 or equivalent institutions in other sectors, as a governance alternative to the top-
down control structures, i.e. excessive delegation to the supranational level, which is 
frequently undesired due to sovereignty concerns and national politics (Newman, 
2011:190, 192). This was very prominent with the GDPR and the reconfiguration of 
powers between the Commission and the DPAs as discussed in Subsection 4.5.4, Sections 
5.2, 5.5 and Chapter VII). Another example pertaining to the national governments’ quest 
for balancing out the progressing integration and supranational influence was the 
introduction in 1987 of the so-called “comitology” procedures, i.e. the rules on the 
implementation of EU regulatory measures, through which the Council representing 
governments has gained significant “gatekeeping” power, enabling, at least to some extent, 
MSs control over some Commission’s policy proposals (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:8; 
Checkel, 2001:36-37). Some insights from the research into the EU institutional setting 
nevertheless suggest that in the committees the Commission remains one of the most 
influential actors (Dehousse, 2003) whose remit of discretion arguably has expanded with 
the new comitology rules and the introduction of delegated acts with the Lisbon Treaty 
(Vihar, 2013). How changes in institutional rules affect the relative power of actors, like in 
the above cases, is the main focus in the rational choice institutionalists analysis. A major 
development here was the introduction of the co-decision procedure21, notably increasing 
the powers of the EP (Rosamond, 2013:90-93). Apart from the EP itself, this was quite a 
game changer for some actors such as civil society groups and new policy issues 
articulated by them. “In fact, human rights pressure groups have begun utilising the EP as a 
means for generating […] the sort of normative pressure-from-below” (Checkel, 2001:34). 
                                                          
21 now ordinary legislative procedure that was also applied to the GDPR. 
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For rationalists, institutions are intervening outcome variables that shape the process of 
European collaboration and power distribution. When reforms are imminent, they raise 
actors’ concerns about potential shifts in power balance (Aspinwall and Schneider, 
2001:4). A relatively minor policy change at the EU level may, however, entail a major 
change for specific actors, e.g. specific countries (Sabatier, 1998:121). The rational choice 
institutionalist perspective has direct links with the state-centric theories on the EU 
(Rosamond, 2000: 148-156), among which the consociationalism discussed in Section 3.3.  
The rationalist reasoning is challenged as incomplete for their attention mostly paid to the 
formal rules, while power dynamics and possible policy outcomes are much more nuanced 
due to existing informal practices. For example, a well-known informal norm of 
consensus-seeking in the Council poses limits to the Commission’s formal institutional 
powers. Policy proposals are greatly shaped by the intergovernmental bargaining in the 
Council and its Presidencies (Schmidt, 2001: 125 – 146). This is very relevant to the 
GDPR process as recounted in the following empirical Chapters. 
Informal institutions are taken more into account in the historical institutionalism. In this 
view, formation of preferences and strategic choices are conditioned by institutional 
context, i.e. by previous institutional commitments (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 10). 
This creates the effect of “path dependency” – “a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing 
activity” (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013: 39). Past decisions have an impact on the interstate 
negotiations. “European integration is a cumulative process, where prior decisions form a 
basis upon which new decisions are made” (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 10, 12). Even 
in the liberal intergovernmentalist vision, where the European integration is interpreted as 
rather loose, it is recognised that major decision-making in the EU does “not take place in 
anarchy, but accept[s] previous agreements (and the societal adaptation to them) as a new 
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status quo”, i.e. “each bargain is recursive, influenced by past bargains and influencing 
future ones” (Moravcsik, 1995: 612). Consequently, enduring structural arrangements may 
render the institutional framework not in pace with social changes and may privilege some 
actors over others as well as certain types of policy over others (Aspinwall and Schneider, 
2001: 10-12). Over time, historical evolution of institutions will not necessarily be 
efficient, and they will not always emerge as a result of neutral bargaining. In the historical 
institutionalism’s depiction, institutions may have effects of both intervening and 
independent variables (Checkel, 2001: 20-21). Institutional structures, both formal and 
informal, may be challenged and may be changed when the context changes or new actors 
emerge (Katzenbach, 2012: 124, 129). 
Sociological institutionalism proposes that cultural and cognitive patterns also have strong 
implications in the integration process. The impact of actors’ values, beliefs and identities 
may manifest itself “along professional lines, where groups of professionals from different 
EU [MSs] begin to respond in similar ways to proposed or agreed policies; it may occur 
along organisational lines; it may occur along national lines” or other (Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2001: 14), constituting a collective power base (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013: 
105). For instance, this applies to epistemic communities, discussed in the previous section 
on policy networks.  
Distinct institutional cultures have been observed within various EU bodies and their units, 
with reference frequently made to the diverse administrative conventions existing across 
the Commission’s DGs (Rosamond, 2013: 89-93). However, formation of organisational 
identities is not an absolute determinant in shaping individual preferences, as it competes 
with other identities. The different national cultural traditions across the EU states that 
have translated into varied modes of economic, industrial and state-society relations in 
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each country, determine actors’ diverse responses and expectations related to supranational 
policies. Apart from different stances brought into the interstate bargaining within the 
Council (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 13; e.g. see Section 5.4), this is also a factor 
when the Commission’s policies are designed. Despite this institution formally being 
independent from the MSs, national governments try to access the shaping of EU policies 
through co-nationals – officials and seconded national experts – employed within the 
Commission administration (Versluis et al, 2011: 137-138). “Even though members of the 
Commission were strictly forbidden from seeking or receiving instructions from their 
national governments, governments were always anxious to get their people into key 
positions where they felt their interests could best be served” (Taylor, 2003: 112). Hence, 
the depiction of the Commission as “a foreign bureaucracy”, i.e. an outside force with 
opposing interests that could be imposed on the MSs, in particular promoted by 
Eurosceptics, is distorted and not sophisticated enough for the analysis of policy process 
and influences (Taylor, 2003: 112). “Intergovernmentalism starts in the cabinets. They are 
mini-Councils within the Commission” (Peterson, 1995: 74). In addition, some studies 
claim that even more than by national adherence, the Commission officials’ preferences 
are formed by their partisan orientation (Hooghe, 2001: 152-173). On the other hand, 
literature on the European integration indicates socialisation, emerging from interactions at 
the EU-level as well, which arguably has a certain degree of impact on the formation of 
identities and interests (Checkel, 2001: 20-35). For instance, the members of the 
Committee of the Permanent Representatives (thereafter COREPER) are said to be subject 
to implicit dual loyalties. The instructions from their governments are supplemented by a 
motivation of “making the system work”. Permanent Representatives develop shared goals 
and values and, driven by their commitment to achieve results, their interaction shifts from 
“hard bargaining” towards more consensual politics, that is it encompasses elements of 
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Europeanisation (Andersen et al, 2001: 33-4). An official of a Permanent Representation in 
Brussels has pointed out that the COREPER happens to be labelled by their domestic 
administration as the “Committee of Permanent Traitors” (Joerges and Neyer, 1997: 291). 
The different GDPR talks dynamics among Justice and Home Affairs (thereafter JHA) 
Counsellors working at the Permanent Representations as compared to the working group-
level, made of delegates most of whom reside and work in their home countries between 
the meetings, were indeed spontaneously mentioned at an interview (see Section 5.4). “The 
EU’s institutional system generates multiple identities, the importance of which cannot be 
discounted in EU policy debates. Virtually all actors in EU policy-making must balance or 
at least reconcile different identities” (Peterson and Shackleton, 2012: 396). The effects of 
institutions for sociological institutionalists are deep reaching, not limited to simply 
constraining actors’ behaviour. As such, they are interpreted as independent variables 
(Checkel, 2001:  20-21). 
Overall, comprehensively taking into account various aspects of new institutionalist 
analysis, the EU supranational institutions can be interpreted as semi-autonomous. 
Deviating from the principal-agent dynamics, in which societal principals delegate power 
to governing agents, they managed to acquire a significant scope of competence and pursue 
their own agendas. At the same time, they encounter a wide range of constraints affecting 
their actions (Cram, 1997: 154-176). The EU institutions assume a collective responsibility 
for EU policies and are greatly interdependent. As they interact in a competing or even 
conflicting manner, the EU policies are shaped by interinstitutional cleavages as much as 
by intergovernmental disagreements (Peterson and Shackleton, 2012:  386-387, 396-398).  
As it can be seen from the discussion in this section, new institutionalism, in line with the 
consociational and policy networks concepts covered in the previous sections, reproduces 
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the ideas of power-sharing and non-linear policy process dynamics among the EU actors. 
However, it additionally devices the analysis of the EU policy-making with the perspective 
of the vast pool of informal (“soft”) factors, capable to alter the outcomes expected on the 
basis of formal rules. These factors – institutions – may have the effects of leverages 
within the power distribution established by formal procedures and even be drivers of 
certain policy initiatives in some cases. Institutional analysis allows both micro- and 
macro-level analysis, i.e. both a sophisticated investigation of an individual actor’s 
incentives as well as a fuller understanding of general structural arrangements of the whole 
system of actors and their interactions in the EU.  
3.6 What is the balance of interests likely to be in the EU decision-making? The 
rationale for the empirical analysis 
A number of contrasting propositions related to the potential prevalence of interests in the 
EU policies emerge from the theories that constitute the analytical framework in this work.  
The interpretations of consociational systems that put the emphasis on the “cartel of elites” 
argument are sometimes associated with the EU project at large, depicting it as “conspiracy 
of elites and big business – in alliance with governments – against the interests of the mass 
of the people” (Taylor, 1990b: 177). The perception of the EU consociation as elite-
dominated and the ambiguity of the processes of the interstate and interinstitutional 
bargaining gave the rise to the EU “democratic deficit” discourse (Chryssochoou, 2009: 
81; Crisp, 2015). These debates have been also enhanced by the emergence of the EU 
regulatory state: the mode of governance which tends to be based on rule-making rather 
than on engagement with the redistribution of resources. This way of governance resulted 
in the growth of so-termed technocratic decision-making. Policy solutions formulated by 
technical experts are seen by some as not transparent and, hence, leading to the 
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“democratic deficit” (Majone, 1997). From the straightforward majoritarian democracy 
perspective, functional European integration triggers so-perceived legitimacy gaps 
(Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2007: 228-9). As to the realm of policy-networking, there 
have been claims about the Commission’s linkage with “big business” and its importance 
in the current EU policy-making (Green Cowles, 1998: 113). Apart from the involvement 
of the big European business, the abundant presence of the American firms including ICT 
giants is observed in the EU policy process shaping “the US-EU trade and investment 
agenda” (Green Cowles, 1998:  108-125). As explained in the first four sections of Chapter 
II, these stakeholders advance commercially-driven preferences and seek relaxation of the 
high EU regulatory standards in the sphere of privacy and data protection. Finally, 
according to some neo-institutional analyses of the EU politics, non-market interests are 
likely to be marginalised due to “the market orientation of European policy, and the 
existence of producer and consumer directorates with shared competence over policy” 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 11). In other words, the EU regulatory output will tend to 
be “market-making” rather than “market-shaping” (correcting), with stronger regulatory 
means used to protect market interests and weaker intervention tools to promote non-
economic interests, as it seems to be the case in the European governance of 
communications (Michalis, 2007c: 10-16, 290, 294, 300). 
Nevertheless, diverse arguments can be found in all the three theoretical dimensions 
employed in this study. Other existing interpretations of consociationalism propose that it 
is one of the most developed inclusive models of the democratic system, overcoming the 
flaws of majoritarian systems, which may lead to continuous inclusion and exclusion of 
some groups (Reilly, 2012). The elements of the regulatory state, such as independent 
regulatory bodies or commissions with delegated powers, create the effect of dispersed, 
shared power landscape with a more limited remit of competence of individual actors. As 
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this embeds pluralist characteristics, the regulatory state is thought to be a favourable mode 
of governance for the articulation and enforcement of post-industrial values, among which 
civil rights and consumer protection. Task delegation to regulators aims at efficiency and 
correction of market failures. The decision-making based on expertise and problem-solving 
is associated with a “positive-sum game”, which, when the right solutions are found, grants 
certain gains to all stakeholders (as opposed to the majoritarian “zero-sum”, i.e. some lose 
as some others win). That said, a number of control mechanisms can be applied to oversee 
the discretion deployed by the agents of the regulatory state (Majone, 1997). Furthermore, 
the overall argument of the EU “democratic deficit” is countered by some researchers, in 
that it “has reached constitutional maturity” (Moravcsik, 2005), on the whole “redresses 
rather than creates biases in political representation, deliberation and output” (Moravcsik, 
2002) and compares favourably with such perceived “model democracies” as the USA and 
Switzerland (Zweifel, 2002). From the policy networks perspective, data protection is an 
area where the EU possesses particularly sound technical expertise (Princen, 2003: 142-
157). The related epistemic community – the network of the DPAs – is thought to have a 
significant potential to influence the EU privacy and data protection policy (Newman, 
2007; Brown and Marsden, 2013c:61). In terms of the institutional eco-system, in parallel 
with the development of market policies, there has been a process of institutionalisation of 
the human rights in the EU (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2007). This process 
culminated in the creation of the specific EU-level constitutional legally-binding basis for 
protection of the fundamental rights, including privacy and data protection, through such 
instruments as the Lisbon Treaty and the EUCFR (EDPS, 2008; see Section 6.7). This 
means an existence of a competing path dependency to that of market orientation of 
European policy.  
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As it was already articulated in Section 2.5, there have been various instances when EU 
policies were not wholly market-oriented. Young and Wallace (2000) note that major 
political, economic and societal changes in the 1980s and 1990s led to incremental 
consideration of non-economic interests in the EU policies. This tendency was driven by 
concerns raised by the waves of Euroscepticism, but also by the changing actor landscape 
altered by the enlargements that increased the number of NGOs and governments 
advocating for promotion of civic interests. Moreover, with time and gained experience, 
public policy has been progressing towards more balanced rules. Young and Wallace argue 
that, even though they are usually less-resourced or insufficiently engaged in the policy 
process, civic interests often have a significant impact on policy in the EU, and the 
interactional patterns “between institutions, actors and ideas in the EU regulatory process 
facilitates” consideration of civic interests. A variety of policy actors (including the 
Commission, the EP and the CJEU or MSs governments) happen at times to articulate non-
economic considerations. The authors suggest that, even when these preferences do not 
prevail, they are present in the policy outcomes, rebutting “[t]he presumption of much of 
the literature on regulation […] that producer interests tend to predominate” (Young and 
Wallace, 2000: 2), and “the allegations that market liberalisation would lead to lower 
standards” observing instead “a tendency towards higher and tougher standards” (Young 
and Wallace, 2000: 9,17). A major Brussels-based consumer protection organisation 
BEUC commented favourably regarding the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) 
adopted in the recent years in the EU and introducing a range of new protections for 
consumers, especially when shopping on-line: “[i]n these days of discussions as to what 
the EU does for citizens, this Consumer Rights Directive is a fine example of how 
consumer laws have improved and continue to improve across the EU” (BEUC, 2014). 
Among other prominent cases, the number portability legislation (Directive 2002/22/EU) 
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and rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (thereafter ACTA) by the EP 
can be mentioned. The Directive 2002/22/EU enabled mobile phone users to change their 
service provider, while retaining their original numbers, charge free, aiming at better 
consumer choice and competition. The ACTA, an international treaty aiming to fight 
copyright infringements, including on-line, was rejected by the EP in 2012 as a result of an 
unprecedented pressure by thousands of EU citizens. The provisions of the agreement were 
thought to have a serious effect on the individual rights (EP, 2012b).  
Policy outcomes are hardly a priori definable (Young and Wallace, 2000). “Policy-making 
processes may end up heading in unexpected and unpredictable directions” (Ackrill et al, 
2013: 882). Relationships between interest groups and public decision-making authorities 
vary between different policy fields, therefore a profound analysis requires a disaggregated 
approach to the policy process and case-by-case investigation (Peterson, 2009: 107). In 
other words, each policy dossier needs an individual analysis of variables that shape the 
resulting balance of interests. Michalowitz thinks that lobbying actors are only likely to 
succeed “if they are in line with politicians or institutions driving the issue” (2004c: 270). 
Having analysed several case studies, some of which concern the IT sector, including 
instances when the EU was legislating on privacy-related issues, she concludes that 
“[p]redominantly, the presence of a political will determine the outcome of a policy 
decision” and overall lobbying “does not seem to matter” (Michalowitz, 2004c: 269). The 
reasons of its weak impact, however, may differ. But, in general terms, weak impact is due 
to the fact that lobbyists are representing very narrow interests that are very contrasting 
among themselves in the overall input, while the decision-makers have their own 
motivations in making certain policy choices and face procedural and political constraints 
(Michalowitz, 2004c:61-71, 269, 276; see Sections 5.3, 5.9, 5.10, 6.3, 6.5, 6.7 and Chapter 
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VII). It would be too reductionist to think that policy-makers embrace the preferences of 
powerful interests by default (Galperin, 2004). 
“Therefore, in order to understand why certain stakeholders are consistently 
favoured over others, why certain governments are capable of passing reforms and 
others are not, or why diffused interests are represented in some cases and not 
others, it is necessary to examine the institutional fabric that underlies the making 
of information and communication policies” (Galperin, 2004: 163). 
Along with a given institutional framework, time and context are important determinants 
of policy outcomes: the success of exactly the same ideas and political brokering in the 
different contexts will vary. The contexts of policy processes include both formal and 
informal institutions. In some situations, issues present in the political agenda may not 
result in a policy decision due to a range of technical and political reasons. In other 
situations, unforeseen (“focusing”) events may catalyse change (Kingdon, 1995c; Ackrill 
et al, 2013).22  
The context of the EU data protection reform builds on a number of significant institutional 
and normative developments of the past two decades, apart from the earlier mentioned 
impact of the Lisbon Treaty adopted in 2007. The package of the EU privacy protection 
instruments – Directive 95/46/EC and subsequent sector specific laws – offers an 
“internationally unprecedented level of privacy protection” (Newman, 2007: 123). 
According to Newman, it has been an important factor, that a comprehensive data 
protection regime in Europe was constructed “prior to the information technology 
revolution of the late 1990s”, making consumer information within Europe “much less 
readily available” if compared to the USA (Newman, 2007: 124). The instalment of data 
privacy rules has been enhanced by the institutionalisation of the administrative network – 
                                                          
22 The process of the GDPR adoption has been indeed marked by some unforeseen focusing events, such as 
the Snowden revelations that began in 2013 (see Sections 2.6 and 6.3) and the two rulings of the CJEU in 
spring 2014 related to the invalidation of the DRD and on the “right-to-be-forgotten” (See section 6.4). These 
events contributed to making the draft GDPR a “high profile” policy dossier.  
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the WP29 of the DPAs – deriving from the provisions of the Directive 95/46/EC 
(Newman, 2007: 134-137). Since mid-2000s this policy area at the EU level is also 
overseen by such bodies as the European Data Protection Supervisor (thereafter EDPS), 
European Network and Information Security Agency (thereafter ENISA) and The 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (thereafter FRA)23. In 2005 the field of 
data protection was transferred from the Commission DG responsible for the internal 
market to the DG competent in the area of justice, including the fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, according to some comments, the judiciary and regulatory activity of the 
current years in the EU can be perceived as the “climate of data protection enforcement”, 
which is “coupled with an increasing awareness by consumers of their rights” (Robert 
Bond of Speechly Bircham quoted in BBC, 2014m).  
Another contextual line encompasses the emergence of the digital economy as the core 
layer of the contemporary economy along with the entry of a new type of economic actors, 
such as search engines, apps developers, social networks, digital advertisers, cloud 
computing providers, and others, drawing on data-intensive business models, into the 
stakeholder constellation. The time of the reform coincided with the economic recession, 
when economic goals are likely to be given priority and the preferences of economic actors 
may gain more relevance. Digital economy and the creation of the Digital Single Market 
are among the core priorities of the current EU policies. Modern privacy protection 
regulation endeavours “to reconcile the fundamental but competing values of privacy and 
free flows of information” (Prins, 2006: 171).  
                                                          
23 The EDPS started work in 2004 and supervises how personal data are being handled in the EU public 
institutions. It also advises the EU institutions on the privacy and data protection matters when new EU laws 
are drafted (see Section 5.6). ENISA has been operating since 2005 and some privacy and data protection 
issues fall under the remit of its competence in the context of the networks and information security in the 
EU. FRA has been functioning since 2007 and monitors the rights to privacy and data protection along with 
implementation of other EU fundamental rights. Besides, some specific personal data processing-related 
issues within health sector are dealt with also by the European Medicine Agency, founded in 1995. 
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Further, this reform represented multiple power shifts, one of which was the replacement 
of a Directive by a Regulation – a directly applicable law – that meant decreasing national 
competence in this field as well as greater adjustment costs for national administrations. 
Harmonisation of different data protection systems in the MSs, that the move from a 
Directive to a Regulation embedded, encompassed accommodation of varying national 
sensibilities.   
The empirical part now presents the analysis of the process of adoption of the GDPR in the 
following Chapters. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The discussion of the EU politics in this Chapter demonstrated that actors from multiple 
levels of the EU governance (supranational institutions, national and subnational 
administrations and regulators, as well as private and civil society actors, and often various 
foreign players) need to be taken into account. All these actors bring their own agendas 
into the concrete policy process and seek influence. The polycentric power landscape of 
the EU political system creates multiple venues and opportunities for the actors to advance 
their interests, and the predominantly consensual decision-making constitutes a possibility 
for accommodation of wider ranging preferences. Which interests will succeed more in 
each policy dossier depends on the context of each concrete policy process, which needs to 
be investigated on a case-by-case basis. The context consists of formal and informal 
structures that will play out differently for various actors in each case. To analyse the 
impact of these structures this study makes recourse to the concepts of policy networks and 
new institutionalism. The national and supranational levels act as countervailing powers, 
i.e. the power dynamics is non-linear in the EU. However, on the whole, the current EU 
institutional set-up locates more power at the national level: the EU, seen as a 
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consociational political system, does not threaten the sovereignty of its composing parts – 
the MSs. Therefore, the analysis of the adoption of the GDPR is carried out from the 
perspective of moderate state-centrism in this thesis. Table 2 below summarises the above-
explained analytical framework.   
Table 2. The summary of the analytical framework of this thesis 
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POLICY NETWORKS 
 
Advocacy coalitions 
 
Epistemic communities 
 
Lobbying and “reverse lobbying” 
(all actors lobby themselves) 
 
Policy flows exchange between 
national and supranational levels 
and their interdependency 
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
Rational choice – strategic 
behaviour, power contest, actors 
driven by self-assertion 
Historical – the impact of 
previous policy decisions on the 
subsequent ones (“path 
dependencies”); significance of 
historical policy processes and 
temporal context 
Sociological – institutional and 
national contexts; the impact of 
identities, ideologies, cultures, 
etc. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The GDPR policy process: infusing a more risk-based approach and decentralising 
the proposed governance model 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the introductory Chapter I, the GDPR has been one of the most intense 
EU legislative processes of the recent years. It was referred to as “a very difficult file” by 
most interviewees during the fieldwork conducted for this thesis, who noted its technical 
complexity. This is also a framework legislation that builds basis for all other related laws, 
such as the review of the e-privacy Directive 2002/58/EC and the Regulation 45/2001 
outlining processing of personal data by the EU institutions, the EU PNR Directive, trade 
agreements, etc.  
“All of a sudden, this file became so big and so important, politically very charged, 
for all very different reasons. In terms of technology development and public 
awareness, it became very clear that privacy and data protection are not niche, but 
suddenly it turned out that this Regulation amounts to essentially the main 
regulation of on-line businesses and on-line interactions for the coming years […] 
On top of that, a lot of pressure from the business side because of “Big Data” […] 
And then Snowden and his revelations which concern a slightly different angle: 
intelligence, public security, etc. But, of course, it just showed that NSA and 
GCHQ just would not have any data if it was not for the big private companies 
gathering that data. All of a sudden, people realised that there is really probably 
something that should be done” (interview with EU official A, 29 January 2015, 
Brussels). 
The pressure on this file only grew in spring 2014, as, following the Snowden revelations 
in 2013, the EP voted with an overwhelming majority on its first reading position (EP, 
2014b) and the CJEU adopted its rulings invalidating the DRD and in favour of the so-
called “right-to-be-forgotten”, highlighting the salience of the privacy and data protection 
issue-area at the highest political decision-making level. In autumn 2015, another landmark 
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CJEU ruling followed invalidating the Safe Harbour agreement. There were also calls from 
the European Council for “the timely adoption of a strong EU General Data Protection 
framework” in October 2013 and June 2014 (European Council, 2013: 4; European 
Council, 2014: 2). In September 2014, a joint declaration of 16 EU national parliaments 
demanded to speed up the reform (Barbière, 2014). Nevertheless, the stipulation of the 
GDPR has taken about twice as long as originally planned, i.e. to be finalised before the 
EU elections of May 2014. This was determined by a vast number of variables, some of 
which of more (such as shifts in the spheres of competence) and others of less political 
nature (such as existing rules and procedures). In addition, some of these factors are 
directly related to the privacy and data protection issue-area (e.g. in balancing fundamental 
rights and economic interests), while others are unrelated to it and originate in the broader 
context of the EU politics (i.e. in the integration processes), but have an impact on shaping 
this specific policy area. This and the following chapters aim to provide an analysis of the 
interplay of these various reasons and how they summed up together in the policy 
outcomes. Section 4.2 presents the content of the EU data protection reform that was 
designed a set of strict rules and introduced a number of innovations. Section 4.3 discusses 
the process of the negotiations, indicating the main challenges encountered by the co-
legislators and the political tensions around them. Section 4.4 analyses the shift towards a 
more risk-based approach in the balance between the user and business interests in the 
course of the reform. Section 4.5 is dedicated to explain how the interests of the national 
and supranational institutional actors were positioned during the process, identifying the 
main areas of tensions. It mainly focuses on the process of decentralisation of the EU data 
protection governance model as compared to a more centralised model in the 
Commission’s draft proposals of 2012. 
4.2. The GDPR draft proposal and the features of the reform 
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The uneasy process of adoption of the GDPR commenced in January 2012, when, 
following related public consultations held between 2009 and 2011 (Commission, 2009-
2011), the Commission released its draft proposals for a comprehensive EU data protection 
reform, consisting of two instruments: a Regulation “setting out a general EU framework 
for data protection” to replace Directive 95/46/EC – the earlier “central legislative 
instrument for the protection of personal data in Europe” – and a Directive “setting out 
rules on the protection of personal data processed for the purposes of prevention, detection, 
investigation or prosecution of criminal offences and related judicial activities” to replace 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (Commission, 2012a)24. As it is stated in the 
accompanying documents, the provisions of the Directive 95/46/EC necessitated being 
updated and modernised in the light of technological progress and globalisation that have 
been unfolding since the adoption of the above Directive and an ever-increasing amount of 
personal information collected as well as emerged new ways of its uses. It is also noted in 
these documents that while personal data have become a very important asset for a lot of 
businesses, on-line services enjoy poor consumer trust (Commission, 2012a; Commission, 
2012b; Commission, 2012c). Further, the Directive 95/46/EC was implemented 
inconsistently across the MSs, resulting in divergent enforcement of the rules. Therefore, 
the reform was aiming to strengthen the rights of individuals as well as to simplify the 
regulatory environment for businesses and other organisations, at the same time devising 
the DPAs with a more robust enforcement mechanism and better coordination across the 
EU (Commission, 2012a; Commission, 2012b; Commission, 2012c). 
The key novelties in comparison with the Directive 95/46/EC were the following: 
                                                          
24 This thesis focuses only on the GDPR and the further analysis engages only with this policy file. While the 
reform was launched as “the package” containing these two instruments and the policy-makers were aiming 
to deliver a package approach, the two policy dossiers, however, evolved as two separate processes. The 
complexity and the utmost importance of the GDPR alone for the EU and the global data protection acquis 
requires an in-depth study on its own and indeed required all the resources available for this research project. 
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• Introduction of the explicit consent25 requirement (Article 4 (8)); 
• Easily intelligible for users privacy policies, presented in clear and plain language, 
etc. (Article 11); 
• Introduction of so-called “right-to-be-forgotten”, so that users can request 
deletion of personal data in order to help them tackle data protection risks on-line 
(Article 17), encompassing in essence an upgrade to the existent right to erasure;   
• Easier access to data subject’s own data (Articles 14 and 15); 
• Introduction of the right to data portability, i.e. establishing the users’ right to 
request a copy of and transfer their personal data from one service provider to 
another (Article 18). This innovation extends in essence the consumer rights of 
changing service providers already existing in other sectors, such as 
telecommunications or banking;    
• Introduction of the “right not to be subject to a measure based on profiling”, 
upgrading the provisions on automated individual decisions under the previous 
instrument (Article 20); 
• Introduction of the principles of ‘privacy by design and default’, entailing a 
controller’s obligation to implement “appropriate technical and organisational 
measures and procedures” so that “the protection of the rights of the data subject” is 
ensured by default and that processing of personal data is not carried out beyond 
the extent “necessary for each specific purpose […] and [personal data] are 
especially not collected or retained beyond the minimum necessary for those 
purposes […] In particular […] that by default personal data are not made 
accessible to an indefinite number of individuals” (Article 23); 
                                                          
25 Understood as “based either on a statement or on a clear affirmative action by the person concerned and is 
freely given” (Commission, 2012a). 
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• Introduction of the data breaches notification obligation that must be enacted 
without undue delay (Articles 31 and 32), extending on to all businesses and 
organisations breach notification rules already applied in the electronic 
communications sector;  
• Introduction of data protection impact assessments and data protection officers 
requirements (Articles 33 and 35(1) respectively), increasing responsibility and 
accountability criteria for personal data processors;  
• Improvement of administrative and judicial remedies in cases of violation of 
data protection rules (Chapter VIII), including tougher administrative sanctions, 
with fines to amount to “up to 1 000 000 EUR or, in case of an enterprise up to 2 % 
of its annual worldwide turnover, whichever is higher” (Article 79); 
• An upgrade of the WP29 to the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) with 
the EDPS to provide the secretariat for this body (Section 3 of Chapter VII of the 
GDPR); 
• Introduction of a “one-stop-shop” system, for data controllers operating in several 
MSs to have to deal with only one single DPA (termed “the lead authority”) of 
the country of their main establishment (Chapters VI and VII of the GDPR); 
• Elimination of the general personal data processing operations notification 
requirement for organisations. 
As later discussed in Section 4.4, overall, the Commission’s GDPR draft proposal 
(Commission, 2012e) was largely seen as advancing pro-privacy policy. A strong impetus 
to reform the EU data protection legislation came from the earlier mentioned (Section 3.6) 
institutional change in the Lisbon Treaty that eliminated the pillar system, 
constitutionalised the fundamental rights and created a specific horizontal legal base for 
personal data protection – the Article 16 of the TFEU. Based on these developments, the 
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European Council in the so-called Stockholm Programme setting out the strategic policy 
priorities for the period between 2010 and 2014 in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (adopted in the late 2009), where a strong emphasis was placed on the citizens’ 
rights to privacy and data protection in the age of information society, invited the 
Commission to prepare proposals for the reforms (European Council, 2009). These reforms 
have also been long called for by other institutional actors, such as the WP29, the EDPS 
and the EP (The Register, 2007; WP29, 2009; Bigo et al, 2011: 63-65). Another important 
factor was that data protection reform was deemed to be a key enabler of the creation of 
the Digital Single Market, for which more harmonisation and consumer trust were 
essential.   
4.3 The process of the co-legislators deliberations 
After the tabling of the Commission’s draft proposal in 2012 (Commission, 2012e), the 
EP’s and the Council’s26 first reading positions were due in line with the ordinary 
legislative procedure to which the GDPR was subject to, to reach the trilogue phase27, 
when the inter-institutional negotiations on the file took place. 
About a year after the Commission’s drafts were presented, the referral EP Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs committee (LIBE) published its draft report (LIBE, 2013a) on 
the proposed GDPR text in January 2013. The opinions of other relevant EP committees 
were subsequently submitted between January and March 2013, including the Committee 
on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO, 2013), the Committee on 
Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE, 2013), the Committee on Employment and Social 
Affairs (EMPL, 2013) and the Committee on Legal Affairs Committee (JURI, 2013). 
                                                          
26 The analysis of the GDPR deliberations process within each of these institutions is offered in Sections 5.2, 
5.3 and 5.4, respectively. 
27 A phase of the EU legislative process when the three institutions seek an interinstitutional compromise on a 
given dossier’s text in a series of informal meetings. 
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Another committee, of the Economic and Monetary Affairs, declined to give its opinion. 
The vote on the compromise text in the responsible LIBE committee, originally scheduled 
in April 2013, was postponed several times due to enormous amount of amendments 
(almost 4000) tabled through the committees (LIBE, 2013b; LIBE, 2013c) and later in the 
light of the Snowden leaks in the world media in early June 2013 (LIBE, 2013d). The vote 
in the LIBE, which was key for the file to progress in the EP, finally occurred in October 
2013 (LIBE, 2013e) and the report on the GDPR was presented to the plenary a month 
later (LIBE, 2013f). The EP adopted its version of the GDPR, containing 207 compromise 
amendments to the Commission text (some of which are discussed below in this chapter 
and later in other chapters), in March 2014 (EP, 2014b). Around a half of the modifications 
were made in the articles and the other half in the recitals (that are supplementary in 
interpreting the actual provisions and do not have legal power). 
The Council, the other co-legislator, engaged with this file at a different pace and the MSs 
compromise text was finally reached in June 2015 (Latvian Presidency Note, 2015f), 
making it possible for the trilogue to begin (see Section 4.5 for the most contentious 
issues). Although this file was always included in the JHA Council – in every single 
meeting since 2012, like hardly in the case of any other file – for long MSs were only 
asking for clarifications, not really engaging with the text. There was some breaking point 
in 2013, following the Snowden revelations, and later the votes endorsing the data 
protection reform in the EP LIBE committee in October 2013 as well as in the EP plenary 
in March 201428, when MSs understood that they had to do something about it (interview 
with EU official C, 23 February 2015, Brussels; see more discussion on this in Section 6.2 
and also 5.4). The first Presidency who actively engaged with the GDPR file was the Irish 
                                                          
28 Both of these votes in the EP enjoyed a rare 95% majority (Commission, 2013b; Commission, 2014a) 
sending a strong political signal of support for data protection reform proposals. 
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Presidency (in the first half of 2013), presumably because of the importance of the digital 
economy to the country (see Subsection 4.5.4) (interview with EU official B, 13 February 
2015, Brussels). The data protection reform was named as a “key priority” by this 
Presidency (Bowcott, 2013; Reding, 2013a). The Irish government organised 30 meetings 
for GDPR discussions during its six months29. Despite pushing hard for an agreement on 
the first four Chapters (a partial general approach), this Presidency faced significant 
difficulties and did not manage to achieve it (interview with EU official C, 23 February 
2015, Brussels). The Lithuanian Presidency in the second half of 2013 that focused on the 
one-stop-shop also encountered a set-back. The Council Legal Service intervened towards 
the end of this Presidency’s term objecting in its opinion the one-stop-shop principle as 
allegedly posing various issues of “proximity” between the DPAs and citizens, which 
made it incompatible with the rights of individuals related to an effective judicial remedy 
provided for in the EUCFR and the ECHR (Council Legal Service, 2013; Council, 2014; 
EDPS, 2014c:3-5). Some partial general approach was reached by the Greek Presidency 
during the first half of 2014 on Chapter V regulating international transfers of personal 
data (Greek Presidency Note, 2014). In the second half of the 2014, the file progressed 
further in the Council, as the Italian Presidency managed to achieve two general 
approaches: on Chapter IV (controllers30 and processors31) in October 2014 (Italian 
Presidency Note, 2014a) and on public sector and Chapter IX (specific processing 
situations) in December 2014 (Italian Presidency Note, 2014e). Another partial general 
approach endorsing Chapters VI and VII on the one-stop-shop mechanism (Latvian 
                                                          
29 The Commissioner Viviane Reding speaking at a press conference in June 2013 praised the remarkable 
commitment of this presidency as “tremendous efforts … invested in the data protection reform” (Reding, 
2013a). 
30 “ʻcontroller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or 
jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data” (Article 4(7), 
GDPR final). 
31 “ʻprocessor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller” (Article 4(8), GDPR final). 
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Presidency Note, 2015c) and Chapter II on the principles for processing of personal data 
(Latvian Presidency Note, 2015d) was reached by the Latvian presidency in March 2015 
prior to reaching a full general approach in June 2015 under the same Presidency (Latvian 
Presidency Note, 2015f).  
The process of the reform seemed to particularly undergo a crisis around the end of 2013 
and the beginning of 2014, as the progress of this dossier in the Council seemed to have 
entered a deadlock with no tangible agreement accomplished by the ministers two years 
after the reform had started in 2012. The then Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding 
commented in December 2013 that the process was apparently moving backwards and, 
despite her well-known insistence on a swift adoption of the reform, this could not be 
pursued at any cost if the ideas are very divergent, defining the latest developments in the 
Council around the one-stop-shop mechanism as making it “an empty shell” (Reding, 
2013b; the one-stop-shop issue is discussed in detail in Subsection 4.5.4). It became 
obvious that the data protection reform would not be completed by the 2014 EP elections 
and the time of its completion became unclear (CPDP, 2014). The implications of the 
imminent elections were another slowdown in the process while the old legislature would 
be going out and the new one would be coming in and new commissioners would take 
office. The EDPS repeatedly urged the Council for a quick progress with the reform 
(EDPS, 2014b; EDPS, 2014c; EDPS, 2014g; EDPS, 2014h) “to thwart the attempts serving 
political and economic interests to restrict the fundamental rights to privacy and data 
protection”, making an appeal to the new German government to take the lead (EDPS, 
2014b)32. In the meantime, the Google’s privacy counsel speculated on his personal blog 
that the EU data protection reform had collapsed and “the old draft is dead” (Fleischer, 
                                                          
32  While there were some changes in the GDPR talks’ dynamics with the arrival of the new government in 
Germany, it was, however, still far from undertaking a facilitator’s role in the process, as is seen in 
Subsections 4.5.3, 4.5.4 and in particular 6.5.2. 
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2014). The above developments make the intensity of political tensions around the GDPR 
self-evident. 
The worst scenario – that the new legislature would have dropped the previous work done 
by the EP on this dossier and would have started from scratch, posing another delay with 
also uncertain consequences for the content of this draft law – did not happen, however, 
and the GDPR file was immediately on the new LIBE committee’s agenda at one of its 
first meetings in July 2014, taking the previous legislature’s resolution of March 2014 as 
the basis (LIBE, 2014). On the other hand, around the same time there was another 
breaking point in the Council’s work, when the progress on the file, while still not with the 
due speed in the view of most stakeholders, relatively accelerated, although it took another 
year for the MSs to fine-tune their general approach. “The real work, i.e. the debate to find 
compromise, had started in the Council since June 2014” (interview with EU official C, 23 
February 2015, Brussels). Around the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 “the time had 
come, simply, when this file had to be closed” (interview with national Ministry of Justice 
official, 18 March 2015). This was also the time when Germany and France finally 
managed to find a compromise on the one-stop-shop (discussed in Subsection 4.5.4).   
In the mid-2015, when the trilogue finally took off, the negotiators of the three institutions 
found themselves under a lot of pressure to find a compromise within 6 months (see 
Section 6.7). This, however, proved to be a very successful phase of the process, especially 
if compared with the previous several-year-long difficulties, and the political agreement on 
the GDPR text was reached in December 2015. The formal adoption of this law was 
finalised in April 2016 after the votes in the Council and in the EP plenary. The merged 
positions of the two institutions were commented upon as a good compromise (McNamee, 
2015; interview with EP source B, 4 February 2016, Brussels; interview with EP source C, 
8 February 2016, Brussels). The Luxembourgish Presidency’s (of the second half of 2015) 
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merit in the fruitful outcome of the trilogue negotiations was emphasised (EDRi, 2016c). It 
put a lot of effort in closing the file and was very organised and more willing to 
compromise (interview with Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, 
Brussels; interview with EP source C, 8 February 2016, Brussels). There was also a rare 
ideological alignment between the head-negotiators, as both the EP rapporteur and the 
Luxembourgish Justice minister were representing Green parties. Concessions were made 
by both co-legislators. For instance, while the Council’s position on breach notification 
provisions prevailed, the sanctions resulted closer to what was envisaged by the EP.  
The overview of the co-legislators deliberations dynamics in this section has shown a 
different outcome both time- and content-wise between the two institutions in the pre-
trilogue stage. Both actors faced significant challenges. While the EP was under pressure 
due to the amount of amendments and the nearing elections (see more in Section 5.3), the 
Council negotiations were marked by the protracted difficulty to find an agreement (see the 
more detailed analysis in Section 5.4). A more detailed analysis of the factors that shaped 
the process and the outcomes is offered in the remaining part of this Chapter and the 
further Chapters V and VI. These two chapters will also look into the political and 
economic interests that played a role and were highlighted here, and that were already 
preliminary explained in Chapter II to lay down the contextual background for this study. 
4.4 The process of balancing user and business interests 
Although with certain concerns and criticism, overall the Commission’s 2012 reform 
proposal was perceived as granting more control to the ICT users over their privacy and 
personal data and was welcomed by the civil rights and consumer organisations (e.g. 
BEUC, 2012a; BEUC, 2012b; ORG, 2013a; EDRi, 2012c). Conversely, the industry 
response, although favouring some elements (such as harmonisation and one-stop-shop 
  134 
 
system), depicted the proposals “if enacted in the present draft form” as detrimental to 
businesses as they would stifle innovation in Europe, “cause substantial loss in revenues 
[…] limit opportunities for new market entrants, strongly increase administrative costs and 
create legal uncertainty” (ICDP, 2012:1-2).  
The EDPS, while noting many points for improvement, commented positively on the 
overall approach in the solutions offered in the draft GDPR as fulfilling in essence the 
expectations related to the creation of an ambitious and robust data protection system in the 
EU (EDPS, 2012a; EDPS, 2012b; EDPS, 2012c; EDPS, 2014g). The GDPR, as envisaged 
by the Commission in the documents presented in 2012, also seemed in line with the EP 
stance on the data protection reform in the phase of preparation, reflected in its resolution 
of 2011 in which this institution called for strong safeguards for data subjects’ rights and 
more accountability for data controllers and processors (EP, 2011b): “the European 
Commission has proposed on the basis of what the Parliament has demanded for” (Jan P. 
Albrecht, EP rapporteur for the GDPR, quoted in Nielsen, 2013a). However, as the GDPR 
started passing through the competent EP committees between 2012 and 2013, the 
alterations to the Commission’s text proposed by them raised concerns that the data 
protection provisions in this law may end up being weaker than under the Directive 
95/46/EC, which it was meant to upgrade (Privacy International, 2013). The amendments 
tabled in the Parliament later summed up as almost 4000, a lot of which were pro-business 
(Section 6.3 looks further into this). The EP rapporteur noted that such developments were 
at odds with the EP promises to strengthen the data protection standards articulated by the 
same legislature in its 2011 resolution (Jan P. Albrecht, EP rapporteur for the GDPR, 
quoted in Nielsen, 2013a). The privacy advocacy groups indicated as some of the major 
areas of harm to the citizen rights the attempts to weaken the provisions on consent, 
profiling, purpose limitation, “legitimate interest”, and the proposals to introduce a new 
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definition of “pseudonymous data” (Privacy International, 2013). The subsequent 207 
compromise amendments adopted in the EP resulted, in their view, in some “improvements 
to the Commission’s initial proposal” as well as “critical gaps that undermine the strength 
of the overall proposal” (Access Now, 2013). The EP modifications offering better 
“protections and controls on data portability, explicit consent, privacy by design and by 
default, and the proposed higher fines for violation of the law33 were commented upon as 
gains, while warning against the permission given to companies “to engage in profiling 
[…] as long as that data is ‘pseudonymous’ ” and to process data without data subjects’ 
consent “if it is within their [companies’] ‘legitimate interest’ ”, including sharing 
collected personal information with third parties (Access Now, 2013). Despite these 
disappointments by the civil society with the outcome of the deliberations in the EP, the 
position taken by this institution did not seem to meet the industry expectations of making 
the new data protection rules less strict, either. It was referred to as a “missed opportunity” 
and alarming in a number of negative feedbacks published by these stakeholders (e.g. 
ICDP, 2013a; ICDP, 2013b; ICDP, 2013c). 
The Council’s revisions of the GDPR text constituted a domain of serious concerns for 
privacy campaigners with the early output of this co-legislator. The compromise text 
emerged from the discussions on some parts of this dossier held during the Irish Presidency 
in the first half of 2013 revealed that the MSs had been taking pro-business orientation 
(Irish Presidency Note, 2013a; Irish Presidency Note, 2013b)34. The Council proposals 
narrowed down the territorial scope, relaxed provisions on consent, data breach 
notifications and processing of anonymous data, defined social networking and non-
                                                          
33 The EP proposed to raise the fines to “up to 100 000 000 EUR or up to 5% of the annual worldwide 
turnover in case of an enterprise, whichever is higher” (EP, 2014b).  
34 The Council signalled its intention to introduce a more risk-based approach already at the conclusion of the 
Cypriot Presidency at the end of 2012 (Council, 2012). 
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commercial on-line activities by individuals as a “household activity” to exempt from the 
Regulation, extended the “legitimate interest” basis to include, inter alia, direct marketing 
purposes, emphasised that the right to data protection is a qualified right that competes 
with other fundamental rights, such as the freedom to conduct a business, etc. In general, 
the version of the first four chapters of the GDPR elaborated by the Irish Presidency 
promoted a more self-regulatory, risk-based approach as opposed to the more prescriptive 
framework featuring in the Commission and EP versions. Such a self-regulatory approach 
was largely in line with the industry demands expressed in some statements (ICDP, 
2013b). Citizen rights defenders equalled the direction taken in the Council to utterly 
undermining the EU privacy reform (Davies, 2013). During her intervention at the Justice 
Council meeting in June 2013 the Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding called on the EP 
and the Council “to resist, alongside the Commission, all attempts by those who are still 
trying to weaken data protection standards in Europe” and pointed out that the level of 
protection enshrined in the Directive 95/46/EC will be “the absolute red line below which” 
the Commission would not go (Reding, 2013a). The direction taken by the Council 
seemingly did not change, as, according to the rights organisations, further developments 
in the Council’s re-drafting of the proposed text undermined the fundamental safeguards 
even more (EDRi, 2015a). As the Council was nearing to the achievement of its pre-
trilogue position in spring 2015, the tendencies present in its amendments prompted the 
civil society representatives to send a letter to the Commission in which they hailed the 
reassurance on the promise to maintain at least the Directive 95/46/EC level standards as a 
red line (EDRi, 2015b). The finalised General Approach adopted by the MSs in June 2015 
significantly diverged from the Commission’s original proposal, weakening its provisions. 
Viviane Reding, who, no longer a Commissioner at the time, took a MEP seat after the EP 
2014 elections, published an article in response to the GDPR version proposed by the 
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Council. She noted that “several parts of the proposed legislation” had been emptied from 
their substance, consumers had been disempowered and that the new data protection rules 
were potentially heading below the level of Directive 95/46/EC dating “back from the 
Digital Stone Age” (Reding, 2015). The BEUC sent a letter to the MSs ambassadors to the 
EU in June 2015 prior to the Council JHA meeting expressing the concern “that in some 
important cases the direction taken in Council deviates from the original purpose of the 
reform and the principles that should be guiding it” (BEUC, 2015a:2). Although at the 
beginning of the trilogue all the three institutions seemingly agreed on the Directive 
95/46/EC level being a red line that should not be trespassed, what constitutes “the 
Directive 95/46/EC level” became ambiguous at that stage, referring to the EP rapporteur 
Jan P. Albrecht’s comments, suggesting that each institution had its own interpretation of 
what was actually already below the standards of that Directive (Greens/EFA, 2015).  
However, one of the most “sticking points” as the trilogue commenced seemed to be the 
proposals for endorsement of the “incompatible further processing” in the Council text35, 
containing, amongst other, such additions to some of the Articles: 
“further processing of personal data for archiving purposes in the public interest or 
scientific, statistical or historical purposes shall in accordance with Article 83 not 
be considered incompatible with the initial purposes;” (Article 5(1(b)), Principles 
relating to personal data processing); 
“further processing by the same controller for incompatible purposes on grounds of 
legitimate interests of that controller or a third party shall be lawful if these 
interests override the interests of the data subject.” (Article 6(4), Lawfulness of 
processing). 
The BEUC commented: 
“Article 6.4, which allows for personal data to be processed for purposes that are 
incompatible with those that justified the initial collection of the data, based on the 
                                                          
35 Not all MSs, however, were comfortable with these amendments, stating their conflict with the EUCFR 
and the Directive 95/46/EC standards (Latvian Presidency Note, 2015e:102, footnote 178). 
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shaky legal grounds of “legitimate interests of the data controller or a third party”, 
would basically render the whole Regulation void of any meaning. This is 
absolutely unacceptable” (BEUC, 2015a:4). 
The issue of “incompatible further processing” featured as one of the key concerns in the 
WP29 intervention during the trilogue process, who stated that: 
“it should be possible for controllers to process personal data for purposes that are 
not incompatible, provided there is a legal basis. Further processing for archiving, 
scientific, statistical and historical research purposes should also remain possible 
and can be considered as a not incompatible purpose. However, enabling 
controllers to process data for a purpose that is incompatible is not allowed 
under the current EU framework as it directly violates one of the corner stone 
principles of data protection, the purpose limitation principle. Undermining 
this principle would mean a lowering of the level currently provided by 
Directive 95/46, which should not be accepted” (WP29, 2015a, emphasis added).   
Other most contested areas in the approaches of the institutions during the trilogue 
negotiations were related to provisions on consent to the processing of personal data, data 
minimisation principle, privacy policies, the duties of controllers and processors36, 
“sanctions and clarification of the scope of the two instruments” (LIBE, 2015b).   
The possibility of “incompatible further processing” did not remain in the post-trilogue 
GDPR text. Overall, the compromise text adopted by the co-legislators was commented 
upon as strengthening data subjects’ rights, although far from what was initially envisaged 
(EDRi, 2015d; BEUC, 2015a; Buttarelli, 2016), the rules on consent, profiling and 
“legitimate interest” being among major weaknesses.  
“The GDPR sets an overall positive precedent for data protection standards across 
the EU. It provides a mostly harmonised, directly applicable set of rules to be 
uniformly enforced across the EU, which will benefit individuals and businesses 
alike. This legislation introduces the welcome concept of data protection by design 
and by default, the aim of which is to promote a privacy-friendly approach to the 
development of new services” (Access Now, 2016).  
                                                          
36 “on a harmonised way to demand for some controllers and processors at least, the appointment for a data 
protection officer, which the Council leaves up to the MSs” (LIBE, 2015b).    
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The business side reacted to the outcome of the GDPR stipulation as disappointing, 
criticising the lack of harmonisation, simplification, modernisation, and, in particular, 
“crippling sanctions and unjustified liability regime overhaul” (EDC, 2015c; see more in 
Section 5.9). 
This section reiterated the alterations in the balance between civic and economic interests 
in the process of drafting of the GDPR. While the proposals of the two supranational 
institutions – the Commission and the EP - were more aligned with the data subjects’ 
interests, the Council approach to the new EU data protection rules was closer to the 
business interests. Other actors, such as the EDPS and the WP29 – important advisory 
bodies – were also taking part in the debate, advocating for strong data protection 
safeguards (see more in Sections 5.5 and 5.6). Although not as strong as originally 
designed in many aspects, the GDPR policy process resulted in a stronger data protection 
regime as compared to the previous one in the EU, which, as earlier mentioned in the 
Chapter I, has been a landmark progression in privacy and data protection. The following 
Chapters V and VI explain the formation of preferences of the actors involved in the 
process, their impact on it and the dynamics of interactions with each other.  
4.5 The process of balancing national, supranational and institutional interests 
4.5.1 Directive or Regulation? 
Apart from the battle between the user and business preferences, divergence of interests 
between various institutional actors and national and supranational levels in a number of 
areas was also clearly evident in the process of the GDPR negotiations. Firstly, the choice 
of an instrument – a Regulation instead of a Directive – was a factor that a number of MSs 
still did not favour long after the beginning of negotiations. The note of the Irish 
Presidency reporting on the state of play of the GDPR file in the Council around a year and 
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a half after the Commission’s proposal stated that eight countries (Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Sweden, Slovenia and the UK) preferred to replace 
the existing Directive with a new Directive. At that stage, converting the proposal for a 
Regulation into a Directive was left as an open option at a later instance and subject to 
further discussions among the MSs in the Presidency’s document (Irish Presidency Note, 
2013a:3). Although later the ministers agreed to stipulate a Regulation, the Council’s 
General Approach text contained a staggering amount of flexibility clauses granting the 
national governments many possibilities to implement the new rules in their own ways 
(Latvian Presidency Note, 2015e), which is what Directives allow for. As these 
derogations were maintained in the final post-trilogue text, the supposed to be Regulation 
was thus heavily “directivised” and the initial goal of harmonisation substantially diluted37. 
Both the civil society groups and businesses were not in favour of such an outcome, since 
they were expecting more legal certainty post-reform (EDRi, 2015e; EDC, 2015c; EDRi, 
2016d; Macrae, 2016). As it thus can be seen, the governments’ preference formation is a 
separate realm of interests which may at times be in unison with the other stakeholders’ 
interests, but not necessarily always will. The derogations also meant more post-reform 
rules-shaping located with the DPAs that would have to clarify the aspects left undefined 
in the GDPR. The context of this outcome is very complex: it stems from multiple issue-
areas as well as from broader EU politics. It is analysed in more detail in Sections 5.4 and 
6.2, with relevant points also touched upon in Subsection 4.5.3, and Sections 5.7 and 6.6. 
4.5.2 Delegated and implementing acts  
                                                          
37 There are almost 50 opening clauses in the GDPR. 
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Another contest of decision-making power emerged in such element of the GDPR as 
delegated and implementing acts38. There were a vast number of such acts in the 
Commission’s draft. Most of them, and in particular the delegated acts, were deleted in the 
Council’s version. The EP, in the meantime, either deleted many of them or proposed to 
task the EDPB with issuing guidance in many cases and to oblige the Commission to 
request an opinion from the EDPB prior to the adoption of such acts in some other cases 
(see the comparative table of the GDPR texts at EDPS, 2015c). While the Commission in 
its response to the EP position agreed to varying degree with the changes proposed by this 
legislator as “in line with the policy objectives pursued by the Commission”, four of the 
ten amendments indicated as unacceptable were related to the reduction of the Commission 
empowerment in the implementation phase through the delegated and implementing acts 
(Commission, 2014b). Although the Commission did not welcome the elimination of many 
of these acts, other stakeholders, similarly to the Council and the EP, were critical of the 
amount of the delegated and implementing acts, too. The EDPS in their opinion also 
pointed out that “the extent to which essential legal provisions” were “left to delegated 
powers” was problematic, suggesting that “several of these empowerments should be 
reconsidered” (2012d). The BEUC expressed similar concerns, indicating in addition that 
the excessive amount of these acts would delay the enactment of the GDPR, and expressed 
a preference for all institutions to be involved in shaping certain elements (2012b:37). 
Commercial and industry players also urged for fewer delegated and implementing acts as 
their high number was making the exact rights and obligations unsure (EuroChambres, 
2012:1-2). Along the lines of the other actors who were critical of the powers delegated to 
                                                          
38 That are post-legislative implementing measures, most of which adopted by the Commission in the so-
called comitology system, pursuant to the Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. While often these acts are of technical 
nature, they do, however, encompass decision-making and might involve important political choices. 
Delegated and implementing acts may have a significant impact on how a law is applied in practice. 
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the Commission in the draft proposal, the European Economic and Social Committee 
(thereafter EESC) and the Committee of Regions did not welcome these excessively 
delegated powers either as compromising the GDPR in terms of legal certainty and 
decision-making transparency, among other issues (EESC, 2012; COR, 2012). In addition, 
the EESC noted that locating formulation of many of the post-legislative measures within 
the national DPAs’ and the EDPB remit (as was proposed by the EP, too, and as was 
eventually enshrined in the finalised GDPR in the Article 70) rather than granting these 
competences to the Commission “would reinforce implementation of the principles of 
subsidiarity” (EESC, 2012). As discussed in Section 3.3, the principle of subsidiarity 
represents one of the key features of the EU as a consociation, i.e. as a state-centric 
political system. Besides, the analysis in this subsection reflecting the decision-making 
power contest links to the rational choice institutionalism. The discussion here informs the 
analysis in Sections 5.2, 5.5 and 6.2. 
 4.5.3 Public sector controversy 
Whether the national public sector should be covered by the GDPR represented one of the 
most difficult issues to surmount during the revisions of this dossier by the Council, 
contributing to the length of the process. 
“The question whether and how to deal with processing of personal data by the 
public sector in the draft General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is one of 
particular sensitivity and importance to delegations. It was already debated at 
the JHA Informal Ministerial Meeting in Nicosia in July 2012 and at the JHA 
Council meetings in October and December 2012. At the latter Council meeting it 
was decided that the question as to whether and how the Regulation could provide 
flexibility for the Member States’ public sector, would be decided following 
completion of the first examination of the text of the GDPR. More recently, at the 
informal Ministerial Meeting in Milan on 9 July 2014 an overall majority of 
Member States supported a Regulation as legal instrument, but the need to provide 
Member States with sufficient leeway to determine the data protection requirements 
applicable to the public sector was equally emphasised” (Italian Presidency Note, 
2014e:2, emphasis added). 
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A major controversy around the public sector emerged with the proposal of the German 
delegation for the GDPR not to apply to this sphere. In Germany, data protection law 
makes distinction between public and private sector, and there are even two different 
regional level systems of DPAs for each sphere (Lexology, 2010). However, a number of 
MSs felt uncomfortable to exclude the processing by the public sector and advanced a 
range of arguments and concerns. To mention some, Ireland and similarly Luxembourg 
pointed out the erosion of a meaningful distinction between the activities in the public and 
private spheres due to the privatisation and the reality of many of public sector services 
being provided by private actors on behalf of public institutions (General Secretariat Note, 
2014:5, 32). Luxembourg besides noted the technical difficulty to make such 
differentiation, as “the public sector is defined differently in each [MS]” and that the 
consistency, transparency, and legal certainty of this instrument would be undermined 
“taking a step back from the 1995 Directive” (General Secretariat Note, 2014:32). 
Furthermore, public administration was comprised in the EU Treaties and the internal 
market acquis both in general as well as in terms of data flows and data protection issues. 
The CJEU interpretation of the Directive 95/46/EC did “not make a distinction between 
public and private sectors” either (General Secretariat Note, 2014:30, 31). In particular, in 
the light of the EUCFR having become part of the EU legal system, Luxembourg and 
Spain insisted that some flexibility in shaping data protection rules in the public sector 
could be conceded to the MSs only if they were obliged to adhere to and maintain at least 
certain minimal common guarantees such as general basic data protection principles and 
safeguards, enshrined in the GDPR (General Secretariat Note, 2014:8-10, 32). France 
repeatedly expressed a preference for the GDPR to cover public sector data, favouring, for 
instance, the EP view with regard to the social welfare activities, indicating the broadness 
of remit of this subsector as well (General Secretariat Note, 2014:17, 22). 
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Moreover, exclusion of the public sector seemed unlikely to be acceptable either to the EP 
(General Secretariat Note, 2014: 30), or to the Commission: 
“The Commission […] argues that EU citizens are entitled to expect similar levels 
of data protection in the public sector in Member States, given that the fundamental 
right to data protection does not differentiate between the public and private sector. 
Another argument from the Commission is that harmonisation in this area is also 
necessary as cross-border exchange of data is increasing between public authorities. 
Indeed, if authorities in different Member States applied different data protection 
standards this could constitute an obstacle to the exchange of information between 
those authorities. However, the free movement of data as required by Article 16 
TFEU would be ensured by the free movement clause in Article 1(3) of the draft 
Regulation” (Italian Presidency Note, 2014c:5).  
Although initially the German proposal was taken into consideration and was discussed, 
eventually, while still adding certain derogations to the GDPR text, a more contained 
leeway was given to the MSs in the Council approach to the issue of the public sector 
formed during the Italian presidency (Italian Presidency Note, 2014b; Italian Presidency 
Note, 2014e). “That was not so easy for us Germans to accept, but we have done it”, said 
Thomas de Maizière, the German Minister of Interior, regarding the public sector clause 
(quoted in Stupp, 2015).  
The outcome of the discussions on the public sector in the GDPR deliberations in the 
Council is an interesting case reflecting such feature of the consociational paradigm as 
shared decision-making power. Due to Germany’s economic power and the biggest share 
held where proportional representation procedures are applied in the EU, including the 
majority voting in the Council, the country’s hegemonic dominance, or at least a 
considerable political power in Europe is often speculated upon39. However, as it was seen 
                                                          
39 Although these speculations are often challenged, based on the absence of comparable military resources to 
those of UK and France, and Germany’s own reluctance to actually undertake a role of a hegemon in Europe 
(Schwarzer and Lang, 2012; Beddoes, 2013; Bulmer and Paterson, 2013; Gros, 2015). 
.  
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in this case, even very influential MSs may find it difficult to impose their preferences 
without finding coalitions with other MSs or support of the EU institutions. The German 
attempt to export their own governance model by excluding the public sector from the 
GDPR, in order to preserve domestic rules and avoid adjustment costs, overall was not 
successful, although important concessions were gained. The discussion in this Subsection 
complements the analysis in Sections 5.4, 5.6, 6.2 and Subsection 6.6.2.   
4.5.4 One-stop-shop: sovereign decision-making concerns trump governance innovation 
and Europeanisation 
Another of the most contentious issues proved to be the one-stop-shop system proposal 
(outlined in Section 4.2), one of the central pillars of the reform, aimed at consistent 
application of the GDPR in the Union, more legal certainty as well as less administrative 
burden for businesses. The one-stop-shop idea in the Commission draft was indeed 
welcomed by the companies. This part of the GDPR was among the “sticking points” 
during the deliberations in the EP and caused one of the major deadlocks during the MSs 
negotiations, having required three years to overcome. While the Commission proposal left 
a series of “technical” ambiguities of how this system would actually work in practice 
(Hustinx, 2014:39) that puzzled the co-legislators, there were also obstacles of clearly 
political nature, related to the reluctance of various actors to share or delegate their 
authority, resulting in alteration of the initial one-stop-shop model, as it will be discussed 
below.  
The one-stop-shop was the focus of the Lithuanian Presidency (held in the second half of 
2013) that was making efforts to reach a partial general approach on some essential 
elements of this aspect of the GDPR. Although in autumn 2013 the Council in general 
endorsed the idea of the creation of such a mechanism, the Presidency’s documents reveal 
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a very unsolid common ground in the MSs positions and indicate a number of perplexities 
and reservations related to the configuration of territoriality of the supervision and its 
implications for the competency boundaries among separate national DPAs as well as 
proximity between data subjects and their rights protection. The model proposed by the 
Commission was thought to be detrimental for the individuals (e.g. Lithuanian Presidency 
Note, 2013a; Lithuanian Presidency Note, 2013c). These concerns were largely in unison 
with strong criticism of the Commission version expressed by some national DPAs (e.g. 
French CNIL, 2012). Some MSs (e.g. Germany) were concerned about the need to enforce 
decisions of another MS deriving from the transfer of powers to the lead DPA and that it 
potentially was raising constitutional issues (Note from delegations, 2013). Other MSs 
(e.g. France) saw as unjustified the removal of the participation of the local DPAs in the 
decision-making in certain situations where data processing and enforcement measures 
concerned their jurisdiction (French delegation Note, 2013). The countries’ concerns 
related to the shifts in decision-making powers are reflected in the following excerpts from 
the Council documents: 
“The one-stop-shop mechanism, as initially proposed by the Commission, covered 
only the situation of processing in the context of the activities of an establishment 
of the same controller or processor established on the territory of different Member 
States. Member States have expressed a clear wish that their data protection 
authorities could also have legal standing to act – on their territory – in cases where 
processing which physically takes place outside their territory affects their data 
subjects” (Lithuanian Presidency Note, 2013b:3). 
“All delegations seemed to agree that at any rate the establishment of such a rule 
could not lead to the exercise of investigative powers by the DPA of one authority 
in the territory of another Member State” (Note from delegations, 2013:41, footnote 
1). 
“[A] number of delegations […] opposed to any concentration of corrective powers 
in the hands of the main establishment authority, notwithstanding the strong 
cooperation and consistency mechanism provided for in the draft Regulation” 
(Lithuanian Presidency Note, 2013c:6). 
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The progress of already complex discussions on the one-stop-shop was hampered by the 
intervention of the Council Legal Service that, as earlier mentioned, challenged the legal 
compatibility of “the overall mechanism of a one-stop-shop, as presented in the [...] 
[Lithuanian] Presidency papers” with the EUCFR and ECHR in terms of the criteria of 
„proximity” and effective judicial remedy (Council Legal Service, 2013).  
The Legal Service objections were taken into account, as dictated by the procedural rules, 
and the Council one-stop-shop model took a shape of a compromise hybrid version that 
foresaw the application of this principle only “in important cross-border cases” a year later 
during the Italian Presidency (Italian Presidency Note, 2014d; Council, 2014) and the 
General Approach on this component was finalised soon afterwards by the Latvian 
Presidency in March 2015.  
Such stakeholders as privacy advocates and the EDPS countered the assertions of the 
Council Legal Service as depicting the one-stop-shop mechanism unduly negatively and 
were particularly concerned about the slow-down this intervention caused to the process 
(interview with privacy advocacy organisation representative, 10 July 2014, London; 
EDPS, 2014c:3-5). The one-stop-shop design elaborated by the Council also disappointed 
the business stakeholders, as becoming too cumbersome and as leaving too much power to 
individual DPAs (other than the lead authority) to influence the decision-making (Essers, 
2014; ICDP, 2015).  
Not the least factor in the controversies that surrounded the discussions on the one-stop-
shop was the “on the ground” reality that the way individual DPAs had been operating and 
their regulatory output was rather divergent in the different MSs. This in particular was 
related to the Irish DPA that, while employing a significantly smaller number of staff than 
many of its peers in the larger countries, found itself overseeing quite a few foreign tech 
companies, including some of the biggest ones, such as Google, Facebook, Apple, 
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LinkedIn, Microsoft, and others, attracted to the country by its favourable tax regime. The 
Irish DPA, besides, had a reputation of having a less stringent approach to the supervision 
of those companies, as compared to its counterparts. That spurred speculations about the 
potential forum-shopping under the proposed model in the Commission draft whereby 
companies could choose to locate in MSs with weaker oversight practices, and a number of 
countries (e.g. UK, France, Germany, Belgium) were objecting the prospect of their 
domestic DPAs losing the power to supervise the activities of those companies in their 
respective countries (De Souza, 2013; Mirani, 2014). 
Various proposals were tabled in seeking to strike the right balance between the exclusive 
decision-making powers that can be conferred on the lead authority and the involvement of 
the “local” DPA in the process. The French co-decision proposal, which envisaged 
involvement of all DPAs (French delegation Note, 2013) and the German proposal to 
create a true one-stop-shop in the form of an independent (EU-level) data protection super-
agency, did not enjoy support (De Souza, 2013). Eventually, following earlier suggestions 
of some MSs (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland and Portugal), a stance of “granting 
the EDPB the power to take legally-binding decisions in the context of the consistency 
mechanism and do away with the proposed Commission power to intervene” was 
enshrined40 (Lithuanian Presidency Note, 2013c:41, footnote 79; EDPS, 2015c:391, 405, 
Articles 64 and 68). “It was argued that the DPAs should have the same independence vis-
à-vis the Commission, as vis-à-vis the Member States’ authorities” (Lithuanian Presidency 
Note, 2013c:41, footnote 79). This development met a strong opposition from the 
Commission, who insisted on the EDPB legally-binding powers being illegal, as “only the 
Commission can take decisions that are binding on the Member States” under the Treaties 
                                                          
40 The Commission had assigned itself ultimate decision-making powers under the consistency mechanism in 
the original GDPR proposal (see Section 5.2). 
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(Commission, 2013a). The GDPR political process resulted in the EDPB acquisition of the 
legal personality introduced by the Council and legally-binding capacity of its decisions in 
case of disagreement between the DPAs. The post-trilogue one-stop-shop design emerged 
as improved as compared to the complicated Council proposal, with local DPAs obtaining 
more weight than in the Commission version (see more in Section 5.6 on the DPAs). 
The one-stop-shop as proposed by the Commission quickly ran into trouble with the MSs, 
since it was viewed by many governments as setting a very dangerous precedent. They 
really were cautious about it, “because if such a scheme would have been agreed and 
would turn out to be successful at the EU level”, then it potentially could be extended into 
other areas as well (interview with EU official A, 1 February 2016, Brussels). Seemingly, 
for many governments at present “this was going to be a little bit too much Europe” 
(interview with EU official A, 1 February 2016, Brussels). It took a while for some 
governments to be able to accept the idea of the EDPB perceived as a creation of a new EU 
structure (interview with national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015). The current 
Justice Commissioner Vĕra Jourová reportedly stated that the GDPR would become “a 
model of governance for other areas of EU law” (Privacy Laws & Business, 2015c). In the 
meantime, the idea of “one-stop-shops” in general, e.g. setting up of on-line “one-stop-
shops”, in order to simplify the mechanisms of operating businesses in enacting the so-
called freedom to conduct business enshrined as Article 16 of the EUCFR has been 
promoted by the FRA (FRA, 2015). The latter two references indicate indeed a possibility 
that certain proposals in the GDPR might not remain of singular application limited to the 
data protection realm. 
This section was dedicated to discuss the process of balancing of the institutional 
competences of various levels related to the data protection governance in the EU. It is 
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necessary for a comprehensive analysis of the GDPR policy process, as configuration of 
the institutional interests translate into concrete outcomes for non-institutional 
stakeholders. This section overviewed the process of re-designing of powers as proposed in 
the Commission’s draft. The Commission’s powers located in the delegated and 
implementing acts and in the provisions on the one-stop-shop were reduced with some 
gains for the DPAs in both cases within the newly established EDPB. The numerous 
flexibility clauses, as also in the public sector case discussed here, indicate weakening of 
the strength of the Regulation, as directly applicable instrument, aimed to advance the level 
of harmonisation in this issue area. Section 6.2 elaborates on the context of the above 
processes. 
4.6 Conclusions 
As the analysis in this chapter shows, there was a substantial reshaping of the powers 
conferred on various national and EU institutional actors during the process of debates on 
the GDPR. While the Commission and the EP were closer in their more prescriptive and 
more user-centred approach in line with overall expectations of the privacy advocacy 
groups, the Council adopted a more risk-based proposal, allowing the data controllers and 
processor more flexibility. The Council approach, however, was divergent from the 
business preferences in its one-stop-shop model and the lesser degree of harmonisation 
than offered by the other two institutions. The final GDPR text combined the three 
approaches with some elements embedding stricter and more prescriptive norms, among 
which the new liability regime, and others more based on the risk-based approach. 
Further, the process also resulted in a tangible shift of the centre of gravity towards the 
national dimension and, consequently, a less centralised model of governance of this issue-
area in the EU as compared to the initial proposal. This is reflected in the derogations from 
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the GDPR provisions inserted in the Council text, significantly reduced Commission 
powers in the cases of delegated and implementing acts and the introduced legally-binding 
capacity of the EDPB bringing together the national DPAs and the EDPS. The latter two 
resulted in more powers assigned to the DPAs. Similarly, individual DPAs retained their 
powers in the Council’s proposal on the one-stop-shop, where the MSs were reluctant to 
concede their decision-making prerogative both vis-à-vis the Commission and the other 
MSs. As the EP changes to the delegated and implementing acts clauses demonstrate, 
where it proposed either a mandatory consultation or entirely moved the decision-making 
to the EDPB, this supranational institution favours a more decentralised governance model 
in the implementing phase.  
This chapter mapped the main legislative and political developments of the GDPR 
adoption process and presented the major areas of tensions between various national and 
EU institutional actors and their interests identified during the process, reiterating the shifts 
in the balance of those interests. This part lays the basis for a more in-depth analysis of the 
stakeholder constellation, their interactions and the factors that were influencing the policy 
process in the following Chapters.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
Explaining the contexts, motivations and policy networking of the GDPR stakeholder 
constellation 
5.1 Introduction 
Bennett and Raab (2006:219-221) map privacy the policy-making community as made of 
governmental institutions, regulatory bodies, technology developers and providers, privacy 
pressure groups and media, data controllers, and data subjects. These actors are mutually 
influencing each other, but the patterns of these reciprocities are likely to differ in each 
specific case when a policy instrument is being developed and implemented. The number 
of participants may also vary for each policy dossier and their interactions may range 
between consensus and conflict. In the constellation of actors “distribution of power 
determines outcomes” (Bennett and Raab, 2006:220, original emphasis). 
“In the political system thus portrayed, the attitudes and actions of participants 
contribute to the outcome as they use resources of various kinds – formal powers, 
money, technical expertise, publicity, and others – in complex exchanges, 
influences, compromises, sanctions, and shifting alliances” (Bennett and Raab, 
2006:221). 
These observations will be reflected in the discussion in this Chapter and are largely in line 
with the points made in Section 3.4 on the EU policy networks. The EU data protection 
and privacy policy-making system, however, is much more complex and multi-layered 
than the above proposed basic model. It spans from subnational, to national and 
supranational levels, and co-opts also international non-EU actors. Hybrid national-
supranational level formations such as the WP29 add even more complexity to this 
constellation. This Chapter further discusses the contexts and the interests brought into the 
  153 
 
GDPR policy process by the main actors and their impact in the shaping of the new rules. 
Each section is dedicated to the role of a specific actor or group of actors. 
5.2 The Commission: an attempt to extend powers and the strategies in overcoming 
formal constraints 
The Commission, as the institution that launched the data protection reform in January 
2012 in its agenda-setter’s capacity, is one of the most central actors in the analysis of the 
GDPR adoption process to which the successful stipulation of this new framework 
instrument was politically very important.  
The Commission of both mandates (2009-2014, 2014-2019) involved with the process of 
adoption of the GDPR can be regarded as strong on the human rights agenda, with an 
incremental focus on data protection reform, closely linked to the creation of the Digital 
Single Market, i.e. the need for harmonisation and stimulation of consumer trust that would 
facilitate the growth of digital economy in Europe (Commission, 2015b). Viviane Reding, 
the Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Commissioner in office as the reform was 
launched in 2012, is a politician with a track record in promoting consumer-oriented 
policies, including such initiatives as the reduction of the roaming charges and the EU 
Consumer Rights Directive (Commission, 2007; Commission, 2011b). Günther 
H. Oettinger, the former Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, has made some 
straightforward statements commenting on the situation when American 
companies establish themselves in the MSs with the least developed data protection and 
“suck up all the data coming from other [MSs] like a huge ‘electronic vacuum 
cleaner’, transfer the data to California, process them and sell them as a service for money” 
as unacceptable and that foreign companies can only do business in Europe if they observe 
the European rules (Oettinger, 2015). On another occasion, Commissioner Oettinger urged 
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for the need to establish a UN agency for data protection and data security 
(Wearden and Treanor, 2015). His peer Andrus Ansip with the Digital Single Market 
portfolio spoke up “strongly against having any kind of backdoor to” encrypted systems 
and for the protection of everybody’s privacy (Valero, 2016). He also stated that privacy 
and data protection should not be seen “as holding back economic activities” 
(Commission, 2015b), countering a commonly advanced stance by business stakeholders 
(see Section 5.9). 
However, the Commission is an institution involved in pursuing various policies and the 
tensions in trying to balance diverse policy-areas are evident as it was, for instance, in the 
Commission’s reaction to the CJEU ruling invalidating the Safe Harbour agreement 
(Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner) when its commitment to the continuation of 
transatlantic data flows and the economic importance of such flows was accentuated 
(Commission, 2015a). The Commission had long refrained from withdrawing its adequacy 
decision on the Safe Harbour notwithstanding acknowledgement of its flaws in its own 
reports and claims of illegality by some experts long before the Snowden revelations in 
2013 (EDRi, 2015c). Even after these revelations the agreement was still not ceased, but 
put to rather inefficient renegotiations instead. 
The Commission’s college decision-making structure has an impact on its overall policy 
output. Progressive proposals formulated by a competent DG, face the scrutiny of the 
College of Commissioners where they may be altered (Michalowitz, 2004c:63). This 
seemed to be the case with the GDPR draft proposal as well (Guarascio, 2012; ORG, 
2013b). There have been cases when contrasting views on certain issues between different 
Commissioners are publicly expressed (Horten, 2012). Fragmentations between different 
DGs often result in incoherence in policy proposals and positions (Pfeifle, 2016). These 
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fragmentations had been having an impact on the interinstitutional negotiations on the 
GDPR as well: 
“The Commission is not in reality as compact as it would like to appear. It is a very 
opaque black box in which a number of converging, conflicting, competing 
interests play. [There are] tensions between the services at the political level, there 
is a legal service; political level of different cabinets behave in different ways, etc. 
[...] The problem that we see from the MSs point of view when it comes to 
reshaping the negotiating positions – because the Commission presents the proposal 
and then it will have to change it, because that is what the Council and the EP ask it 
to do – then we face enormous uncertainty, because one day it is black, and the next 
it is white. And there is a continuously developing position. The process that brings 
those developments is completely opaque, not readable from the outside. And, 
surely, you get some results that may or may not be what is at the best interest of 
negotiations at that point” (interview with Permanent Representation official A, 20 
January 2015, Brussels). 
The Commission had always been very active, putting pressure on the Council’s 
Presidencies to reach the General Approach and posing unrealistic goals (interview with 
national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015; interview with Permanent 
Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels). In the meantime, though, it had 
taken a “hard line” to rather aggressively be inflexible on the sensitive issues to the MSs41, 
deterring thus a number of delegations. The changes in the Commission after the 2014 EP 
elections resulted in a slightly more balanced stance in the interinstitutional dialogue 
(interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, Brussels; interview with national 
Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015; interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, 
Brussels).  
“The Commission, on the one hand, is trying to present solutions that the MSs 
could subscribe to, but at the same time [it] has particularly strong points of view 
which it has on the file […] linked to the fact that it is one of its priorities, and, on 
the other hand, that does not help with the negotiations in the Council. I would say 
                                                          
41 E.g. concerning the European Data Protection Board or public sector. 
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that we have spent more time arguing with the Commission than with the MSs” 
(interview with Permanent Representation official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels). 
During the earlier stages the Commission was striving to defend its proposal while paying 
a lot of importance to details. During the trilogue, though, in the light of pressure to close 
the file, it had taken a different attitude, focusing on the essential, ideologically important 
aspects and taking a more abstract approach, as compared to the pre-trilogue stage of the 
negotiations (interview with Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, 
Brussels). In the final stage the Commission had played a facilitating role and was strong 
on safeguarding that the level of data protection in the GDPR would not go below the 
levels of Directive 95/46/EC (interview with EP source C, 8 February 2016, Brussels; 
interview with EP source B, 4 February 2016, Brussels).  
The Commission deployed various strategies to exert influence beyond its formal 
capacities. Under both Commissioners it was resorting a lot to putting pressure through the 
media, announcing at times unrealistic terms of finalisation of the negotiations, or 
announcing, together with the EP, 2015 a year of data protection (interview with national 
Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015; interview with Permanent Representation 
official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels). It tried to establish rapports with countries holding 
the Presidencies and invested a lot in liaising with them at both expert and political level to 
offer its “support”. As having a lot of technical expertise in this issue-area, sometimes it 
even managed to assist the Presidencies in drafting their proposals. In doing so, it 
attempted to push its own perspective, regardless the ideas of the Presidency. The 
Commission may have a lot of influence on a weaker Presidency (interview with national 
Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015). There was a lot of liaising between the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat beyond formal meetings. The Commission 
attempted to influence the large MSs (interview with Permanent Representation official B, 
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3 February 2016, Brussels). Similarly, there is intense liaising with the EP. Senior 
Commission officials, based on their partisan adherence, tried to maintain links with their 
parliamentary counterparts “so that they do not deviate too much from the Commission 
proposal”. It was a positive factor hence that the Commissioner Viviane Reding was 
aligned with the European People’s Party42 (thereafter EPP) in terms of her party lines 
(interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels).  
 “It is important to note that because of its pragmatism, the Commission (and almost 
certainly parts of it) might favour a policy more radical than the one it proposes, which is 
one it thinks will be adopted” (Young and Wallace, 2000:23). The original GDPR proposal 
was rather radical, i.e. entailing strict rules. It therefore underwent some “watering down”, 
but the Commission was conscious that it would (interview with national Ministry of 
Justice official, 18 March 2015). The Commission’s and the EP’s views on the reform 
were perceived as being quite close in essence, while the approach formed by the Council 
was divergent in several key aspects, e.g. making the proposal less user-centric and the 
rules less harmonised, as it is detailed in the previous chapter. Overall, the two co-
legislators come from different perspectives: “the Parliament tends to take a more 
ideological, integrationist line on the big debates, whereas the Council seeks to defend 
[MS] prerogatives and is often held up by disagreements between the larger [MSs]” (Sean 
Kelly, MEP and ITRE rapporteur, 2014). The MSs will have to implement and live with 
the GDPR, i.e. they are placed differently as compared with the Commission and the EP 
(interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels; interview with EU official C, 23 
February 2015, Brussels). As Section 6.2 elaborates, the MSs behaviour is determined by 
the perceived realities of domestic implementation of the reform and sovereignty notions, 
                                                          
42 The centre-right conservative political group in the EP, which overall was more supportive of the pro-
business line during the GDPR talks (see the following section). 
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whereas the Commission and the EP share a general interest in seeking public support for 
the European integration (Young and Wallace, 2000). 
Apart from modernisation of the rules, there were major institutional shifts of authority 
envisaged in the reform. The Commission’s draft GDPR of 2012 stood out as assigning a 
lot of powers to this institution. One aspect where this was felt was the unusually high 
number of implementing and delegated acts which it would later adopt in the context of the 
comitology and through which it would gain significant powers (interview with Permanent 
Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels; interview with EP source C, 8 
February 2016, Brussels). As shown in Subsection 4.5.2, a wide range of actors were 
critical of that. Moreover, the Commission also originally assigned itself the “backstop” 
role, i.e. final decision-making in the one-stop-shop and consistency mechanism, in the 
event a concrete case agreement failed to be found in the context of the EDPB or if the 
Commission disagreed with the outcome (Articles 58-62, Commission, 2012e). The 
competences that the Commission would have gained were commented upon as unjustified 
and inadequately wide in general and as compared to the Directive 95/46/EC, and raising 
“concerns with regard to primary law and […] contrary to the system of supervisory 
authorities” (Hornung, 2012:80-81). At the same time, the exclusion of the revision of the 
Regulation 45/200143 that sets out data protection rules for EU institutions and agencies 
including the Commission from the reform was a subject of debates (LIBE, 2012:4-5; 
Fleming, 2013c; EDPS, 2015b), and seemed peculiar in the light of the above proposals.  
However, despite its insistence (Commission, 2013a), this attempt to centralise the data 
protection governance by the Commission was not successful and the initially aspired for 
                                                          
43 “On the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data”. 
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powers were significantly reduced by the co-legislators in the course of deliberations, and 
moved to be located within the EDPB competence, representing the DPAs. The 
Commission, however, managed to resist an imposition of a deadline within the GDPR 
provisions for the upgrade of the two other data protection instruments– the Regulation 
45/2001 and Directive 2002/58/EC – as was proposed by the EP44. Another gain was 
managing to secure an implementing act for adequacy decisions, as opposed to a delegated 
act where the EP would have had a veto right. The Council was supportive of the former 
option (interview with EP source B, 4 February 2016, Brussels; interview with EP source 
C, 8 February 2016, Brussels). The aspects of the GDPR policy process related to the 
political interests and the attitude of the Commission analysed in this section – the 
importance of this dossier for its self-legitimisation, this institution’s endeavours to gain 
new powers through this reform and the other actors’, notably the EP’s and the Council’s, 
resistance to these attempts – point to the relevance of the rational choice institutionalist 
approach in which policy processes are seen as a ceaseless contest of power between the 
actors. 
5.3 The EP as a countervailing institutional power with a long history in privacy affairs 
The EP, representing the EU citizens, can be viewed as the most evolving EU institution 
since its powers have been growing with every Treaty revision. Its impact on the EU 
politics and governance has been felt in various ways: from the dismissal of Santer’s 
Commission amid the inquiry into fraud and mismanagement in 1999 (Walker, 1999), to 
legislative proposals that were amended or rejected in favour of civic interests in its 
extending role as a co-legislator (Young and Wallace, 2000:16). The new powers conferred 
                                                          
44 The Commission, however, quite promptly presented the reform proposals for these two instruments in 
January 2017, i.e. about a year after the finalisation of the GDPR. 
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on the EP with the Lisbon Treaty that came into force in 2009 including endorsement of 
trade agreements were soon felt in the earlier mentioned rejection of the ACTA in 2012 
(see Section 3.6). The US ambassador to the EU pointed out a necessity to systematically 
engage with this actor for its impact on the EU politics (Price, 2014). 
This institution has been long active in the area of privacy protection. Since the 1970s, 
prior to the adoption of the Directive 95/46/EC, the EP had been repeatedly urging the 
Commission for the need to stipulate an EU-level data protection law (Bennett and Raab, 
2006:93; Bigo et al, 2011:60-62). Referring to a US government document, the EP has 
been playing a significant role in the data protection policy debate even through non-
binding means, such as resolutions, statements, opinions, as well as public hearings, “and 
lobbying the Council and Commission for action” (US Mission to the EU, 2009 cited in 
Brown and Marsden, 2013c:59). It made the case in causing significant barriers related to 
privacy concerns during the stipulation of PNR and TFTP agreements with the US and 
PNR with Canada (BBC, 2007a; BBC, 2010; BBC, 2012c; EP, 2014d). 
The Chair of the responsible LIBE Committee Claude Moraes stated regarding this data 
protection reform that it “is not only one of the key priorities of the [LIBE] Committee but 
of the entire European Parliament” (LIBE, 2015a:3). The former EP President Martin 
Schulz has also expressed a strong stance against “technological totalitarianism” and for 
the need for strict data protection standards in Europe as well as inclusive and democratic 
distribution of the benefits of digitisation in some of his speeches (Schulz, 2016). The 
former EDPS Peter Hustinx appealed to the EP “as a countervailing power” in the light of 
the pro-business approach taken in the discussions on the GDPR within the Council 
(Fleming, 2012).  
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Despite the above discussed profile, the EP remains susceptible to various political 
pressures generated by certain contexts. This was the case with the revival of the EU PNR 
directive, rejected by the LIBE Committee in 2013, following the attacks in Paris in 
January 2015. While, on the one hand, this controversial instrument was adopted by the EP 
on the same day with the GDPR, it was nevertheless an EP’s condition imposed on the 
Council, that the former law would be voted for only if the ministers finalised the data 
protection reform, i.e. strengthened data protection (Barbière, 2016). Besides, the pro-
privacy camp in the EP managed to obtain some important improvements to this heavily 
privacy invading measure (Gotev, 2016).  
There was one very significant and decisive development in the EP – the appointment of 
the rapporteur of the GDPR dossier. According to Viviane Reding, this figure is of 
extraordinary importance (speaking in Bernet, 2015). The rapporteur is behind the wheel of 
the intra- and interinstitutional negotiations on behalf of the EP. The Parliamentary 
procedures allowed the Greens to demand the steering role for the GDPR. However, as 
they expressed the political will to be in charge of it, the file did not go to them without a 
fight (interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels). Originally, the EPP group 
was interested to take the lead in the GDPR deliberations with the MEP Axel Voss, who 
had prepared a report on the imminent data protection reform proposal in 2011 (EP, 
2011a), willing to take the rapporteur’s job. The implications of the turn when the Greens’ 
MEP Jan P. Albrecht became the rapporteur, instead, are quite straightforward looking at 
the two MEPs’ ranking by the LobbyPlag (http://www.lobbyplag.eu/map), for example, 
where Mr Voss tops the list of the legislators behind the highest number of privacy 
weakening amendments, and Mr Albrecht is the one with the most privacy strengthening 
amendments. In 2015, Mr Voss co-authored an article criticising restrictions on further 
processing of personal data for incompatible purposes, the principle of purpose limitation, 
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and advocating for a risk-based approach (Voss and Padova, 2015). He remained actively 
engaged in the GDPR debates as a shadow rapporteur from the EPP. In the meantime, the 
gaining of the rapporteur’s post by Jan P. Albrecht, known in the EP as a data protection 
expert and defender, caused a backlash from the industry side and prompted more lobbying 
on the EP (interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels; Bernet, 2015). 
A substantial challenge in the EP was to work through the nearly 4000 amendments that 
made it physically impossible to be voted on one-by-one, and that could have distorted the 
law in an unpredictable way. In the light of the situation with the amendments, a different 
procedure had to be applied and the rapporteurs took time to find a compromise for each 
individual article in case of most articles that were “wrote completely based on the 
amendments after long negotiations” (interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, 
Brussels). But for some chapters, e.g. on the consistency mechanism, broad architecture 
was discussed and the articles resulted being formulated based on that. The talks on the 
consistency and cooperation among the DPAs were a bit difficult, because an 
understanding of how the coordination across MSs and other policy fields really worked 
was needed. Different models, such as banking regulation and telecoms regulation, were 
looked at. In the end, a simpler model was decided on, limiting the Commission role and 
proposing the two-thirds majority vote in the EDPB. There had been long discussions on 
the Chapters II and III, addressing the very basic foundations, such as data subject rights, 
legal grounds for processing, legitimate interest and other provisions that had been 
evolving till the very end of negotiations. The compromise was built based on concessions 
from all political groups that had to put aside some of their concerns and preferences 
(interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels). Among main “sticking points” 
during the debates in the EP were the definition of consent, legitimate interest, profiling, 
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one-stop-shop, and pseudonymisation (Sean Kelly, MEP and ITRE rapporteur, speaking at 
Interact, 2013). 
Compromise seeking was not very easy, not the least because of different approaches by 
the negotiators: some wanted a background approach to be later worked out in the 
negotiations with the Council, while some others focused on details (interview with EP 
source C, 16 February 2015, Brussels). The Socialists and Democrats (thereafter S&D) had 
a particular style in negotiations of concurring in principle with everything and making no 
other demands apart from insisting on raising significantly the fines and imposing more 
control on big corporations, which they expected to be taken on board as their only 
requirement. In terms of other large groups and their ideologies brought to the compromise 
talks, the liberal-centrist group ALDE wanted an enabling environment for entrepreneurs, 
but rules and users’ rights to be respected. The centre-right EPP and the Conservatives and 
Reformists (thereafter ECR) were more pro-business, especially in the light of the 
economic recession. But there may be a spectrum of attitudes within political groups. For 
example, there is a “dissenting minority” within the EPP which wants more privacy. As 
each file, the GDPR required majority-building. A weak coalition was found between 
liberals and socialists (interview with EP source C, 16 February 2015, Brussels). However, 
despite the remarkable challenge posed by the 4000 amendments and divergent views, the 
earlier mentioned perceived importance of this dossier to the EP and its institutional 
capacity to deliver was a consolidating factor that was reflected in the overwhelming 
endorsement of the GDPR in the plenary vote of March 2014. 
“I think you can get consensus on some issues, you [will not] on others, but then it 
is not really a stumbling block, because at the end of the day you have to put it to 
the vote and the majority will decide. So, the real key is to have balance to go into 
that vote so that major issues are clear. And then Members of Parliament can vote 
accordingly [...]. Obviously, the views from [the Industry Committee] which have 
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been passed would conflict to some degree with the views of [the LIBE] 
Committee. So, at the moment we are discussing, trying to work out what are the 
red lines for [both] so that we can reach a compromise and progress the Regulation. 
Because if we do not, we are going to do a lot of damage not just to industry, to 
consumers, but perhaps to the image of the European Parliament as well” (Sean 
Kelly, MEP and ITRE rapporteur, speaking at Interact, 2013). 
In the interinstitutional realm, there had been a constructive interaction between the EP and 
the Commission. Since the tabling of the Commission proposal in 2012 there had been a 
series of meetings between the EP rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs and the Data Protection 
unit in the Commission’s DG Justice in order to get the ideas behind the draft GDPR 
explained for each article: why something was changed as compared to the Directive 
95/46/EC, and so forth. The LIBE draft report of January 2013 was prepared based on that 
work (interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels). The interinstitutional 
dynamics between the EP and the Council is very different with much less interaction 
taking place, except for Permanent Representations – more informally. Besides, when a 
Presidency starts, they are willing to introduce themselves (interview with EP source C, 16 
February 2015, Brussels). The two co-legislators elaborate their positions independently. 
These positions are later negotiated to find a common formulation of a new legislation. 
The EP’s role in determining the outcome of the GDPR drafting was very significant in 
bringing the text back closer to the Commission proposal in the trilogue talks, i.e. in 
defending a number of stronger data protection provisions in comparison with the Council 
General Approach text. As will be discussed in the next section, a number of governments, 
however, were leaning towards a pro-fundamental rights approach and were sympathetic to 
the overall EP position – a factor that must have facilitated such a trilogue outcome. The 
EP was also key in giving prominence to this dossier in general at a critical moment with 
its overwhelming plenary vote in spring 2014. The process within the institution was 
marked by some unique circumstances such as gaining the rapporteur’s post by the Greens 
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and the amount of amendments that had to be dealt with. Various informal factors played 
out as sources of empowerment for the EP such as institutional profile building or issue 
linkage as with the PNR Directive related to the sociological and rational choice 
institutionalism, respectively. Formal rules – another rational choice institutionalist 
dimension – provided an opportunity for a small political group to become in charge of the 
GDPR, although this opportunity had to be coupled with a strong political will. 
5.4 Negotiating country positions: the impact of formal arrangements and informal 
factors in the Council GDPR talks. 
Negotiations in the Council, where national governments are represented, is a very 
dynamic process as the cleavages between the EU MS are mostly not cumulative, but 
cross-cutting. The coalitions are constantly shifting depending on issues at hand 
(Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:65-67, 87) and there are no permanent “blocs grouped 
around big/small, rich/poor or north/south” (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:87). This is also 
one of the drivers of consensus-seeking and the accommodationist politics, characteristic to 
the EU, as any MS that finds itself in a majority on one issue may be in a minority on 
another. “The governments […] are sensitive to one others’ political situations and 
requirements” (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:87). While larger MSs are often perceived as 
capable to enjoy more political weight, size will not always be a wholly determinant factor. 
For instance, Italy’s role in the EU has been much less influential as compared to France; 
but such relatively small state as the Netherlands managed to gain a lot of influence 
(Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:67, 68, 88, 91). Some empirical studies on the countries’ 
positions versus policy outcomes demonstrate that preferences of the larger states do not 
necessarily prevail (Hix, 2015). The ability of all MSs to influence the outcomes cannot be 
underestimated (Naurin and Wallace, 2008). Achievements may depend on the political 
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skills of concrete personalities at the negotiations table, the country’s expertise in a given 
policy area, the salience of certain policy areas to the MSs, etc. (Buonanno and Nugent, 
2013:67, 89-90). While France and Germany traditionally have been counted as two core 
countries with considerable influence over policy development, and the EU integration has 
been significantly driven by the so-called French-German axis, since the late 1990s their 
influence has been relatively declining, due to the enlargements and increased number of 
MSs participating in the decision-making, significant divergence between the two on some 
policy issues, and other factors (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:67, 89-90).  
The lengthy GDPR revisions process in the Council repeatedly spurred claims of lack of 
political will from the part of the Commission and the EP (Reding, 2014a; CPDP, 2014; 
CPDP, 2015). As later discussed in Section 6.2, there was a certain politically motivated 
reluctance from the side of the MSs to engage with this dossier more promptly at the 
beginning. However, the claims that slowness of the deliberations in the Council was 
wholly a matter of political will were countered by other actors, e.g. some DPAs and civil 
society representatives, who noted the complexity of the procedures that unfold across 
several levels, at some of which the process is more formal than in other institutional 
venues, and the valid concerns of the MSs related to the implementation of the law and its 
impact on digital economies (CPDP, 2014; comments made by a national DPA official at 
the 5th Annual European Data Protection and Privacy conference). 
The negotiations in the Council consist of work at the technical group level, which then 
moves to the JHA Counsellors meetings, where the further COREPER-level meetings are 
prepared, and up to the Ministeral meetings that take place only a few times a year. The 
process across these levels progresses from extensive detailed technical-level discussions 
to more political decision-making, respectively (interview with Permanent Representation 
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official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels). In addition, some discussions also take place under 
the auspices of the so-called Friends of Presidency meetings that are of a more ad hoc 
nature. 
At the Council meetings delegations present their positions quite formally, one-by-one and 
in their own language. The process was hence particularly slow at the Working Party on 
Information Exchange and Data Protection (thereafter DAPIX) level meetings. This is 
quite different from the way the talks take place in the EP or at the WP29 meetings, for 
instance, where more socialisation and more informal interaction is involved (interview 
with an EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels; comments made by national DPA official 
at the 5th Annual European data protection and privacy conference). The JHA Counsellors 
meetings in the Council’s work entail, however, different dynamics, i.e. more socialisation 
and effectiveness, which is at times strategically used by Presidencies by relying more on 
meetings of this tier rather than those of working group level, in order to move the process 
ahead (interview with Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels)45. 
Rotating Presidencies also have a certain impact on the process, as compared to one single 
rapporteur in the EP. Here, every six months there is a tangible shift in strategy, style and 
skill (interview with Permanent Representation official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels; 
interview with EU official A, 29 January 2015, Brussels).  
One of the factors that added complexity in the formulation of the Council’s position was 
structural institutional arrangements at the national level. In each MS, the area of data 
protection and its regulatory part is handled in very different ways. In most countries the 
Ministries of Justice were steering this dossier, but some of them were led by the 
                                                          
45 This kind of meetings are easier to organise and hold, as the Counsellors reside in Brussels, there is greater 
informal interaction between them and only English is spoken at these meetings, as compared to most 
DAPIX delegates who reside in national capitals and meet only a few days a month (interview with 
Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels). 
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Ministries of Interior, while Poland was represented by the Ministry of Digital Affairs46. 
This meant diverse perspectives that were very difficult to converge (interview with 
Permanent Representation official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels). Besides, some of the 
DAPIX delegations were either chaired or strongly influenced by their DPAs. Therefore, 
the alignment of the viewpoints across the group was ranging from very strongly data 
protection-oriented of the DPAs, to those of the Ministries of Justice that could be placed 
in the middle, and those of the Ministries of Interior - least expected to give much 
importance to data protection with some implications also originating in the tensions 
between security and privacy (interview with EU official A, 29 January 2015, Brussels). 
“The role of DAPIX was to examine the Commission’s proposals in detail, but as 
the months of discussions turned into years, the draft text was examined in ever 
greater depth by [MS] delegations on an issue-by-issue basis […] The length of the 
process also meant that on several occasions, DAPIX had to recalibrate discussions 
to take into account issues raised by the Snowden disclosures and the “right-to-be-
forgotten” judgment of the [CJEU], amongst many others. DAPIX delegates […] 
were often robust and resilient in representing the views of their governments and 
stakeholders which led to the negotiations taking much longer than originally 
envisaged” (John Bowman, former head of the UK delegation to DAPIX, 2015). 
The primary interest of the MSs is “to preserve their own familiar rules” (Simitis, 
1995:449; see also Section 6.2). At the substantive level, “MSs weigh various interests, 
including business, and balance positions” (interview with national Ministry of Justice 
official, 18 March 2015). Position formation was shaped by a general political 
environment, the government’s priorities and the policy course pursued by the minister in 
office. Positions were also based on the positions of the internal institutions of each MS, 
related to their experience and applicability of the rules in practice (interview with 
Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels; see also two detailed 
                                                          
46 An official of the Polish Ministry for Digital Affairs made some interesting comments at the 3rd European 
Data Economy conference in 2017, explaining that this is a “very different Ministry”, which was created 
aiming at a very technical, non-political mission. 
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country accounts in Section 6.6). To a certain degree it also depends on the data protection 
philosophy of the country (interview with national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 
2015). Here a certain division could be felt between the Northern and Southern European 
countries, the former in many cases tending to have a more business-oriented attitude, and 
the latter leaning towards a fundamental rights point of view (interview with EU official B, 
13 February 2015, Brussels; interview with privacy advocacy organisation representative, 
10 July 2014, London); with some small states and Scandinavian countries also defending 
data subjects’ rights (interview with Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, 
Brussels). For example, Italy’s more rights-based views were in a rather stark contrast with 
the UK’s pro-business position (interview with European consumer organisation 
representative, 11 December 2015, Brussels). During the trilogue, there were tensions 
between business-oriented and data subjects-oriented MSs regarding the risk-based 
approach. The states with the positions leaning towards enhancement of guarantees for 
data subjects found themselves congruent with the EP position (interview with Permanent 
Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels), which can explain the relatively 
successful outcome of the trilogue.  
But differences between the MSs agendas and their issue areas-related sensitivities were 
far more wide-ranging than the above aspects. To make some examples, Spain and some 
Scandinavian countries were concerned about the GDPR implications in terms of research 
and statistics; Germany, as discussed in Subsection 4.5.3, about public sector and also one-
stop-shop; France being mostly concerned with one-stop-shop as were the UK and Ireland; 
Denmark about constitutional problems with the EDPB, etc. During the trilogue there were 
very hard discussions on the children consent age due to very different national civil law 
perspectives (interview with a Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016). 
Even the countries deemed to have similar contexts, for instance, prominent digital 
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economies, such as UK, Ireland and Luxembourg, had rather differing preferences or at 
least on some issues. While the UK was against the Regulation in favour of a Directive and 
was trying to delay the adoption of the GDPR, Luxembourg was advocating for maximum 
harmonisation and Ireland was striving to progress the adoption of the law during its 
Presidency. Besides, Luxembourg’s position, with Greens in the government, was in 
principle quite close to civil society views (interview with international digital rights 
organisation representative, 8 December 2015, Brussels), as opposed to the UK’s. 
For long countries did not have clear positions on the GDPR and had very fragmented 
approaches. There were no steady groups to enable formation of majority (interview with 
national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015). The so-perceived key countries 
Germany and France, too, took very long, about two years, to form their positions 
(interview with national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015; interview with 
Permanent Representation official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels; interview with privacy 
advocacy organisation representative, 10 July 2014, London). The Commission, to whom 
this dossier was politically very important, was struggling to find allies. As Germany was 
not leaning to its side, the Commission was trying to gain France’s support that 
traditionally is closer to the Commission from the perspective of citizen rights protection, 
but also unsuccessfully. However, it managed to achieve a more pro-active France 
engagement in the talks in order to counterweigh the German and British influence 
(interview with national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015). As mentioned in 
Section 5.2, the progress on the Council’s General Approach was hindered to some degree 
by a tough negotiating style pursued by the Commission towards the MSs.  
The very difficult consensus-building was reflected in the multitude of reservations 
expressed by the delegations, which can be seen in the enormous amount of footnotes as 
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the General Approach was formulated (almost 650, e.g. see Latvian Presidency Note, 
2015e), and which translated into numerous derogations, as highlighted in Subsection 
4.5.1. Some developments that followed the interinstitutional political agreement of 
December 2015 also suggest that a common perspective was not found in the Council till 
the very last and the MSs simply accepted to move on to close the file. Austria – the only 
country that voted against the GDPR – could not agree with, in its view, inadequate level 
of data protection, which in some cases was going below the level afforded under its 
existing national law47 (General Secretariat Note, 2016a; General Secretariat Note, 2016b). 
The Republic of Slovenia stated that data protection should primarily be treated as an 
individual human right and that the notions of legitimate interests of data controllers48 in 
the GDPR might be constitutionally in conflict with the fundamental rights dimension. It 
also reiterated its position that MSs should be able to set higher data protection standards. 
In the meantime, the Czech Republic regretted in its statement the insufficient application 
of the risk-based approach (General Secretariat Note, 2016b).  
The analysis in this section indicates some interesting aspects of the sociological 
institutionalism and their impact on the policy process and outcomes. These aspects 
include the specific, less socially cohere policy formulation dynamics within the Council 
as compared to some other EU-level institutions, the varied institutional adherence of the 
delegations that affected to some degree their positions during the talks, and the diverse 
national contexts related to the MSs law systems, political economies and data protection 
cultures. These dynamics are determined by formal arrangements, i.e. the formal rules that 
                                                          
47 Austria indicated as unacceptable the “household exemption”, i.e. the exclusion of private activities on 
social media from the scope of the Regulation, the weakness of some provisions on purpose limitation, 
legitimate interest and further data processing in the Articles 5, 6 and 49 that disadvantage data subjects. It 
was also critical of the restrictions of the key principles of data protection law, such as fairness, lawfulness or 
proportionality, made possible under the Article 23. This Article includes, amongst others, the exceptions on 
the grounds of “national security”, “public security” and “public interest”.   
48 As permissible legal grounds for the processing of personal data in some situations. 
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underpin the process of negotiations within the Council and the patterns of governance of 
this issue-area domestically. The difficulty to find a solid common ground between the 
MSs on the GDPR links to the realms of the rational choice institutionalism as well as the 
state-centric approach. 
5.5 DPAs – between the collective power and the preservation of domestic reign 
The DPAs “were among the first independent regulatory agencies in Europe” following the 
passage of comprehensive national privacy laws in a number of European countries in the 
1970s and 1980s, including some of the EU founding MSs, such as France, Germany, and 
Luxembourg (Newman, 2007:130, 132). The network of national DPAs constitutes a 
prominent epistemic community that is deemed to have a significant potential to influence 
the EU privacy and data protection policy. Between national and supranational levels these 
actors have been endowed with different capacities. At the national level, they exercise 
certain enforcement powers, while at the supranational level they have been assigned an 
advisory role as the WP29, which pursuant to the adoption of the GDPR has been upgraded 
into the EDPB, with more powers as compared to the WP29, notably the legally-binding 
decisions within the consistency mechanism (see Subsection 4.5.4). 
Historically, the national DPAs are thought to have had a key role in the instalment of the 
Directive 95/46/EC, i.e. a harmonising data protection instrument in the EU acquis. 
Supranational-level action was prompted when the DPAs, in the light of potential venue-
shopping for data processing operations, used their powers to prevent data exchanges with 
the EC countries, e.g. Belgium and Italy, were privacy laws were absent at the end of the 
1980s. Apart from interference with the accomplishment of the Single Market, that 
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situation was also affecting the plans to launch the Schengen System49, leading the 
previously reluctant Commission to undertake the drafting of the EC-wide law – the 
Directive 95/46/EC – to create a level playing field across all MSs. Despite the industry’s 
efforts to stop it, the European-level privacy protection regime was adopted, requiring the 
presence of data protection rules and independent DPAs in all EU MSs, and expanding the 
regulatory powers of these agencies. Moreover, supranationally the role of national DPAs 
was institutionalised and cooperation consolidated by a provision establishing the WP29 
composed of national regulators, which since its first meeting in 1997 has been actively 
involved in the process of development and enforcement of the rules as well as in 
evaluation of the adequacy of privacy regimes in foreign countries (Newman, 2007:123-
134).  
Despite their only advisory capacity in the policy process at the supranational level, the 
DPAs continued to tangibly influence it. This is reflected, for example, in the concern of 
such stakeholder as the USA, in whose view the EDPS (discussed in the next section) and 
national DPAs have been regularly making “high-profile public statements on areas 
outside of their formal competence…[which] tend to give primacy to civil liberties-based 
approaches for the EU’s Single Market, consumers, or law enforcement” (US Mission to 
the EU, 2009 cited in Brown and Marsden, 2013c:61). The guidance issued by the WP29 
has at least to some extent an impact on business behaviour, is taken into account by courts 
and, more generally, shapes policy formulation on emerging privacy-related issues in the 
EU and beyond (Newman, 2007:135; Newman, 2011:186, 187). The WP29’s highly 
critical opinions were significant during the drafting of the Safe Harbour agreement 
(Princen, 2003:151). “The importance of the [WP29] for the EU data protection cannot be 
                                                          
49 The area without internal border control between most EU MSs and some non-EU states. 
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overstated […] a recent show-case of its strength is the deadline set by it for the 
replacement of the Safe Harbour Agreement, annulled by the [CJEU] that was promptly 
observed by the negotiating parties” (De Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2016:193). 
The WP29 constitutes a pan-European transgovernmental co-operative structure for the 
oversight of data protection rules. National expertise is pooled regionally through a process 
of information exchange, harmonisation of standards, and joint enforcement (Newman, 
2011). Coordinated responses were given to a number of recent incidents, for example, 
concerning the updated Google privacy policy in 2013 (BBC, 2013m), the eBay massive 
data breach in 2014 (Wakefield, 2014a), enactment of the CJEU “right-to-be-forgotten” 
ruling in 2014 (Lee, 2014b), or non-users tracking by Facebook in 2015 (Fioretti, 2015a).  
However, the network of DPAs has not had a consistent strategy in approaching the EU 
institutions to be able to better counterweigh business lobbying. Only several WP29 chairs 
had a real strategy in this realm (interview with national DPA official, 22 January 2015). 
The perception of their role in the policy formulation process differs also among the DPAs 
(Barnard-Wills, Pauner Chulvi and De Hert, 2016:5). While “there is a community of EU 
DPAs with sufficient shared perspectives that it is possible to talk about an EU DPA 
perspective” (Barnard-Wills, Pauner Chulvi and De Hert, 2016:11), collectively elaborated 
common opinions may differ from individual views held by national DPAs (Isabelle 
Falque-Pierrotin, WP29 Chairwoman, speaking at Privacy in a Connected World 
conference, Privacy Laws & Business, 2015b). Divergent responses may be also given 
while interpreting the same law or addressing the same issues, even defecting from 
commonly advanced positions50. Within the WP29, depending on the issue, different 
                                                          
50 For instance, German DPAs declared an intention to be less lenient than in the common WP29 position 
regarding alternative legal grounds for data transfers in the interim between the annulment of the Safe 
Harbour and a new such agreement (Moody, 2015). 
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countries may find common interest. The newer EU countries, except for Poland, tend to 
be significantly less pro-active in the discussions than the older ones, despite some of them 
playing a prominent regulatory role domestically (interview with national DPA official, 22 
January 2015). Although there is a lot of substantial informal day-to-day cooperation and 
best-practice sharing (Barnard-Wills, Pauner Chulvi and De Hert, 2016), these informal 
forms of bilateral, regional, supranational and international cooperation have not yet been 
unfolding with full potential (Kloza and Galetta, 2015). Besides, the DPAs function very 
differently in terms of administrative, legal and economic contexts, the resources and 
powers available to them, cultures and approaches to their role as regulators and enforcers 
(Barnard-Wills, Pauner Chulvi and De Hert, 2016:9-10)51. In many countries, the DPAs are 
under-resourced in terms of staffing and funding. In several MSs, the DPAs have limited 
investigatory and/or sanctioning powers, with emphasis being placed on the pre-emptive 
“soft” ex-ante measures and “hard” enforcement instruments even non-existent in some 
jurisdictions (FRA, 2010). The network of DPAs is therefore a strong and a weak link in 
the EU policy process.  
Upgrading the governance of data protection enforcement and addressing the above 
deficiencies was one of the key pillars of the reform to be conveyed through the GDPR laid 
down in two dedicated entire chapters – VI on Independent supervisory authorities and VII 
on Cooperation and consistency mechanism – with some relevant provisions also in the 
chapter VIII on remedies, liability and penalties. “It is a key project for the DPAs […] it is 
going to alter very deeply the way we work, our operational tool box, the way we reflect 
[…] it is the reason why the WP29 has from the very beginning been very active on this 
                                                          
51 This may determine their political behaviour with regards to reforms. E.g. the phasing out of the processing 
operations notification requirement with the GDPR was affecting the funding model of the British DPA that 
resulted in its lobbying against the GDPR (Brewster, 2012; Oltermann, 2013a; ICO, 2013; 
DecisionMarketing, 2013). 
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project” (Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, WP29 Chairwoman, speaking at Privacy in a 
Connected World conference, Privacy Laws & Business, 2015b). The WP29 issued about a 
dozen of opinions on the draft proposal. Some individual positions were advanced by a 
number of DPAs, too. The DPAs have been influential in the GDPR discussions (Fedma, 
2015; CNIL, 2013c), feeding into the process in various modes: as the WP29; as part of 
some DAPIX delegations in the Council (see Section 5.4) and having an impact on the 
formation of national positions in all MSs (interview with Permanent Representation 
official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels); or individually liaising with politicians (e.g. see 
comments by Sean Kelly, MEP and ITRE rapporteur, 2014 in Section 6.5). During the 
discussions the regulators made some robust contributions in advocating strong privacy 
protection rules (WP29, 2013b), and acted also as stakeholders whose future operation was 
going to be determined by the new law, and whose major interest in the light of the reform 
was to be given full powers, envisaging a governance model constructed as increasing, 
integrating and professionalising cooperation whilst remaining decentralised (Isabelle 
Falque-Pierrotin, WP29 Chairwoman, speaking at Privacy in a Connected World 
conference, Privacy Laws & Business, 2015b, emphasis added). These expectations were 
related to several dimensions: the DPAs’ oversight powers, the capacity to issue 
operational-level guidelines in the implementation phase, and maintaining decision-making 
competence in their own jurisdictions, i.e. vis-à-vis supervised operators, vis-à-vis the 
Commission, and vis-à-vis their peers, respectively (WP29 2012a; WP29 2012b; WP29, 
2013a; WP29, 2014).  
The adoption of the GDPR resulted in many gains for the DPAs, with some already present 
in the draft proposal, and some that emerged during the process. It enhanced their oversight 
powers and made them more harmonised. The EDPB will have the possibility to challenge 
enforcement measures applied by national DPAs viewed as inadequate, potentially placing 
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more scrutiny on more lenient DPAs (Privacy Laws & Business, 2016)52. The reduction of 
the number of delegated and implementing acts and the introduction of mandatory 
consultation with the EDPB in case of some remaining ones (Article 70, GDPR final, 
2016) as well as prevention of the Commission interference in the decision-making within 
the EDPB after the review by the EP and the Council concurred with the preferences of the 
DPAs concerning their role in the implementation stage (WP29, 2012a; WP29, 2012b; 
WP29, 2013a) and diminished the Commission’s powers as compared to its draft proposal 
of 2012. Besides, with the WP29 upgrade to the EDPB, its secretariat previously provided 
by the Commission has been moved under the auspices of the EDPS. The strongly opposed 
original one-stop-shop model conferring exclusive decision-making powers on the lead 
authority (WP29, 2014) was altered during the negotiations, especially in the Council’s 
version, and was finalised as a “qualified” one-stop-shop where other concerned 
supervisory authorities do not lose their say (Chapters VI and VII, GDPR final, 2016; one-
stop-shop is discussed in detail in Subsection 4.5.4). 
As it can be seen from the discussion in this section, there is a very dynamic and 
sophisticated process between transnational integration and collaboration, and striving to 
preserve the decision-making autonomy in one’s own jurisdictions. The DPAs’ pursuit of 
their strategic interests and the quest for preservation of their spheres of influence relate to 
the notions of the rational choice institutionalism of actors’ strategic behaviour when 
formal rules are being decided. The high degree of their informal influence as experts and 
informal co-operation also link to the sociological institutionalism perspective. The 
emergence and institutionalisation of these actors in the EU policy-making landscape and 
their subsequent feeding into policy formulation encompasses, as suggested by Newman 
                                                          
52 While this may diminish sanctions application autonomy of individual DPAs in some cases, it augments 
the overall DPAs’ enforcement power in that it helps tackle the “jurisdiction-game”, which was often the 
case in Europe. 
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(2007), a historical institutionalism dimension, i.e. the impact of earlier policy 
developments on later policy processes. 
5.6 The EDPS: more supranational-level policy dynamism in advocating privacy 
protection 
The EDPS is a unique actor in the EU governance defined by Hijmans (2006:1324-1332) 
as “not an institution, not an agency, not a regulator, not an Ombudsman and not a judicial 
body”, but having some characteristics of each, who has been fulfilling explicit and 
implicit public expectations (De Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2014:237-252). Apart from its 
general function to oversee processing of personal data by the EU institutions and bodies, 
the EDPS also has an advisory role to examine and consult on privacy and data protection 
implications in the new EU legislation related to a wide range of issue-areas. It exercises 
this role at all stages of policy-making process, both on request by the institutions and 
through own-initiative interventions (EDPS, 2014f). The GDPR was a particular case. 
Since it is really EDPS’s core business and core expertise as well, this institution had a 
great interest in this file and tried to be more involved (interview with EDPS official, 30 
January 2015, Brussels). While the EDPS comes mainly under the Regulation 45/2001 on 
the processing of personal data by the EU institutions, some GDPR provisions touched 
upon certain aspects of the EDPS future role, too, because of the transfer of the WP29 
secretariat from the Commission to be provided by the EDPS with the coming into force of 
this new law. The timeframe for the revision of the Regulation 45/2001 itself and whether 
it should be established in the GDPR was also part of the discussions (see Section 5.2).  
Referring to the EDPS’s own comments, it did have some influence over the drafting of the 
GDPR both in the preparatory phase and later (EDPS, 2012c; Buttarelli, 2016). It has been 
viewed as having an influential role by external actors as well (Reding, 2014b:v-vi; 
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FEDMA, 2015). The EDPS’s prominent “soft power” is the result of its systematic, pro-
active profile building through a careful and successful selection of dossiers for 
intervention since the very beginning of its existence (De Hert and Papakonstantinou, 
2014:237-252). The EDPS’s input was important in both the GDPR deliberations and in 
rebalancing debates surrounding the tensions between Big Data and fundamental rights in 
general (interview with European consumer organisation representative, 11 December 
2015, Brussels). Lately, this institution has been very pro-active in bringing to the fore the 
need to rely more on the ethical and human dimensions in the current technological and 
business environment (EDPS, 2015d; EDPS, 2016a). Besides, in 2015 and 2016 it 
organised meetings with the representatives of the civil society (EDPS, 2015a; EDPS, 
2016b). At the first of those meetings civil society organisations urged the EDPS not to 
limit itself to the role of technical experts and to undertake a more political role in the 
GDPR negotiations.  
According to an EDPS official, the very (ordinary legislative) procedure applied to the 
GDPR was posing constraints oftentimes for the EDPS involvement at various stages, as 
its participation was simply not foreseen, or where it was foreseen it was limited to its 
advisory role, i.e. not necessarily taken on board. Other barriers in making an input derived 
from either misperception of the role and aims of the EDPS as an institution (as who they 
really are, what they really do, or what interest they might be representing), or, on the 
opposite, knowing well the EDPS as a body who can release an independent opinion. This 
resulted in “reluctance from some actors to get [EDPS] more involved” (interview with 
EDPS official, 30 January 2015, Brussels). The former (misperceptions) makes some MSs 
somewhat wary of the EDPS, for example. The latter was likely to make the input of the 
EDPS in some phases of the process undesirable for the Commission, for instance, where, 
in pursuing its position, it might not want another external voice, a respected expert, 
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expressing criticism in the on-going negotiations. Similarly, despite the EDPS and the 
national DPAs working together in the WP29, individual perspectives were, nevertheless, 
divergent53. So even other (national) DPAs could happen to feel averse about the EDPS’s 
potential interference at certain venues of the political process, such as DAPIX, of which 
they wished to take advantage of to articulate their specific preferences (interview with 
EDPS official, 30 January 2015, Brussels). 
But the EDPS’s involvement is not limited to only formal procedures and its expertise is 
often called upon by co-legislators (the EP and the Council) also in other cases, where 
there is a significant data protection component. “In practice, this way of informal 
collaboration with the co-legislators […] works” (interview with EDPS official, 30 January 
2015, Brussels). However, the cooperation with the EP has been much easier, also because 
their work is much more transparent. Besides, the EDPS has “its natural point of contact” 
in the LIBE committee, which in the case of this specific policy file had been very keen on 
using the EDPS as experts. The EDPS was approached by the LIBE committee during the 
revision of the famous 4000 amendments. Also, it was even invited to some of the shadow 
meetings when compromises were discussed (interview with EDPS official, 30 January 
2015, Brussels).  
The interaction with the Council was more difficult, particularly while it was working on 
its position, and it was mainly due to the procedure – the DAPIX meetings were closed, 
and only the MSs delegations, the Council Secretariat and the Commission were present at 
the meetings. More interaction was, however, foreseen in the trilogue phase, during the 
work on the final text. But the process in the Council was monitored by the EDPS, as much 
                                                          
53 The EDPS represents “a unique European perspective” (interview with EDPS official, 30 January 2015, 
Brussels), which at times may not be congruent with the preferences of some national DPAs, especially, 
when their domestic authority is at stake, as discussed in the previous section. 
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as possible, deploying also informal contacts (interview with EDPS official, 30 January 
2015, Brussels). Then the EDPS’s intervention, when perceived needed, included both 
more formal avenues, such as writing letters, as well as informally “talking to people”, as 
in some instances the option of formally expressed position could be potentially too 
confrontational and counterproductive. Sometimes the EDPS was also approached by the 
Presidency, in which cases it could “provide a more or less structured input on issues 
which were really crucial” and seemingly were going “in the fundamentally wrong 
direction” (interview with EDPS official, 30 January 2015, Brussels). A less radical 
proposal in terms of reduction of harmonisation for the public sector in the GDPR 
ultimately presented by the Presidency (see Subsection 4.5.3) was “purely a result of 
informal interaction and experts explaining to the Presidency” as well as of talks from the 
part of the EP and the Commission (interview with EDPS official, 30 January 2015, 
Brussels).  
The above discussion of the EDPS’s role reveals a lot of interesting, and maybe not 
immediately obvious, aspects of the political process. Firstly, it indicates how nuanced and 
multi-channelled the influences over policy outcome are. While the previous section on the 
DPAs has already shown that understanding of policy formulation cannot be limited to the 
interactions between interest groups and the decision-making institutions, and that advisory 
bodies introduce additional layers in the policy solution flows, the presence of such actor 
as the EDPS creates even more dynamism. In addition, a significant impact of informal 
factors surfaced here. These factors played out in various ways in the GDPR talks. While 
the EDPS technical expertise – a sociological dimension – in some cases extended this 
body’s access to the policy process, at the same time, perceptions by other actors related to 
its role may also be constraining, along with limits posed by formal rules, when exclusive 
spaces of influence are sought. The latter observation brings attention to the rational choice 
  182 
 
institutionalism perspective in explaining the GDPR policy process, i.e. the strategic 
behaviour of the participants in the pursuit of self-assertion and maximisation of their 
gains. As with the DPAs discussed in the previous section, the impact of the EDPS on the 
policy formulation is also relevant to the historical institutionalism, i.e. the effect of the 
creation of this body on the subsequent EU data protection policy and governance 
landscape. The importance of informal policy networking when delicate issues are at stake 
was also brought up by the discussion in this section. 
5.7 FRA – competing rights and competing realities: between supranational policy ideas 
and national practice on the ground. The collective redress issue 
In response to the EP request, the FRA produced its assessment of the EU data protection 
reform proposals. The FRA stated that, given the prior release of the opinions by the EDPS 
and the WP29 specifically addressing the right to data protection, it focused on examining 
the effect of the reform on other fundamental rights enshrined in the EUCFR and a larger 
number of them than those mentioned in the explanatory memorandum of the draft 
proposals. The FRA analysis advanced considerations in favour of various interests.  
On the one hand, for example, it referred to the freedom to conduct a business, Article 16 
of the EUCFR, noting that in order to enhance protection of the rights of data subjects the 
reform introduced new obligations on business, such as mandatory data protection officers, 
data protection impact assessments, documentation obligations, or related to some data 
subject’s rights, e.g. the right of access, the right to be forgotten or the right to data 
portability, implementation of which entail new costs. The opinion suggested that the 
balancing of the rights could take into account more aspects relevant to the freedom to 
conduct a business beyond “special arrangements for micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises” (FRA, 2012). In a separate dedicated paper, the FRA also urged that this 
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freedom should be more considered in the EU policies, especially in the light of the need 
for economic recovery, acknowledging, however, that it may be limited by the right to data 
protection or other rights (FRA, 2015). The freedom to conduct a business was hailed in 
the industry response to the reform proposals in 2012 (ICDP, 2012), although, seemingly, 
these arguments did not have a major impact in the debates (interview with European 
consumer organisation representative, 11 December 2015, Brussels).  
On the other hand, the FRA position brought up the lodging of complaints by civil society 
organisations question – a contentious issue both in terms of data protection namely and in 
exercising other rights in the EU. The Commission and the EP were proposing to concede 
the right to the civil society organisations to lodge complaints with supervisory authorities 
independently of a data subject’s mandate, if they believe that rules laid down in the GDPR 
have been breached (see the comparative table of the GDPR texts at EDPS, 2015c, Articles 
73 and 76). FRA stressed the importance of broadening the possibilities for any body, 
organisation or association acting in the public interest to take a more direct role in 
litigation, as very often access to remedies is too complex and costly for individuals, 
rendering the existing redress mechanisms and the enforcement of the rights ineffective in 
practice (FRA, 2012:27-29; FRA, 2014:7). Pursuant to the Council position, however, the 
final GDPR text stipulates that whether or not organisations are allowed to act in the 
absence of data subjects’ mandates (including to judicially challenge a DPA’s decision or 
its handling of a complaint, and to seek a judicial remedy against a controller or processor) 
will be optional for the MSs to provide (Article 80(2), GDPR final, 2016). While there has 
been a lot of lobbying against bundling of complaints (EuroChambres, 2012), this outcome 
has been probably more determined by a very divergent situation between different MSs 
with regard to collective redress legislation. In a large number of countries in Europe, no 
kind of collective action for damages was foreseen by law at the outset of the reform 
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(BEUC, 2011). A common collective redress policy at the EU level is only nascent with a 
non-binding Recommendation issued by the Commission in 2013 (Commission, 2013c; 
BEUC, 2013). Formulation of this provision reflects the dynamics discussed within the 
rational choice perspective: small change at the EU level – a provision in a field-specific 
law, such as data protection – entails big implications at the national level related to 
uneven adjustment costs in different MSs as well as uneven impact on national law 
systems. The historical institutionalist dimension was present here, too. The absence of 
laws foreseeing the role for civil society organisations in enacting redress in some 
countries as well as the absence of a strong horizontal instrument at the EU level – a factor 
unrelated to data protection – affected the outcome of this provision in the GDPR. 
5.8 Privacy advocacy by civil society – a fragmented but consolidating force 
Advocacy interests active in the field of privacy protection are very diverse, ranging from 
more specialised actors engaged only with privacy protection to “traditional civil liberties 
organisations, consumer associations and groups established to promote freedom in 
cyberspace” who tend to form loose temporary coalitions to enact some specific causes 
when privacy-related controversies arise (Bennet and Raab, 2006:281-282, see also 231-
233). This diversity of participants weakens privacy advocacy in that they at times “also 
lobby on a range of civil liberties and consumer-related issues, some of which can sit 
uneasily alongside privacy” (Bennet and Raab, 2006: 281-282). Moreover, although the 
media “occasionally mount vigorous campaigns against erosions of privacy”, often in 
alignment with advocacy groups, they also have a conflicting relationship with privacy 
“given their own commercially driven propensity to pry into private lives” (Bennet and 
Raab, 2006: 282). Both of these divergences were felt in the recent policy debates 
concerning the widely misinterpreted so-called “right-to-be-forgotten”, following the 
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related CJEU ruling, its enforcement by the European DPAs, and the provisions in the 
GDPR proposal (Llansó and Jeppesen, 2016; Powles, 2015).  
For some time, in Europe coordination and communication between different groups 
involved in privacy advocacy was not consistent, although some organisations such as 
Privacy International, Statewatch, The Chaos Computer Club and BEUC managed to build 
international ties and to have a tangible impact on the policy debates and outcomes. At the 
national level, different countries tended to be stronger in different types of advocacy with 
“the UK […] well positioned for civil liberties, France for human rights, the Netherlands 
and the Scandinavian countries for consumer rights, and Germany and Austria for Netizen 
rights” (Davies, 2012). This diversity implies focus on different issues that are being 
addressed, with consumer organisations, for example, largely not dealing with government 
surveillance (interview with European consumer organisation representative, 11 December 
2015, Brussels), or may result in conflicting perspectives, as we have seen above. Further, 
the patterns of engagement in the policy-making are diverse among the groups of the same 
type in different countries. For instance, while consumer organisations in some countries 
are involved only in litigation, in other countries they are also active in lobbying directly 
the government (interview with European consumer organisation representative, 11 
December 2015, Brussels). In some countries, such as Italy, the dialogue between the 
government and civil society can be defined as almost non-existent (interview with privacy 
advocacy organisation representative, 10 July 2014, London).  
Privacy advocacy and digital rights forces have been consolidating at the Europe-wide 
level since early 2000s, in particular with the establishment of the European Digital Rights 
Initiative (EDRi) that, in a way, was prompted by the surfacing of the Echelon affair54 at 
                                                          
54 The electronic communications interception programme run by a number of Western countries discussed in 
more detail in Subsection 2.6.1. 
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the time. In the recent years, it has been felt that privacy advocacy in Europe has gained its 
momentum and has become “part of the fabric of legislation” (Davies, 2012). A number of 
the US civil society organisations, including American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
Center for Digital Democracy (CDD), Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) are 
also active in the European privacy policy-making both through individual as well as 
concerted action with their European counterparts. This was also the case with lobbying 
the GDPR (see, for instance EDRi, 2015b; EDRi, 2016a; Sean Kelly, MEP and ITRE 
rapporteur, 2014). Apart from occasional collective actions, there are also some more 
permanent forms of cooperation, as, for example, through a sort of bridging platform – the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), bringing together over 75 NGOs from the USA 
and the EU engaging with consumer protection issues. It is also interesting to note the 
input of a young, US-born digital rights organisation Access Now, with 10 offices around 
the world, including in Brussels, Berlin and London, who were one of the key civil society 
voices during the GDPR talks. 
Currently, there have been some ground-breaking achievements by the civil society in 
changing policy and regulatory landscape that the invalidation of the DRD instigated by 
the Digital Rights Ireland and the invalidation of the Safe Harbour in a lawsuit against 
Facebook data transfers instigated by Max Schrems - one of the most prominent activists 
of the last few years – showcase (see Sections 2.6 and 6.4 regarding these rulings). 
However, as discussed later in Section 6.5, the resources that the civil society was able to 
deploy to work systematically on the GDPR dossier were extremely scarce.  
The main overall expectation of the civil society from the data protection reform and the 
lobbying goal was keeping existing rights and upgrading them in the way that data subjects 
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possess control over their personal data. Among other important criteria, there were 
maintaining the level of protection offered by the Directive 95/46/EC and having a new 
law with an easily intelligible to ordinary ICT users text that they could meaningfully make 
use of in exercising their rights (CPDP, 2014; interview with European digital rights 
organisation representative, 8 December 2015, Brussels; interview with European 
consumer organisation representative, 11 December 2015, Brussels). Similarly to other 
stakeholders, the civil society was feeding into the process through a series of position 
papers, statements, public events, liaising directly with policy-makers as well as through 
some bespoke platforms dedicated to the GDPR deliberations, some of which LobbyPlag 
and www.protectmydata.eu. Some non-specialised, i.e. not primarily privacy or digital 
rights-focused, but civil rights watchdogs’ role undertaking platforms, such as Statewatch 
and Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), were also engaging with the data protection 
reform-related matters and giving publicity to arising issues. The civil society action was 
important in providing more legitimacy to policy decisions that already had a lot of 
currency due to other factors, such as EU fundamental rights norms and institutional 
framework that has to be enacted, the salience of data protection in the light of Snowden 
revelations, on-going massive consumer platform data breaches, non-ceasing lack of user 
trust in the ICT environment, and in countering the voices urging for a more relaxed 
privacy regime (see the next two sections). 
5.9 Business actors – resourced influencers, but not quite the winners in the struggle 
over the GDPR 
Based on the responses received during the deliberations, the rules proposed in the GDPR 
touched upon the activities of a wide variety of business operators (see, for instance, the 
list of contributors at Commission, 2010:15-21; Commission, 2011a). However, the major 
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stake was held by firms with business models centred on collection and exploitation of 
personal data, primarily such as so-called tech companies, on-line advertisers, digital 
marketers and on-line traders, and also insurers, credit rating companies and banking 
businesses, who were most actively engaged in lobbying against the efforts to stipulate 
strict data protection provisions. The American Internet giants played a prominent role in 
campaigning against the GDPR (see, for instance, http://www.lobbyplag.eu/influence). 
“The key industry players used various methods to make sure their arguments were 
repeated by lots of different voices, to create the impression of a broad opposition against 
the legislation” (EDRi, 2016b). The views of these businesses were mainly voiced through 
a bespoke Industry Coalition for Data Protection (ICDP) – a coalition of associations of 
digital industries with overlapping membership including US companies, such as 
Microsoft, eBay, Apple, Verizon, Google, Yahoo!, etc. (EDRi, no date). Besides, apart 
from various European industry bodies, American Chamber of Commerce to the EU 
(AmCham EU), TechAmerica Europe and Japan Business Council in Europe were also 
adhered to this coalition. Another bespoke lobbying platform targeted at the GDPR 
stipulation process was European Data Coalition, active since 2014, with intentionally, as 
it can be inferred, heterogeneous membership ranging from fashion retailers to vehicle 
producers, to emphasise a detrimental impact of the to be GDPR on broader realms of the 
European economy, apart from those of Internet businesses. One of the publicly most pro-
active voices and a member of both above platforms, was the Allegro Group – a Poland-
based e-commerce company with subsidiary links to the multinational South African 
Internet and Media business (Naspers, 2016) – posing as a Central and Eastern European 
firm. One of the industry’s strategies that surfaced was the controversial European Privacy 
Association, named in disguise in the way that “may give the impression that it is a 
supporter of citizen’s rights to data privacy” and presenting itself as a think tank, while 
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being funded by some of the US tech giants and with connections to lobbying 
consultancies (CEO, 2013c). 
Apart from the above described unified actions, business companies and industry 
associations also liaised individually with politicians of all levels. The resources available 
to the commercial players, especially big firms, enabled them to be present at all relevant 
conference panels where the GDPR was debated and to put pressure on governments in all 
MSs (interview with European consumer organisation representative, 11 December 2015, 
Brussels) to advance a perspective that Big Data is the only possible way forward that 
cannot be hindered (interview with European digital rights organisation representative, 8 
December 2015, Brussels). Some reports revealed Google’s longstanding privileged access 
to the senior members of the British government (Garside and Ross, 2016). However, the 
amount of lobbying received at the national level differs across countries (interview with 
national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015), but is very intense at the EU level 
(see Section 6.5). Economic recession had created a favourable context for business 
stakeholders’ views to gain more weight in the debates and was used by business actors to 
increase pressure (Data Now, 2015).  
The major interest of the industry stakeholders aimed at this process was that of “complete 
deregulation” (Jan P. Albrecht, EP rapporteur, quoted in CEO, 2013a), i.e. as unrestricted 
collection, processing and monetisation of personal data as possible. In its statements, 
ICDP countered the proposition that strict EU privacy rules would play out as a 
competitive advantage for companies operating on the continent, saying instead that they 
would scare off investors from investing in Europe who would look to invest somewhere 
else (INTA/LIBE, 2015; Fioretti, 2015b; DataIQ, 2015). Although, conversely, Apple – an 
American tech giant with a less data-intensive business model – recently has been trying to 
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market itself with a claim of more privacy offered to its users as a competitive advantage to 
distinguish itself from its competitors, such as Google and Facebook (Lee, 2015; Cellan-
Jones, 2015).   
As discussed later in Section 6.5, an unprecedented effort was mobilised in lobbying 
against the GDPR (Warman, 2012; Hastings, 2013b). While the initial proposal was 
weakened on some key provisions, e.g. on profiling or breach notifications and others, it 
can nevertheless be said that the overall outcome was somewhat disproportionate to the 
extent of lobbying, or at least the result was not an omnibus “watering down” of the rules 
towards the business side. In fact, some elements exceeded even the Commission’s draft, 
already perceived as a strict reform. Among these are the sanctions, the re-introduction of 
the Article 43a55 prohibiting disclosures of personal data to third countries’ authorities that 
do not fall under the legal frameworks adopted by the EU or its MSs, opposed by the 
industry (EDC, 2015a; see Section 6.3), and the legally-binding decision-making powers 
conferred on the EDPB during the stipulation process56, alongside the overall increase in 
DPAs powers embedded in the reform. Further, the GDPR resulted in less harmonisation 
and a re-shaped one-stop-shop process, again, not meeting the expectations of commercial 
companies. The interplay between various lobbying efforts and the actual policy outcomes 
across different decision-making venues is discussed in more detail in Section 6.5. As also 
follows from the discussion in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 as well as a privacy-friendly position of 
some of the most recession-hit countries such as Italy and Spain, the economic factors, 
while being very salient ones, have not been the wholly determinant forces, and other 
factors, such as institutional and national contexts, need to be taken into consideration in 
investigating policy outcomes. In the post-trilogue statement the industry stakeholders 
                                                          
55 Numbered as the Article 48 in the GDPR final text. 
56 Which introduced the prospect of scrutiny over jurisdictions with weaker enforcement practices. 
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lamented that the legislators had not been inspired by their four-year-long efforts (EDC, 
2015c). 
5.10 Foreign governments in the EU policy networks – the USA input into the GDPR 
policy process 
The USA had a great interest in the EU data protection reform since its very early stages 
(Guarascio, 2012) for its impact on “the transatlantic market, as well as on international 
regulatory and law enforcement cooperation” (Kennard, 2012). The US government and 
firms were principle lobbyists against the European data protection standards (Brown and 
Marsden, 2013c:60). As explained in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, due to the dominance of the 
American companies in the on-line market that generates huge revenues for the US 
economy, the EU capacity of setting global data protection standards since the adoption of 
the Directive 95/46/EC that affects data-driven business models, and the US extensive 
practices of all sorts of intelligence gathering through the global communications 
infrastructure, the stakes of this actor in the outcome of this reform were very high. 
Alongside the American tech firms’ own effort to lobby against the GDPR that policy-
makers spoke about as unprecedented, including their share in the famous 4000 
amendments tabled in the EP, the US government was active in the process of 
deliberations, too. The main areas of concern indicated by the US government were the 
proposed provisions on binding corporate rules, explicit opt-in consent, the right-to-be-
forgotten, data breach notification, and, in particular, data transfers to third countries, 
including adequacy decisions and foreign law enforcement bodies’ access to the data held 
by companies, which it found too restrictive. In general, the US government was lobbying 
for more alignment between the European privacy rules and the US Consumer Privacy Bill 
of Rights, and moving towards mutual recognition between the two privacy protection 
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regimes, i.e. easier personal data exchanges (Kerry, 2012). As pointed out by Hornung 
(2012), from the outside it is not possible to make judgements about the actual extent to 
which modifications in the GDPR were related to the US government’s involvement. 
There were developments towards various directions. Some reports were alleging the US 
government’s impact on “watering down” the Commission’s initial draft before its public 
release in 2012 (Guarascio, 2012; Fox, 2013; Fiedler, 2014). There were also reports 
potentially indicating the US administration’s direct liaisons with some of the DG Home 
cabinet staff in the Commission (Access Now, 2014). Formal bilateral consultations 
were held, too (Fleming, 2013b). Overall, the USA is an important stakeholder in the 
EU. This is reflected, for example, in the Commission’s invitation for the US 
administration and e-companies to contribute the ideas on the EU digital future (Digital 
minds, 2014). Seemingly, big pressure from the USA part through the diplomatic networks 
had an impact on making adequacy decisions as implementing rather than delegated acts, 
where the EP would have had a veto prerogative in case of the latter, in finalising the 
GDPR provisions during the trilogue (interview with EP source C, 8 February 2016, 
Brussels). However, some other developments indicate that it will not be easy for the US 
government, despite being an important and well-resourced actor, to alter the policy course 
taken in Europe. Among these were the return of the Article 43a restricting the access of 
foreign law enforcement bodies to the personal data of European citizens into the GDPR 
text following the EP intervention (the so-called anti-FISA clause, numbered as Article 48 
in the GDPR final), and the CJEU’s invalidation of the Safe Harbour agreement that also 
had implications for the data transfers regulated in Chapter V of the GDPR (see Section 
6.3). In general, the USA has also been facing difficulties in various related realms. In 
autumn 2016, the TTIP negotiations, where data protection has been a salient issue, 
although not directly included in the negotiated package, came to a halt due to the USA 
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unwillingness to accept the European expectations of standards in a number of societal 
spheres (BBC, 2016c). At the same time, concerns were voiced by an American body 
regarding a detrimental tendency for the US “infocomm” sector – the prevalence being 
given to the domestic ICT providers in many countries, not the least on national security 
grounds (Reuters, 2016).  
5.11 Conclusions 
The EU data protection reform was a central piece of legislation for data-driven industries 
which draw on the use of personal data as their core asset and which had a particularly 
high stake in the outcome of the reform that emerged in 2012 as a stringent upgrade of the 
existing rules. Despite remarkable mobilised efforts in the attempts to prevent stricter rules 
from being enshrined in the new law, alongside the efforts towards the same direction of 
the US government, and despite significantly lesser resourced privacy advocacy action, the 
EU data protection regime, while accommodating some less user rights-friendly 
preferences, progressed towards stronger provisions in many aspects of the GDPR. This 
was determined by the presence of such influencers as the network of national DPAs and 
the EDPS in the process as well as the strategic interest of the supranational-level EU 
institutions to legitimise themselves, especially, in the light of the Lisbon Treaty in which 
an emphasis was put on the fundamental rights in the EU constitutional order. The 
governance ideas to enact the new regime differed among the stakeholders. The 
Commission’s aspiration to centralise the oversight was unsuccessful in favour of the 
DPAs powers. At the same time, the MSs difficulty to find a lowest common denominator 
diluted the degree of harmonisation.  
Different institutional contexts had a tangible impact on the policy process within the 
Council and the EP. Such sociological factor, as diverse institutional adherence of the 
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delegations and very different national political economies were hindering the process of 
negotiations in the Council, while such sociological factor as institutional profile-building 
in this issue-area in the EP was a consolidating force. The construction of the institutional 
identity, as in the case of the EP, as a means of self-legitimisation overlaps with the 
rational institutionalist perspective which is also relevant to the power contest between the 
Commission and the DPAs, among many other aspects of the making of the GDPR 
discussed in this chapter pertinent to this strand of the neo-institutional theory. Historical 
institutionalism was particularly reflected here in the prominent impact on the GDPR 
formulation process by such actors as the WP29 and the EDPS who embody the effect of 
the previous policy decisions that created them on the recent policy process. In addition, 
this chapter defined the competing advocacy coalitions: the structure, interests and 
strategies of the privacy advocacy by the civil society groups, who were promoting 
fundamental rights alongside the DPAs and the EDPS, and the same features of the 
industry groups, who were lobbying for a more relaxed privacy protection regime 
alongside the US government. The lobbying-related aspects during the GDPR deliberations 
are further discussed in more detail in Section 6.5. 
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Figure 1. The main actors of the GDPR deliberations  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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CHAPTER VI 
The factors that shaped the adoption of the GDPR: more insights into the context of 
the policy process 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains some important aspects of the GDPR adoption process without 
which the policy process that shaped this dossier cannot be fully understood. The first 
section takes a look at some macro-level processes, i.e. redistribution of powers, related to 
the transition from a Directive to a Regulation that placed this dossier in a certain context 
and had an impact on the strategic behaviour of the institutional actors and their policy 
choices. The section on the Snowden revelations, building on Sections 2.5 and 2.6, 
explains the impact that the political environment that emerged in the aftermath of the 
surveillance scandals had on the GDPR and the role the decision-making actors played in 
determining the provisions affected by the Snowden revelations. The section on the role of 
the CJEU in shaping the EU data protection policy explains the drivers behind some 
landmark rulings of the Court. These judgements were prominent developments that 
influenced the GDPR policy process. The section on lobbying covers the interplay between 
policy networks and the institutional factors in shaping policy outcomes. It builds on and 
converges the material presented in Chapters III and V. The section on domestic politics 
aims to explain how some national factors fed into the supranational-level negotiations. 
The British and German cases are discussed. The last section of this Chapter looks into the 
time dimension and how actors’ motivations, possibilities and policy outcomes were 
determined by certain timeframes. The time dimension is particularly important to 
historical institutionalism.  
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6.2 The GDPR in the context of broader EU politics: the choice of the instrument and 
putting breaks to integration 
Replacing the Directive 95/46/EC with a Regulation was not the default option of this main 
EU data protection instrument. “Internal discussions took place in the Commission, 
whether to propose limited amendments of the old Directive or a more radical 
harmonisation and reform” (interview with EU official D, 27 February 2015, Brussels). A 
few policy options of different scale and depth of the reform were considered:  
• “Option 1: this option consisted of minimal legislative amendments and the use of 
interpretative Communications and policy support measures such as funding 
programmes and technical tools; 
• Option 2: this option comprised a set of legislative provisions addressing each of 
the issues identified in the analysis and 
• Option 3: this option was the centralisation of data protection at EU level through 
precise and detailed rules for all sectors and the establishment of an EU agency for 
monitoring and enforcement of the provisions” (EP, 2012a). 
These options were assessed in the light of their perceived impact “on the three policy 
objectives of improving the internal market dimension of data protection, making the 
exercise of data protection rights by individuals more effective and creating a 
comprehensive and coherent framework covering all areas of Union competence” (EP, 
2012a, original emphasis). The impact assessment identified Option 2 as the preferred 
option, but with the incorporation of certain elements from the other two options. Such 
solution was “the most likely to achieve the policy objectives without excessive 
compliance costs, and with considerable reduction of administrative burden” (Commission, 
2012d:9). The choice of a Regulation as instrument was justified by the need to tackle the 
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deficiencies of the Directive that led to fragmented implementation, which was particularly 
tangible in the divergent MSs’ responses to the Google street view incident57  .  
However, functional justifications aside, there was a political dimension, too, to the choice 
of Regulation. With a Regulation the Commission could strengthen its control “over the 
way in which MSs apply data protection legislation” (interview with EU official B, 13 
February 2015, Brussels). 
“There are various factors in this process, and in the contest over influence between 
the institutions not everything has to do with this particular file. In a broader sense, 
it is part of the contest between the Commission and the Council related to the 
processes of harmonisation” (interview with national Ministry of Justice official, 18 
March 2015). 
The ways in which the Commission had attempted to increase its powers were discussed in 
Section 5.2, but a wide range of actors were critical of that. Besides, the very introduction 
of the “so-called one-stop-shop mechanism with harmonised and very beefed-up 
sanctions” in the Commission proposal “would have been very difficult in the context of a 
Directive” (interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, Brussels). Although, as 
mentioned earlier, the majority of MSs were ultimately supportive of the Regulation as a 
form of legal instrument (some countries, among which France, Poland and Luxemburg, 
being even strongly pro-Regulation), the prospect of no transposition leeway was 
nevertheless a factor for MSs, making them cautious during the process. Consequently, the 
MSs strongly resisted rushing the adoption of this law before the 2014 elections to the EP, 
as it was initially aimed for by the Commission. Moreover, in the light of pending 
difficulty to adapt it to their national systems, delegations became “fiercely critical of the 
                                                          
57 When the lawfulness of inclusion of un-blurred images of persons who were not aware about being 
photographed was interpreted differently between the MSs.  
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text of the Regulation”, i.e. the language they were committing to, leading at times to the 
attempts to renegotiate even some aspects that the GDPR was inheriting from the Directive 
95/46/EC (interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, Brussels).  
Although, as one single directly applicable instrument, the Regulation is a desirable move 
towards greater harmonisation and consistency in all MSs, the message promising “one 
single set of rules” used to promote this form of law in the GDPR policy debate was 
nevertheless overstated. The GDPR is unable to replace all pertinent national laws due to 
the way the EU law interacts with the national law and due to the existence of other 
national laws, apart from those specifically on data protection, that contain provisions 
related to the processing of personal data (Hustinx, 2014:34-35). In fact, certain 
discretionary powers were conceded to the MSs already in the Commission text58. 
However, even acknowledging the above, the degree of derogations that emerged from the 
deliberations within the Council and made their way into the final text, was perceived as 
excessive (see the initial discussion on this in Subsection 4.5.1). “There are specificities at 
national level. But we cannot give too much space to adjustment, derogations, 
clarifications that can simply reintroduce through the main door what we are throwing out 
through the window” (Giovanni Buttarelli, the EDPS, quoted in Stupp, 2015). It can be 
argued, that this was determined by the divergence of the national positions and the 
difficulty in finding an agreement, as discussed in Section 5.4.  
                                                          
58 E.g. located in Article 6 (3) (b) on the basis of the processing (GDPR), Article 9 (2) (b) and (g) on the 
processing of sensitive personal data, Article 17 (3) (d) on the “right-to-be-forgotten”, Article 20 (2) (b) on 
profiling, Article 21 on restrictions of the rights and obligations with regard to public interests, Article 44 (1) 
(g) and (5) on transfers of personal data, Articles 46 and 48 on the modes of establishing supervisory 
authorities, Article 73 (2) on representative actions, Article 78 (1) on penalties, Article 80 on processing of 
personal data for solely journalistic or artistic purposes, Article 82 on processing of personal data in the 
employment context and some other. 
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“When you cannot find a compromise, let the MSs decide. Council always wins, if 
it really insists. If you cannot find a compromise, you stick to the status quo. 
Harmonisation is based on the principle of subsidiarity: why you are harmonising, 
why it happens at the supranational level? If there are no benefits, it should stay at 
the national level. It is a political choice sometimes. There are also some forces 
within the EP – among the EPP and other – that push towards more nationalism. 
The Greens, S&D, and ALDE have a more harmonisation-oriented approach” 
(interview with EP source C, 8 February 2016, Brussels).  
“A lot of it goes back in this particular file, again, to the fact that Commission is 
proposing a Regulation to replace a Directive. Because it creates all kinds of 
problems: they have to replace their national law, and it’s not just one law on 
privacy, it is scattered throughout legislation […] The rather mundane reality is in 
this particular type of negotiations, and especially here, when we are talking about 
the replacement of national law adopted pursuant a Directive by a Regulation, what 
you are trying to do is as much as possible to make sure that the situation does not 
change drastically. They are to a large extent defending their status quo, not 
because they are inherently politically conservative, but because that makes their 
lives easier, rather than having to change all kinds of rules in line with the future 
Regulation” (interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, Brussels). 
“Harmonisation, yes, but not at any price” (Ole Schrӧder, Secretary of State in the 
German Ministry of Interior, quoted in Fleming, 2013d). 
The lowest common denominator between 28 MSs is very difficult to find and it may end 
up being “very dangerously low” (interview with EU official A, 1 February 2016, 
Brussels). Such countries as Germany and Austria feared potentially lowering their 
standards with the GDPR, while it was raising standards for some others, such as Britain, 
Ireland and Luxembourg (interview with EU official D, 27 February 2015, Brussels). 
The discussion in this Section is relevant to the macro-level analysis of the GDPR 
formulation process and the explanation of the EU as a consociational system (Sections 3.2 
and 3.3). The non-linear, two-way dynamics was clearly seen in the degree of 
harmonisation that was possible to achieve through the instrument of Regulation, i.e. the 
degree to which the level of harmonisation has been limited. It reflected growing European 
competence and preservation of national competences at the same time, located in what 
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was aimed to be a directly applicable measure. The convergence of the MSs preferences, 
on which progress towards integration depends, was particularly difficult in the GDPR 
case. 
The proposal for a Regulation and subsequent derogations from it are also a clear case for a 
rational choice institutionalist analysis that looks into how actors compete for influence in 
asserting themselves and how they seek to extend their spheres of influence, as in the case 
of the Commission, or maintain their domains of authority as much as possible, as in the 
case of the MSs, during the process of reforms. As it could be seen, the passage from a 
Directive to a Regulation tangibly generated such tensions in the light of the decision-
making power shifts that this reform entailed. Although, despite abundant flexibility 
clauses, the level of harmonisation in the GDPR results higher than in the Directive 
95/46/EC, the mechanism of the EU politics, at least to some extent, allows to pull the 
evolving integration back to the national level. 
6.3 Snowden revelations: the patterns of international politics feeding into the GDPR 
deliberations and its limits 
The Snowden revelations (see Section 2.6) emerged in summer 2013, i.e. during one of the 
most difficult stages in the political process of the GDPR when this dossier was seemingly 
failing to progress within the two co-legislating institutions – the Council and the EP. This 
move by the US NSA contractor to expose the massive on-going communications 
interception by the US and European intelligence agencies was an unexpected but very 
significant turn in the political debate surrounding data protection and privacy. It was since 
referred to as a “wake-up call” to make the case for speeding up the EU data protection 
reform as well as ensuring strong safeguards in its content (EP, 2013a; Reding, 2014a). It 
was consistently defined as a factor during the interviews conducted for this thesis. “The 
process would have been far far worse if not for the Snowden revelations” (interview with 
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privacy advocacy organisation representative, 10 July 2014, London). “Mass surveillance 
revelations had a very big impact […] on the intensity of the lobbying. It had a massive 
impact on the industry, because they realised they suddenly had all this big trust and public 
relations issue and they had to do something about it” (Anna Fielder of Privacy 
International, speaking at CPDP, 2015). 
The Snowden revelations had mainly an impact on Chapter V of the GDPR on the transfers 
to third countries or international organisations and to an extent was a mobilising factor in 
dealing with this dossier, although mainly in the EP. 
The major development related to these revelations was the reintroduction by the EP of 
Article 42 addressing disclosures not authorised by Union law that allegedly still featured 
in the Commission’s draft in late 2011, but was dropped following US pressure. The 
provisions of the article would have prevented any US requests for data handovers on EU 
citizens through telecoms or technology companies (ORG, 2013b). For example, in the 
explanatory part of the proposal it stated:  
“Article 42 clarifies that in accordance with international public law and existing 
EU legislation, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/9633, a controller 
operating in the EU is prohibited to disclose personal [data] to a third country if so 
requested by a third country's judicial or administrative authority, unless this is 
expressly authorized by an international agreement or provided for by mutual legal 
assistance treaties or approved by a supervisory authority” (Statewatch, 2011:12); 
and one of the paragraphs of the article read as:  
“No judgment of a court or tribunal and no decision of an administrative authority 
of a third country requiring a controller or processor to disclose personal data shall 
be recognized or be enforceable in any manner, without prejudice to a mutual 
assistance treaty or an international agreement in force between the requesting third 
country and the Union or a Member State” (Article 42(1), Statewatch, 2011:69).  
In the EP GDPR text, this article was reintroduced as a new Article 43a. This article in a 
shortened version remained in the final post-trilogue text of the law (renumbered as Article 
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48). The amendment to the Commission text proposing such an article was already present 
in the LIBE’s draft report of January 2013 (LIBE, 2013a), i.e. a few months before the 
Snowden news. As these revelations raised public awareness and public pressure to the 
highest levels, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for data protection in general, 
they made it very easy to agree on Chapter V on international data transfers within the EP, 
including the addition of the Article 43a, and put pressure on the shadow rapporteurs and 
everybody to finally agree on the whole dossier. Another aspect that these revelations had 
an impact upon was helping to come up with much higher fines - up to 5% of the annual 
turnover and 100 million euros – in the EP text if compared to those proposed by the 
Commission. It did not really have a substantial impact on other aspects, such as details of 
data protection foundations, like legitimate interest, or on the consistency mechanism, 
although indirectly the leaks about mass interception of the communications invoked more 
seriousness towards, for example, American IT companies in the larger political discourse 
around the GDPR, based on understanding that “if companies collect less of our data, the 
less NSA can get” (interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels). 
The Snowden revelations also affected negotiations in the Council, “but not as much as 
some may have wanted to” (interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, Brussels). It 
obviously put more pressure on the MSs and on the Council to negotiate, and that was the 
reason why the first chapter that the Council agreed on was on the international transfers 
(interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, Brussels).  
“And regarding personal data transfers outside the EU, it made it impossible to look 
at alternative models. At one stage, in particular the German delegation, was 
looking into ways how the Safe Harbour model could be extended to other third 
countries, like new Asian economies, that became impossible after the Snowden 
revelations. The US Safe Harbour became a dirty word […] or something very 
suspicious, at least. It became very difficult to defend that this model should be 
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extended to other countries” (interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, 
Brussels).  
Besides,  
“If there were MSs that had a very clear pro-data protection stance, after Snowden 
it was fierce. In certain delegations, where certain DPAs have a more vocal role, 
after the Snowden revelations they had an absolutely dominating role in shaping 
positions. The EP gained more influence. Governments feel pressure coming from 
the public opinion. At the present, I would say, that none of the MSs can possibly 
think of taking a stance which is anything but oriented towards data protection. And 
the whole question of the Transatlantic relationship, and data protection and data 
exchange, is a huge chapter” (interview with Permanent Representation official A, 
20 January 2015, Brussels). 
Due to the pressure in the Snowden aftermath, “the European Council has called ‘we have 
to move forward’ […] But, usually, there is a difference between what is said at the very 
high political level and the way it ripples down to the lower level. It is technically a very 
complicated file and that is why […] the things did not go as far as some would have 
hoped” (interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, Brussels).   
The Council General Approach was agreed upon in June 2015 and did not contain an 
addition similar to that of the EP’s Article 43a amendment restricting the powers of the 
public authorities of third countries, although in summer 2014 a proposal to have such a 
clause was brought up by Germany (Fiedler, 2014). Conversely, it contained an exemption 
from the provisions of the GDPR on the grounds of national security and defence in the 
Article 21 (Article 23 in the GDPR final). The UK, soon after the political agreement on 
the GDPR was reached between the EP and the Council in December 2015, hailed its opt-
in prerogative in the JHA matters under the Lisbon Treaty that, as it was stated, certain 
wording in the Article 43a triggered, and declared that it will not be opting in on the 
grounds “of concerns relating to the integrity of the UK legal system” (UK Parliament, 
2016). 
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The Article 43a was pleaded for by the rights groups (Fiedler, 2014), but lobbied against 
by the industry, who were arguing that it was creating jurisdictional conflicts that private 
companies would be exposed to as well as interoperability issues (EDC, 2015a; AmCham, 
2015). 
The Snowden revelations also fed into the GDPR formulation process through the 2015 
CJEU ruling invalidating the Safe Harbour agreement (see Sections 2.5, 2.6 and 6.4). 
Following the ruling, the EP insisted on some stronger provisions on the adequacy 
decisions. Based on the wording and reasoning in the ruling, the requirement that third 
countries “should offer guarantees that ensure an adequate level of protection essentially 
equivalent to that guaranteed within the Union” was inserted into the recital 104 (GDPR 
final, 2016, recital 81 in earlier versions, emphasis added). Besides, in the paragraph 5 of 
the Article 45 (41 in the earlier drafts) the Commission was obliged to repeal, amend or 
suspend adequacy decisions, i.e. to take action, if the situation changed in the third 
country, as compared to previous drafts that only foresaw it within the competence of the 
Commission (interview with EP source B, 4 February 2016, Brussels; GDPR final, 2016). 
The discussion in this section clearly indicates polycentric decision-making in the EU and 
how the interplay between the policy choices of the four supranational-level institutions 
were altering the provisions on international transfers and safeguards of personal data 
against the reach of foreign public authorities in the GDPR. Different responses given by 
different actors to the issue of surveillance indicate how the protection of citizen interests 
depends on the strategic interests of decision-making actors. The EP and the CJEU 
positions advanced more citizen protecting stances, while the Council, representing the 
MSs, was less susceptible to the political pressure spurred by the mass surveillance 
revelations. As it follows from the discussion in Section 2.6, the interests of foreign and 
national authorities in the EU are rather intertwined. The UK’s stepping away from the 
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article 43a on the restrictions of data handovers to foreign authorities reinstates the state-
centric argument of this thesis, showing how the EU composing parts maintain significant 
decision-making powers even as the integration advances. 
6.4 CJEU – politics never goes away. Tracing strategic interests of the constitutional 
court 
Similarly to the Snowden revelations, the CJEU landmark rulings of 2014 invalidating the 
DRD (Digital Rights Ireland and others) and instating the right to delisting59 (Google 
Spain SL) as well as of 2015 annulling the Safe Harbour (Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner) have been viewed as influential factors during the GDPR deliberations as 
well as heavy-weighted contributions to the earlier-mentioned overall “climate of data 
protection enforcement” in the EU60.   
“The bottom line is that we have a big ‘wake-up’ call saying to everyone: ‘you 
have to take this seriously’. These two judgements [of the spring 2014] have been a 
major factor in the negotiations, if not specifically on the topics we are dealing with 
in the discussions, but certainly the attitudes of the delegations have changed” 
(interview with Permanent Representation official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels). 
As a constitutional court and the supreme judicial authority, the CJEU is a very important 
supranational actor that has played a key role in the processes surrounding privacy 
protection and fundamental rights in the EU. While the CJEU is not directly engaged with 
policy creation, its main task, as of any courts, being interpretation of the law, the Court’s 
judgements have a tangible potential to alter the existing policy regimes in the EU and 
influence policy processes (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:57-59; Falkner, 2012:292-310). It 
has been one of the key elements in the EU institutional framework. Its decisions create “a 
rule-based context for policy making […] set the parameters for future initiatives and 
shape actor expectations” (Bjurulf and Elgström, 2005:53). This is known as judicial 
                                                          
59 Linked to the upcoming “right-to-be-forgotten” in the GDPR. 
60 See page 120. 
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policy-making (Falkner, 2012:292-310; Majone, 1997). It is therefore important to 
understand the context of the CJEU rulings and the motivations behind them, which will be 
analysed below. 
The CJEU jurisprudence had played a crucial role in the constitutionalisation of 
fundamental rights in the EU before the Lisbon Treaty and before the EUCFR became 
legally-binding. In the 1950s, during the time of inception of the European Communities 
that also foresaw a Political and a Defence Community, a rigorous human rights catalogue 
was being drafted. This catalogue was intended as part of the institutional design of the 
European Political Community, the setting up of which failed following the unsuccessful 
ratification of the European Defence Community Treaty. In the light of these developments 
and the difficulty of the underlying political processes, the idea of a comprehensive rights 
catalogue was subsequently abandoned when establishing the EEC, in order not to hinder 
the process (De Búrca, 2011: 465-497).  
In the absence of a supranational-level human rights protection system in the following 
decades, institutionalisation of human rights in the Community gradually emerged through 
the CJEU case law from the late 1960s onwards (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 
2007:223-229). The beginning of this process is famously known as the “triptych of cases” 
(De Búrca, 2011:478), the first of which – Erich Stauder v City of Ulm-Sozialamt of 1969 
– involved privacy issues, i.e. arguably unnecessary divulgation of personal information. 
However, “[t]he CJEU did not start as a champion of European-level human rights 
protection” (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2007:223). Its stance that human rights, albeit 
implicitly, were, however, indeed guaranteed and protected by the EC legal system 
appeared in some of its rulings in the 1960s and 1970s when the supremacy of EC law and 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU were disputed by some German national courts (Rittberger 
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and Schimmelfennig, 2007:224-225). “Without the rights-based challenge of the German 
administrative and constitutional courts, the CJEU would not have been pressed to 
introduce, and increasingly strengthen its commitment to, human rights review” (Rittberger 
and Schimmelfennig, 2007:228).  
Eventually, the fundamental rights became fully constitutionalised in the Lisbon Treaty 
signed in 2007 and through the legally-binding force of the EUCFR. In the post-Lisbon 
time challenges to the CJEU’s status quo as well as stimuli for activism in this issue-area 
continue due to the domain of the ECtHR case law, specialised in human rights, and the 
imminent EU accession to the ECHR, which will make the latter Court an ultimate judicial 
authority in the EU, since the CJEU decisions will become open to its scrutiny. The CJEU 
has long managed to resist such developments, but the amendments to the Lisbon Treaty 
made the accession mandatory (Douglas-Scott, 2013; Cameron, 2013). The current 
engagement with the rights to privacy and data protection by the CJEU that particularly 
came to the fore with the still much debated landmark rulings of April and May 2014, 
invalidating the DRD and in favour of the right to de-listing from search engines results, 
respectively, can be linked to this context.   
“At the moment, the CJEU is undergoing a quite substantial political 
transformation, because it is in the process of asserting itself as a fundamental 
rights court. It feels pressure coming from the competition with the ECtHR, 
operating on the same continent, which works brilliantly in this respect. The CJEU 
is extremely worried about this competition. In order to show the world that they 
are capable of acting as a fundamental rights court, which is an important factor, 
because it is an important dimension to show that the EU is a bit more 
understandable to its citizens and a bit friendlier, it has chosen, among other 
subjects, data protection. And that has to do with the two rulings which were quite 
staggering. The two decisions, with similar undertones, on the same topic, so close 
to each other, were not accidental” (interview with Permanent Representation 
official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels). 
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The CJEU now features as a powerful supranational-level actor in the EU politics. Most 
notably, this is linked to its ability to have developed the doctrine of the supremacy of the 
EU law over national law. The difficulty for the governments, despite the existing formal 
mechanism allowing to do so, to overturn its judgements in practice prompt some 
commentators to attribute “dictatorial power” to this institution (Falkner, 2012: 298). This 
notwithstanding, the CJEU remains heavily reliant on the national level in that the cases 
are referred to its jurisprudence by the preliminary ruling procedure from national courts 
on which the implementation of its decisions also depends. The support of the national 
courts, especially the lower courts, has been crucial for the CJEU’s actorness (Alter, 2002). 
The salient cases that enable the CJEU to assert itself as a “norms entrepreneur” and a 
fundamental rights actor are outsourced from the national level. “[N]ational judges when 
applying EU law are key actors in ensuring effective judicial protection in relation to the 
rights provided for in the Charter and […] the increased number of applications for 
preliminary rulings with specific reference to the Charter submitted by national courts to 
the CJEU since 2010” has been noted (COREPER, 2014:5). The CJEU remains bound by 
“the importance of having domestic interlocutors to make adherence to international 
institutions politically constraining at home […] international norms will most influence 
national politics when they are drawn on or pulled into the domestic political realm by 
domestic actors” (Alter, 1998:144). Although judges cannot be viewed as an epistemic 
community as they do not have entirely shared values and beliefs (Alter, 2002), the above 
described dynamics can be viewed as a kind of policy networking. 
Moreover, while this institution is known to have brought the European integration much 
further than it was originally envisaged and it has demonstrated the institutional and 
political capacity to rule against MSs interests, it still is sensitive to the national interests in 
a broader sense. The national interest of MSs differs and the CJEU judgements tend to 
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affect them differently. A number of MSs deem having a strong EU legal system with a 
strong role for the CJEU in it as beneficial. The Court is unlikely to make decisions that 
would fundamentally compromise national systems and could make these allied 
governments cease favouring its strong powers (Alter, 1998). This probably can explain 
the CJEU’s rulings of 2013 (Schwarz v Stadt Bochum) and 2015 (Willems and Others) not 
banning the use of biometrics in the national ID documents – a very intrusive, privacy 
undermining state surveillance measure – that are somewhat incongruent with its latest 
data protection wave, its own earlier case law and, in particular, tangibly departs from the 
ECtHR stance taken in these matters (Wisman, 2015).  
The construction and protection of its authority by the CJEU, especially the EU law 
supremacy discourse as well as strategic behaviour that can be inferred in at least some of 
its rulings, as discussed in this section, reflect rationalist lines of the neo-institutional 
theory. The tangible parameter-setting effects of the CJEU’s judgements and its 
contribution to the development of the fundamental rights in the EU, including privacy and 
data protection, embed considerations of the historical institutionalist branch of this theory. 
This discussion on the CJEU indicated the prominence of the institutional factors in the 
policy formulation process. In addition, it showed the importance of the CJEU’s 
connectedness to the national-level actors as one of the sources of its power.  
6.5 Lobbying the GDPR: different venue receptiveness to competing policy advocacy 
“Since an extremely diverse range of interests is often involved, lobbying may also 
be understood as a form of feedback on the interests of different social groups […] 
politicians […] need to be able to verify and weigh up lobby proposals […] The 
information provided may be deliberately misleading, incomplete or selective” 
(Bendrath, 2015:33).  
The accounts given by the decision-makers on the efforts of various actors with a stake in 
data protection rules in accessing the decision-making process indicated an overwhelming 
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amount of requests for meetings and significantly contrasting preferences among those 
advanced (interview with Permanent Representation official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels; 
interview with Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels; Sean 
Kelly, MEP and ITRE rapporteur, 2014). 
“There is the whole galaxy of interest groups that have an almost infinite range of 
major or minor concerns about what you are doing, who are keen to present their 
point of view, to try to convince you to do certain changes or to maintain certain 
points for the benefit of the groups they represent. Many have extremely specific 
points of interests: we are talking about one sentence or one article that they really 
really want or do not want. And these interest groups do that with the 28 
delegations, the Commission, and each and every MEP that has something to say 
about this. It is really really complicated. Points of view differ” (interview with 
Permanent Representation official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels). 
“I met, amongst others, Google, Facebook and IBM on the one hand, and the 
European Digital Rights Initiative, the American Civil Liberties Union and many 
senior US and EU government officials as well as virtually all EU data protection 
authorities on the other” (Sean Kelly, MEP and ITRE rapporteur, 2014).  
The success of the proposals in being taken on board will depend on the perspectives 
represented by the decision-makers themselves, their goals, and approach taken towards 
policy-making (interview with EP source A, 21 January 2014, Brussels; Traynor et al, 
2014) as well as existing political constraints (interview with Permanent Representation 
official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels). This is evident from the very different positions 
developed by such institutions as the EP and the Council. “The EP was taking a rather 
radical left-wing stance, while the Council was more right-wing minded” (interview with 
Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels; see the respective 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 on the motivations behind these institutions). This also follows from 
the varied behaviour among the same type of actors at the decision-making venues and 
related policy outcomes. Within the Commission, there are more accessible and less 
accessible as well as more progressive and less progressive DGs. For instance, DG 
Competition and DG Justice can be deemed quite progressive (interview with European 
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digital rights organisation representative, 8 December 2015, Brussels). In this particular 
file, the competent DG Justice had always interacted with the civil society, including the 
preparatory phase before 2012, and the officials of all levels have been receptive to this 
side of the debate (interview with European digital rights organisation representative, 8 
December 2015, Brussels; interview with European consumer organisation representative, 
11 December 2015, Brussels). Some Permanent Representations, e.g. the Italian, the Polish 
and the French ones could be mentioned as aligned with the rights-based approach. The 
Luxembourgish Presidency in the second half of 2015 was very open to the civil society 
and even invited their representatives for a follow-up meeting on their own initiative, 
despite their extremely busy schedule. The Greek delegation was constructive and 
receptive, but did not have a strong position on this, so the result was limited. The German 
and the British Permanent Representations, though were available to talk, did not take on 
board the civil society messages (interview with European digital rights organisation 
representative, 8 December 2015, Brussels; interview with European consumer 
organisation representative, 11 December 2015, Brussels). Similarly, in the EP the 
openness of the MEPs to certain categories of stakeholders and their impact on decision-
making vary based on the legislators’ own views regarding this issue-area (interview with 
a privacy advocacy organisation representative, 10 July 2014, London; interviews with 
European and international digital rights organisations representatives, 8 December 2015, 
Brussels; interview with European consumer organisation representative, 11 December 
2015, Brussels). At the national level, again, the dynamics of the interaction of the 
different governments with the interest groups and the outcomes of such interaction are 
different. For instance, while the UK is open and transparent with all, it had been 
nonetheless taking a pro-business stance, whereas the Polish government, despite a lot of 
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pressure from various actors, had had a much more balanced position (interview with 
privacy advocacy organisation representative, 10 July 2014, London).  
However, the unprecedentedly enormous amount (circa 4000) of amendments tabled in the 
EP makes the overall pressure on the file and the high stakes involved obvious (see 
Chapter II explaining the political economy in which this issue-area is embedded), and 
necessitates a more in-depth discussion.  
According to the Corporate Europe Observatory, “on average, a piece of legislation attracts 
50 to 100 amendments in the [EP]”, but one legislative file in the recent years was exposed 
to more than 1600 (CEO, 2013a).  
The GDPR amendments flood in the EP was accompanied by the “copy-pasting” scandal, 
when the text identical to the proposals coming from the business stakeholders, among 
which large American tech companies, was detected in the documents tabled by the MEPs 
(see, for instance, http://www.lobbyplag.eu/influence and Hastings, 2013b). However, a 
number of proposals coming from digital rights lobby papers, e.g. Bits of Freedom and 
EDRi, also went into the amendments text (http://www.lobbyplag.eu/influence), but 
submissions from NGOs were much less numerous and imbalanced as compared to those 
from the industry (Eva Lichtenberger, an Austrian MEP, quoted in Hastings, 2013b). 
One of the most prominent cases of the “copy-pasting” from the industry papers pertained 
to the Belgian MEP Louis Michel, who featured in an investigatory documentary into the 
“lobby war” around the GDPR by a Flemish TV team (CEO, 2013b; Brems, 2013). 
Around 230 amendments, 158 of which strongly anti-privacy, were tabled by Mr. Michel. 
As it emerged later, the industry-friendly amendments were submitted by his assistant, 
allegedly, without the MEP’s knowledge. After these issues of contested democratic 
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process were revealed, Mr. Michel announced that he withdrew 80-90 of his amendments 
(CEO, 2013b).  
The above case, however, is not a generalisable example. Overall, both privacy-unfriendly 
and privacy protecting amendments were abundant in the EP, while there were also a lot of 
neutral proposals. According to the data available at the www.lobbyplag.eu61, the highest 
number of amendments with also the highest ratio of privacy-unfriendly proposals came 
from the ALDE group. This notwithstanding, one of the fiercest defenders of the rights to 
privacy and data protection in the EP – the Dutch MEP Sophia in't Veld – along with some 
other MEPs, who presented only privacy-friendly proposals, belong to this group. The 
ALDE is followed by the EPP group, both in terms of the number of amendments and the 
ratio of the protection weakening proposals. Three political groups with the highest ratios 
in advancing pro-privacy proposals were the Greens/EFA, followed by the S&D and the 
European United Left - Nordic Green Left (thereafter GUE/NGL).  
One of the factors as to why industry preferences succeed in finding a fertile ground in the 
law-making process is because of the pro-business mindset that many MEPs have, 
assuming “that what’s good for big business […] is good for Europe as a whole” (CEO, 
2013a). This data protection reform had been carried out in the context of the economic 
recession, when the EP electorate was also more sensitive to the issues of the economic 
well-being. At the time when the reform started, the data-driven economy and the ICT 
sector were reportedly outperforming other struggling sectors (Fleming, 2013a). For 
instance, European on-line advertisers claim having created millions of jobs and generated 
a contribution to the EU economy that amounts to hundreds of billions of euros (IHS-IAB 
Europe, 2015). 
                                                          
61 A civil society platform set up by transparency campaigners to report on the developments of this dossier.  
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The employment-oriented reasoning was reflected in the IMCO rapporteur Lara Comi’s 
(EPP) intervention during the EP debate before the plenary vote on the GDPR in March 
2014, where she emphasised the importance of micro-enterprises that create apps as a 
possibility for young people to earn a living and criticised “a rather aggressive approach” 
taken by the EP rapporteur in promoting data protection (EP, 2014a, author’s translation 
from Italian)62. The same MEP was also behind many data protection weakening 
amendments. In the meantime, as covered in Chapter II, the apps industry currently 
represents a major source of data protection issues (see page 38, footnote 8).   
The above example points to another factor spanning across both national and 
supranational levels of policy and law-making – the lack of internal expertise. This, 
combined with scarce resources of time, makes some law-makers and their teams both 
domestically and in the EP, who are not necessarily very pro-business per se, susceptible to 
the influence of the tech industry advice while drafting their amendments (CEO, 2013a; 
BBC, 2014p). 
 A large number of the MEPs are involved in some of the existing dozens of cross-party 
groups that can be deemed “MEP-industry forums”, frequently being run and funded by 
industry lobby groups or consultancies based in Brussels. The platform relevant in this 
policy process is the European Internet Forum (thereafter EIF), whose membership 
includes MEPs as its political members, as well as ICT industry and associate 
representatives. A significant share of the industry-oriented amendments tabled in the EP 
originated from the EIF members (CEO, 2013a).  
                                                          
62 An American think tank the Progressive Policy Institute estimated that the app economy counted 1.64 
million jobs between the EU, Switzerland and Norway as of January 2016 (PPI, 2016).  
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But there are also MEPs with engagement in privacy advocacy networks like, earlier-
mentioned, Sophia in't Veld who is a member of the advisory board of Privacy 
International organisation. Besides, the far left GUE/NGL political group came to the 
GDPR discussions with proposals as strong as wanting “to scrap the legitimate interest line 
altogether”, arguing that “the only legitimate interests are the citizens’ fundamental rights 
to privacy and data protection” (Nielsen, 2013b)63. In general, some very strong initiatives 
in balancing business and non-business interests, and not limited to specific political 
groups, originating in the EP are not unusual. Such was the case of the EP resolution 
adopted by an overwhelming majority in autumn 2014, urging “the Commission to 
consider proposals aimed at unbundling search engines from other commercial services” as 
an anti-trust measure to prevent commercial operators from taking unfair advantage of 
their dominant position in the market. This resolution, inter alia, stressed the importance of 
the creation of privacy-friendly communication networks and services (EP, 2014e).  
Technical complexity from both a technological and legal point of view, was also an 
obstacle in generating more public pressure on this file and engaging a wider public. As the 
earlier mentioned ACTA rejection case by the EP (see Section 3.6) indicates, public 
pressure has a potential to have a very tangible impact on policy outcomes. While the 
website of the digital rights group Access Now states that more than 400 000 emails were 
sent to the EP (Access Now, 2013), which can be considered a substantial amount that 
seemingly should have had an “ACTA effect”, the mode of campaigning was rather 
different in the two cases. In the case of ACTA, it was a straightforward “NO” campaign 
against the entire agreement, as it could also be done with the EU PNR Directive. In the 
                                                          
63 The vague wording in the “legitimate interest” clause as one of the legal grounds for the processing of 
personal data in the GDPR draft proposals was criticised by privacy advocates as a loophole that might be 
exploited by businesses, which was weakening the strength of the whole law (BBC, 2013n). See also  
Slovenia’s criticism regarding the notion of “legitimate interest” in Section 5.4. 
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case of the GDPR, instead, the message was more complex, more specific and very 
technical. The GDPR proposal contained many good things and only certain undesirable 
elements. Prompting the general non-specialist public to oppose such aspects as profiling, 
for example, or to advance demands for an explicit consent was quite challenging, as it 
required difficult explanations of what such things meant and how they affected data 
subjects. Therefore, often, like in the case of the above-mentioned 400 000 e-mails, only 
rather generic messages, demanding a more privacy-protective stance in general, could be 
advanced (interviews with European and international digital rights organisations 
representatives, 8 December 2015, Brussels).  
Yet another factor in the process was the strongly polarised and asymmetric interest 
representation. The pro-privacy perspective lobbyists counted only a few people across the 
whole Europe working on this file64 and the DPAs, while the forces lobbying against the 
data subjects’ rights strengthening proposals in the GDPR potentially counted several 
hundreds (interviews with European and international digital rights organisations 
representatives, 8 December 2015, Brussels; interview with European consumer 
organisation representative, 11 December 2015, Brussels). Reportedly, only the American 
Chamber of Commerce had a task force of 50 people working on this dossier (Brewster, 
2012). The role of the LobbyPlag platform, which brought to the fore the influences behind 
the proposed modifications to the GDPR draft proposal, was hence very important in 
raising public awareness and preventing a potentially even higher number of amendments 
and “copy-pasting” from industry papers (interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, 
Brussels). While a situation when civic or consumer interests are under-resourced and 
under-represented in the policy process is not unusual (CEO, 2013a), a strongly 
                                                          
64 The civil society resources were mainly confined to the work of the limited staff at such NGOs as Privacy 
International, EDRi, BEUC, Access Now, Panoptykon Foundation and Bits of Freedom.  
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asymmetric and polarised configuration is not necessarily always the case. For instance, 
the process of the Telecoms Package deliberations has seen fragmented and competing 
interests of different business players, in addition to the presence of consumer interests 
(interview with European consumer organisation representative, 11 December 2015, 
Brussels). There are rather fierce tensions between mobile network providers and on-line 
content publishers surrounding ad-blocking (Kleinman, 2016). Consumers’ and smaller 
telecommunications providers’ interests seem to concur in the broadband market 
liberalisation matters (Reinhold, 2016). Both the civil society and the tech industry oppose 
the attacks on the use of encryption pursued by some state authorities and politicians. 
This section discussed the dynamics of how the demands of various interest groups were 
feeding into the GDPR decision-making process, their impact on it and the variables that 
determined that impact. Some factors uniquely characteristic to the context of the GDPR 
policy process – such as unprecedented amount of amendments that entered the EP 
deliberations, difficulty to generate public pressure due to the technical complexity of this 
dossier, and particularly imbalanced and polarised configuration of competing interests – 
were identified.  
The varying receptiveness across different decision-making venues to certain types of 
interests lends support to the Galperin’s ideas, referred to in Section 3.6, about the 
importance of the “institutional fabric” in understanding the actual policy outcomes. Based 
on the EP example, it can be said that the impact of the pressure that was put on this 
institution in the attempts to “water down” the new data protection rules and some 
disadvantageous to the pro-privacy side of the debate circumstances mentioned here were 
not decisive. There were other, “gatekeeping” factors, e.g. the personality in the steering 
position, the overall salience of this particular dossier and this issue-area in general for the 
EP (see Section 5.3), and the overall political environment (e.g. see this Chapter, Sections 
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6.3 on Snowden revelations and 6.4 on the CJEU rulings) that were significant. This has 
links to the new institutionalist reasoning explained in Chapter III. 
6.6 Domestic politics as the source of difficulties in the GDPR talks 
6.6.1 UK: negotiating the GDPR in the context of “referendum games” 
The UK is an EU MS with a particular track record. While having been offered a 
membership since the conception of the European Communities in the 1950s (Taylor, 
2003:113), the country joined the Treaties only in 1973. However, since its accession, it 
has gained a reputation of “a spoiler and scavenger” (Taylor, 2003:117), as it has been 
opposing most of the policy initiatives and obtained a series of exemptions from various 
EU instruments and agreements, some of which being the introduction of the EU currency 
euro and the Schengen zone. But a number of cases demonstrate that the supranational 
level, despite its demonisation, still represents an indispensable venue, to which even the 
most eurosceptic actors appeal to surmount both domestic and international as well as 
political and business issues. For instance, such were the cases of using the EU level for 
data retention legislation policy by the UK after nationally unsuccessful attempts (Hills, 
2006:206, 209; Morris, 2014); the UK inability to overcome without the aid of the EU 
institutions the alleged territorial tensions with Spain over Gibraltar in 2013 (BBC, 2013l); 
or the Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp’s – a well-known EU-unfriendly publisher – demand 
to the European Commission to tackle the Google dominance (Greenslade, 2014).  
As the Directive 95/46/EC, which the GDPR replaces, was adopted, the UK was the only 
abstention with all the other MSs assenting to it. The reservations of the British 
Conservative government in office at the time about the necessity of such an instrument on 
data protection, given the existence of the Council of Europe Convention 10865, as well as 
                                                          
65 Council of Europe Convention 108 of 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data.  
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wider concerns of a gradual centralisation of supranational powers, alongside some 
technical legal divergence between certain provisions in the new EU law and the existing 
related national law, added to the protraction of the stipulation process of the above 
Directive (Bennett and Raab, 2006:93-94, 96)66. 
A few years later, when the EUCFR was due to be adopted, most EU governments wanted 
it to be given a Treaty status in the Nice Treaty. The UK led a coalition of a few opposing 
governments to prevent such a development. As consequently the Charter was merely 
“solemnly proclaimed” by the EU governing institutions in 2000, its legal status was rather 
uncertain and, accordingly, its impact weaker for almost a decade. With the coming into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the Charter acquired a legally-binding status, but again 
failed to be incorporated into the EU Treaties, and became an annex to them due to the 
concerns of some countries that the Charter might open up an avenue to weaken the 
national governments’ position with regards to their citizens through its potential 
interpretations by the CJEU. The UK felt particularly uneasy with this catalogue inferring a 
threat of spillover of some continental economic and social rights through the Charter as 
well as was wary of more prescriptively enshrined rights, as compared to the common law 
principles. The UK, along with Czech Republic and Poland, insisted on a guarantee that 
citizens in their states would not gain new rights through the Charter. Such guarantee was 
granted in Protocol 30 of the Lisbon Treaty (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:246-250). 
Soon after the drafting of the EU Lisbon Treaty, the UK Conservatives, at odds with the 
history, became uncomfortable with commitments to another international rights catalogue 
                                                          
66 There were issues with the implementation of this and another EU law – ePrivacy Directive – in the UK. In 
2009, an infringement proceeding was opened by the Commission in relation to the use of some tracking and 
behavioural advertising technologies by the ISPs (EC, 2009). 
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– the ECHR67. The proposals as radical as the withdrawal from the above Convention and 
the replacement of its national transposition with a new national law have been propagated 
by the conservative forces since around 2010 (UK Parliament, 2010; Klug, 2012; Mignon, 
2012). This became part of the Tories’ manifesto in the 2015 elections (Watt and Bowcott, 
2014).      
The time of drafting of the GDPR coincided with the height of the debates around the 
proposed “EU in or out” referendum – the so-called Brexit – in the UK political agenda 
that in June 2016 resulted in the vote to leave the EU. The Conservatives aligned 
themselves with what was the main message of the populist one-issue UK Independence 
Party, as the latter started gaining more relevance in the British political landscape 
(Winnett and Mason, 2013; Hunt, 2014). Since the new EU data protection law was 
designed as a directly applicable Regulation leaving much less leeway for the MSs in its 
implementation, it clearly clashed with the general political climate in the country and the 
government’s course of “getting the powers back from Brussels”. Similarly to the 
negotiations on the Directive 95/46/EC, the UK position was determined by various 
motivations: from opposition to concrete elements of the GDPR, some of which the “right-
to-be-forgotten” (Bowcott, 2013) or breach notifications (Corera, 2013), to the overall 
architecture of the law. The UK, based on the common law perceptions, wanted a concise 
piece of law68, while the majority of the MSs, coming from the continental civil law 
                                                          
67 Winston Churchill, the Second World War time British Prime Minister, is viewed as one of the main 
initiators and visionaries of this Convention as well as of the related institutions – the Council of Europe and 
the ECtHR (Commission, no date), “to hold states to account by a higher judicial authority upholding a 
European-wide set of values” (Klug, 2012). The drafting of the Convention “was heavily influenced by 
British lawyers” (Mignon, 2012). Churchill was envisaging that building of a “United States of Europe” 
would help “to eliminate the European ills of nationalism” (Commission, no date) that led to two very 
atrocious wars in the 20th century. 
68 In this regard, even the British Information Commissioner criticised the GDPR as “too dirigiste” and that 
“regulation that is a to-do list” is not suited for Britain (Christopher Graham quoted in Oltermann, 2013a). 
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perspective, preferred more detailed rules (interview with national Ministry of Justice 
official, 18 March 2015). The above-mentioned EU membership issue and the on-going 
power contest between London and Brussels also shaped the British position in the GDPR 
negotiations in its preference for a Directive instead of the Regulation. However, the 
majority of the MSs did not agree with the UK stance and preferred a Regulation. In the 
process, the UK influence declined, as its steady opposition deterred other MSs from 
paying much attention to its demands, and even the Council Presidencies started putting 
less efforts in accommodating its preferences (interview with national Ministry of Justice 
official, 18 March 2015). Thus, as it can be seen, the UK attitude driven by domestic 
politics proved to be counterproductive for this MS in the negotiations. Later, as business 
stakeholders favoured a Regulation as the instrument and, accordingly, greater 
harmonisation, the UK changed its position (interview with EU official D, 27 February 
2015, Brussels; interview with national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015). There 
was also realisation that “this law is inevitable, it is going to happen”, so the British 
negotiators started opposing less in general to a Regulation. Even though, “for the UK it is 
also politically difficult to sell some aspects of this reform at home, for the UK 
‘symbolism’ is difficult”, where more EU competence is involved, e.g. as in the case of the 
EDPB (interview with EU official D, 27 February 2015, Brussels). This “symbolism” can 
be clearly inferred in the UK’s statement as the Council voted to adopt the GDPR, where it 
expressed the intention to “make use of the available discretion for [MSs] to implement the 
regulation domestically in an appropriate way” (General Secretariat Note, 2016b). 
The UK example covered here shows how competition between domestic political forces, 
unrelated to a particular issue-area in question, may feed into the EU-level policy processes 
in that specific sector. The Brexit discourse was the case of the so-called “referendum 
game”, mentioned in Section 3.5 on the rational choice institutionalism, that affected the 
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country’s stance in the GDPR stipulation process. This Subsection also aimed to explain 
that the recent “referendum game” in the UK was not a random development and that this 
country has always represented a “hesitant” MS (see Taylor, 2003: 99-134). Moreover, as 
it can be seen from the calls of withdrawal from the EHRC, the UK isolationist politics is 
not limited to the EU and problematisation of any international commitments and fora can 
be used to gain more weight domestically. The first paragraph examples show that the 
same forces that advance nationalist rhetoric benefit from integration and the institutions 
that govern them. These tendencies – that integration does not in essence weaken domestic 
forces – were discussed within the consociational paradigm. 
6.6.2 Germany – preference formation is much more than the country’s data protection 
and federalist profile 
The part Germany played in the GDPR formulation has been very controversial. It is a 
country with a strongly embedded data protection culture, a lot of expertise in the field, 
very vocal and active DPAs, and a country behind the development of the influential 
concept of the “informational self-determination” that has played an important role in the 
development of the data subject rights (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009; Coleman, 2014; 
Moody, 2015). Germany can be also perceived as a pro-integration MS (Taylor, 2003: 99-
134), as opposed to the above discussed UK example. Given these dimensions, this 
country’s input in the GDPR deliberations could have been expected as facilitating, which 
was not the case. The mismatch between the public official rhetoric in favour of strong 
data protection and the actual position brought to the GDPR table has been noticed several 
times (Fleming, 2013d; Scally, 2015).  
Germany had been from the beginning very unhappy with the Commission proposal and 
had been gradually accepting it, as with the question of the public sector on which 
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compromise was found in December 2014 (interview with EU official B, 13 February 
2015, Brussels; see Section 4.5.3). One of the issues related to Germany’s position in the 
negotiations originated from the regional (länder) level, and the reluctance of the local 
administrations to give competence to legislate on the federal level to the EU. Another big 
factor was that in Germany data protection is settled in the Ministry of Interior which had 
been run for some time by conservative ministers who, as it can be expected, tended to be 
“more industry-friendly than in favour of fundamental rights and privacy” (interview with 
EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels). Besides, the minister who was in post till late 
2013 did not seem to have a particular interest in data protection matters and seemingly 
favoured self-regulation. The situation changed to some extent when another minister took 
office. While the German proposals remained still industry-friendly in substance, the 
Ministry started engaging more with the data protection dossier and interacting with 
various stakeholders. Also, under the new minister, Germany started showing a more 
constructive approach in finding a compromise in the Council and to that end the DAPIX 
delegation was changed (interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels). 
Germany was supporting some controversial proposals in February 2015 to relax 
safeguards on purpose limitation, fairness and lawfulness of processing. For instance, 
Germany’s concern that the GDPR provisions would “not hamper direct marketing or 
credit information services” features in some of the Council documents (Latvian 
Presidency Note, 2015a; Latvian Presidency Note, 2015b).  
The German example importantly shows that, while a lot of attention was focused on the 
attempts of big tech-industry players, often American companies, to prevent stronger data 
protection standards from getting into the GDPR text, the role of other – both public and 
business - domestic actors should not be underestimated in the formation of the national 
preferences. In Germany’s case it could also be seen that several dimensions relevant to the 
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sociological institutionalism, such as the country’s “data protection culture” and 
ideological (in this case conservative) adherence may be competing in determining policy 
choices.  
6.7 Time, timing and timeliness: how the EU data protection reform was affected by its 
timeframe 
As mentioned in Section 3.6, time is an important variable that may determine the context 
and fate of a policy initiative. In some cases, even a short difference in time may lead to a 
reconfiguration of political factors and personalities at the negotiations table to produce 
different results, like this happened with the process of “communitarisation”69 of the JHA 
issues while drafting the Lisbon Treaty (Donnelly, 2008:20-21). Besides, time is “a scarce 
and valuable resource of policymakers” who “operate under significant and varying time 
constraints” (Ackrill et al, 2013:872). The time dimension played out in various ways for 
various actors involved in the process and for this dossier as such. 
The EU data protection reform has been often referred to as long overdue (e.g. see BEUC, 
2015b). For instance, according to the EP rapporteur Jan P. Albrecht this reform was 10 
years late already at its starting point given “the realities out there” (CPDP, 2015). The 
Commission reports of 2003 and 2007 on the implementation of the Directive 95/46/EC 
stated a number of issues, including tangible divergences and deficiencies of its enactment 
between MSs. However, until 2009, when the preparation of a new EU data protection 
framework started, it preferred corrective measures rather than amending the Directive 
(Hustinx, 2014:24-25). The end of the Commission mandate in 2009 shifted its proposal to 
                                                          
69 Inclusion into the “Community method” remit, by means of which most EU decisions are taken. It is 
characterised by the use of the ordinary legislative procedure when the Council and the EP act as co-
legislators. It also assigns an exclusive agenda-setting role for the European Commission and significant 
powers for the CJEU. It involves the use of qualified majority voting in the Council.  
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be issued later – “it is always difficult to draft such big reforms when the term is nearing 
the end” (interview with EU official D, 27 February 2015, Brussels). The newly appointed 
Commission seemingly had a stronger human rights agenda (Hustinx, 2014:25).  
Since 2009 onwards, there were a number of developments on the timeline to enhance the 
realm of fundamental rights in the EU and to have an effect on drafting the GDPR. “A 
considerable emphasis on the protection of fundamental rights” was placed with the new 
institutional framework brought along with the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force at the 
end of 2009. Amongst others, it enshrined a specific right to the protection of personal data 
in Article 8 of the Charter, which became legally-binding, and a new horizontal legal basis 
in Article 16 of the TFEU, providing for comprehensive protection to adopt rules on data 
protection regardless the policy area (Hustinx, 2014:27). The Commission draft GDPR 
proposal issued later in 2012 built on this new legal basis.  
“The data protection reform package is the first legislation proposed since the entry 
into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2009 that 
explicitly aims at comprehensively guaranteeing a fundamental right, namely the 
fundamental right to data protection” (FRA, 2013:104). 
The effect of the norms being enshrined in the EU primary law, e.g. purpose limitation, 
was tangibly felt in the shaping of the GDPR, as they prevented some of the most 
dangerous to the users’ rights proposals, such as possibility of further incompatible 
processing of personal data (see Section 4.4), getting into the final text of the law. 
The Lisbon Treaty and the binding status of the Charter increased the CJEU competences 
in the field of human rights (Douglas-Scott, 2013:160-163). While the absence of an 
explicit legal basis for the rights to privacy and data protection arguably did not allow to 
fully take advantage of the Directive 95/46/EC potential, making the CJEU reasoning and 
rulings somewhat cautious in the pre-Lisbon era, the effect of the above two institutional 
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developments was soon felt in the Court’s decisions that were taking a bolder stance on 
data protection (Lynskey, 2013). Several landmark rulings (see Section 6.4), whose timing 
coincided with the deliberations on the GDPR, along with the Snowden revelations in 2013 
and later (see Section 6.3), were developments that can be interpreted as “focusing events” 
in the process (discussed in Section 3.6).  
Further considerations pertain to how different actors are affected by the timeframes posed 
by the rules and policy delivery tasks that are set. While there are time limits that the 
ordinary legislative procedure, applied to the GDPR, sets to further stages, if they are 
needed, there are no time limits neither for the EP’s first reading nor for the Council’s first 
reading (EP, no date). Nevertheless, the two institutions found themselves in different 
situations. Differently from the Council which could afford more time for the 1st reading 
discussions, the EP was constrained by the 2014 May elections, i.e. the end of its mandate, 
which was a mobilising factor. The Commission was another institution pressed by the 
2014 end of mandate and very keen on the adoption of the GDPR by the 2014 EP 
elections. This file was one of the Viviane Reding’s top priorities. She was in office as the 
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Commissioner when the reform proposal was 
released, and took a very proactive and vocal role in the process (Hustinx, 2014:25). 
Towards the end of the process, though, and in particular when the trilogue phase started, 
all the three institutions were under similar pressure to find the interinstitutional political 
agreement by the end of 2015 due to the related calls from the European Council and the 
salience of the EU data protection reform for the creation of the EU Digital Single Market, 
completion of which originally was set by 2015 and later moved to 2016 (e.g. see 
European Council, 2013:3-4; European Council, 2015). These political and institutional 
constraints prevailed over the calls of business stakeholders not to adhere to “self-
imposed” deadlines in order to allow more time for getting the content of the reform right 
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(EDC, 2015b). Finally, another interesting observation to make, is how the timing when 
proposals are introduced matters in the outcomes of the negotiations. For instance, more 
than 10 MSs were against the incompatible further processing clause (Latvian Presidency 
Note, 2015e:102, footnote 178). It, nevertheless, was introduced into the Council text and 
the issue was left for the trilogue, when it was discussed anew, so that the adoption of the 
General Approach would not be hindered (interview with Permanent Representation 
official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels).  
Time is a dimension central to the historical institutionalism perspective. Previous 
arrangements create and determine path dependencies that have an impact on subsequent 
policy outcomes, as it could be seen from the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on this particular 
dossier and this issue-area in general. As it was seen from the EP elections and the delivery 
of the Digital Single Market, to which the data protection reform was linked, decision-
making actors’ behaviour is strategically projected into the existing timeframes and these 
can be important variables in the policy process and outcomes. 
6.8 Conclusions 
This Chapter aimed to cover a number of factors deemed essential to complement the 
analysis in the two previous Chapters and to better explain links between the actors’ 
motivations and the actual developments in the policy process. External influences, for 
instance the international political climate as in the case of mass surveillance revelations 
(Section 6.3), or the dynamics of lobbying (Section 6.5), played out differently with 
diverse decision-making actors. This was due to their interests of asserting themselves in 
the political landscape, the existing political commitments and values prioritised in each 
case, as well as the institutional setting of the GDPR policy process, reinforced by the 
landmark CJEU judgements infusing data protection-oriented parameters (Section 6.4). All 
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these variables have been important in forming the actors’ positions and shaping the 
balance of interests. As the section on the transition from a Directive to a Regulation (6.2) 
and the section on domestic politics show (6.6), the process of the GDPR negotiations was 
shaped by the power contest between national and supranational levels as well as by the 
competition between domestic forces. The discussion in the last section (6.7) implies that 
the context of a particular timespan in which decisions are made is an important factor to 
be considered in understanding policy outcomes. Figure 2 below provides a summary of 
the main factors in the GDPR policy process examined in this chapter. 
Figure 2. The main factors that have influenced the GDPR policy process 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Conclusions – GDPR: a unique policy dossier, but politics as usual?  
7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter summarises the analysis of the policy process of adoption of the GDPR 
laid down in the empirical chapters IV, V and VI. It provides the synthesis of the findings 
based on the research questions that this study strived to answer. These research questions 
focused on  
• the EU policy process dimensions and actor constellation in the debate that 
surrounded the formulation of the GDPR between January 2012 and April 2016 
(research question 1); 
•  the interests and the strategies of the policy stakeholders in influencing the EU data 
protection reform (research question 2);  
• and the factors that determined the course of the policy process and the ultimate 
balance of stakeholder interests in the GDPR (research question 3).  
This thesis argues that (1), despite not meeting entirely the initial expectations, the Internet 
users’ rights to privacy and data protection were strengthened in the GDPR; (2) that the 
institutional factors were key in determining the policy outcomes; and (3) that there was a 
tangible state-centric shift in the power balance between the data protection governance 
design in the original Commission’s proposal tabled in 2012 and the outcome of the reform 
finalised in spring 2016, where many national discretions were introduced and the powers 
of the national DPAs preserved. Below a more detailed reflection on these findings is 
offered, linking them to the analytical strands (consociational paradigm, policy networks 
and new institutionalism) that this research drew upon. 
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7.2 Explaining the GDPR policy process 
The formulation and adoption of the GDPR underwent a very intense policy process that, 
despite many tensions, as mainly presented in Chapter IV, was finalised in spring 2016. 
The Commission’s reform proposals tabled in January 2012 were introducing a set of new 
rights, a stronger liability and accountability regime as well as governance innovations and 
further Europeanisation in this issue-area. Many GDPR aspects were substantially altered 
across different decision-making venues, i.e. during the Council and the EP deliberations. 
This resulted in various gains and losses for the stakeholders. 
The competing policy networks - privacy advocacy coalition of consumer, digital and civil 
rights organisations (covered in Section 5.8) and data-reliant businesses, among which the 
US and European digital companies (Section 5.9) – had similar strategies and footprint. 
These strategies included, amongst others, direct liaising with policy-makers, preparation 
of position papers, writing open letters, and participation in public debates. Similarly, the 
footprint of these two main competing policy networks span across national, pan-
European, and transatlantic dimensions. The policy goals of these groups were mainly 
polarised in the GDPR case, with imbalanced availability of resources (Section 6.5). For 
instance, only a few digital and civil rights NGOs were able to consistently engage with the 
GDPR dossier, as compared to a whole host of tech industry and some other industries’ 
lobbyists. However, their views were congruent on some elements of the reform proposals, 
such as the opposition to the Commission’s empowerment through a very large number of 
delegated and implementing acts (see Subsection 4.5.2) and higher harmonisation 
expectations (see, for instance, Subsection 4.5.1). The industry’s campaign to relax data 
protection rules in the GDPR was enhanced by the presence of such an actor as the US 
government in the process that was advocating for the same policy direction. The outcome 
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of the reform does not, however, reflect such a configuration of forces. While the final 
GDPR text was not as ambitious in terms of the users’ rights protection as envisaged at the 
outset of the reform, there was, nevertheless, more disappointment in the industry 
feedbacks that spoke of the formulated regime as being too restrictive. Institutional factors, 
such as specific internal institutional dynamics and how institutional actors endeavour to 
position themselves with regard to the other actors (mainly discussed in Chapter V), and 
the overall political context, notably the salience of the data protection issue-area, played 
an important role alongside various advocacy efforts. 
The policy process was influenced by some unique factors, specific to this policy dossier, 
which are not generalisable in that their presence and impact were more circumstantial 
rather than indicative of certain underlying processes. These include the gaining of the 
rapporteur position by the Greens – a strong pro-privacy group in the EP (Section 5.3); the 
Snowden revelations (Section 6.3) – an autonomous external development that made on-
line privacy issues more prominent in the political agenda; the CJEU rulings acting as 
autonomous internal EU developments (Section 6.4) setting data protection-oriented 
parameters for the EU policies; the particular technical complexity of this file, and others.  
Other factors that are significant in understanding the GDPR policy process can be viewed 
as part of the dynamics of the EU integration processes and related interactions between 
national (including subnational) and supranational levels. Related core actors, their 
interests and interactions have been mapped in Chapters V and VI. The EU-level actors, 
such as the Commission, the EP and the CJEU are generally inclined to promote the 
European integration, albeit not necessarily always in concert, and compete for influence 
among them. National realm actors, such as national governments and DPAs, weigh the 
benefits of integration against adjustment costs and sovereign decision-making related 
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trade-offs. At the EU level, they have been collectively acting through the Council of 
Ministers and the WP29, respectively, which, nevertheless, should be viewed as 
fragmented fora in terms of the individual interests articulated there.  
The focus of this study was on the EU-level policy process, taking the EU as a unit of 
analysis, where a vast number of supranational institutional actors were involved in 
shaping the GDPR, such as the Commission, the EP, the Council, the CJEU, the EDPS, the 
WP29, the FRA, etc. Depending on issues, there have been shifting coalitions between the 
institutional actors. Overall, the Council and the EP had similar views regarding the 
lessening of the Commission’s powers aspired for in the initial proposals. However, the 
Council was in support of the Commission for stipulation of adequacy decisions as 
implementing acts instead of delegated acts which entail the EP veto prerogative. Other 
stakeholder interests (civil society and business) were articulated through European-level 
coalitions and associations.  
Application of the consociational analogy as a macro-level paradigm was useful for the 
analysis of the GDPR political process in understanding the accommodationist politics on 
which the negotiations in the Council were based: consensus (“nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed”) was sought despite the majority vote procedure that this dossier was 
subject to. The difficulty to agree on this file can be aligned with other features of this 
state-centric theory, such as cross-cutting cleavages and heterogeneity of national contexts 
as well as high degree of autonomy of the composing units. As discussed in Subsection 
4.5.1 and Section 6.2, at odds with the purpose of stipulating a Regulation that aims at the 
highest possible degree of approximation of national laws, a lot of autonomous decision-
making was maintained through the multiple exceptions in the GDPR to adapt to 
individual national situations. Decision-making sovereignty was also an issue in endorsing 
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the one-stop-shop mechanism by the MSs (covered in Subsection 4.5.4), which was altered 
to preserve the powers of national DPAs and to curb exclusive competence conferrable on 
the lead authority. The above aspects of the process are also a combination of rational 
choice and sociological institutionalist elements. The rational choice perspective pertains 
to the effects of actor interests defended in the light of altering authority landscape that this 
reform was bringing about within the 2012 proposals. The sociological dimension is linked 
to the differing domestic political economies and ideologies. The GDPR stipulation 
dynamics were not limited only to the specificity of the data protection sector, i.e. the pre-
reform patterns of its governance at the national and supranational levels, but was also 
determined by factors unrelated to data protection, such as unwillingness to delegate more 
powers to the Commission by the Council and the EP, while the Commission had tried to 
increase its powers. The tensions around distribution of oversight powers and progressing 
integration observed during deliberations on the GDPR can be similarly observed in other 
areas, such as in the proposals for regulation of telecommunications, for example 
(Simpson, 2009; Stupp, 2016)70.  
There are many important historical institutionalist dimensions pertinent to the recent data 
protection reform. Primarily, the way for the current policy course was paved by the 
Directive 95/46/EC – the first EU-level data protection legislation – which has left a very 
strong legacy (see Section 2.5). The creation of this instrument in the 1990s, enacting 
protection of a fundamental right to privacy, marked a very important structural shift from 
predominantly economic focus of the EU activities to a more political integration (Simitis, 
                                                          
70 However, different models of centralisation have been pursued by the Commission in the two areas. While 
in the case of the GDPR the Commission was not supportive of a creation of an EU agency due to related 
costs and the time needed, but was pushing for a streamlined oversight model through the so-called one-stop-
shop, an upgrade of the WP29 into the EDPB, and an ultimate “backstop” decision-making power for itself 
(see Subsections 4.5.2 and 4.5.4, and Sections 5.2 and 5.5), in the telecoms sector it has been trying to install 
an actual EU-level agency for about a decade now. More Commission powers in both cases have been 
opposed by national regulators, the Council and the EP. 
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1995). Internationally, it has influenced privacy protection regimes in many countries. As 
mentioned in Section 4.4, Directive 95/46/EC was playing the role of a threshold in 
assessing the acceptability of the new rules that were expected not to go below the level of 
safeguards enshrined in this law. The GDPR proposal inherited most of the content of the 
Directive and happened to reflect another shift in the EU institutional order, as it was a 
piece of legislation pioneering the enactment of the Charter and the new Article 16 TFEU 
on the protection of personal data in the Lisbon Treaty (see Section 6.7). The existence of 
the Directive, later also in combination with the Charter, produced a host of CJEU case law 
that also influenced data protection reform (as discussed in Section 6.4). Finally, as 
highlighted in Section 1.1, the content of the GDPR has set a new precedent, too, by 
introducing a series of innovations, such as the “right-to-be-forgotten”, the right to data 
portability, privacy by design and default, as well as by taking the accountability, liability 
and enforcement regime to a whole new level.  
While this study was not focused on comparing the stipulation of the Directive 95/46/EC 
with the process of adoption of the GDPR, some aspects available in the academic 
accounts on the Directive 95/46/EC compare meaningfully with some of the findings 
related to the current reform. This alignment reveals certain tendencies that, based on their 
repeated presence, can be termed as long-standing and indicate an unaltered landscape of 
actor interests and power. One of such tendencies was the attempt to centralise 
Commission oversight powers in the initial drafts that failed in both cases and were 
reduced to the minimum through the EP and, in particular, through the Council 
interventions (see Bignami, 2005: 838-839 for the Directive and Section 5.2 for the 
GDPR). Another similarity can be drawn with regard to the Southern European MSs’ 
inclination towards a more rights-based approach versus the more pro-business position of 
many Northern MSs during the revisions of the GDPR proposal (see Section 5.4). This 
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broad conceptual privacy policy divide between the Northern and Southern countries was 
felt when the Directive came into existence, too (Princen, 2003:151; Bignami, 2005: 841-
845). Furthermore, despite a different institutional, political and economic setting, the 
drafting of the Directive 95/46/EC was as contentious as the GDPR deliberations – both 
processes had undergone a phase when speculations were made regarding the potential 
failure of these dossiers altogether (see Simitis, 1995 for the Directive and Section 4.3). 
Despite being a much longer law and negotiated among a significantly larger number of 
MSs, the coming into being of the GDPR took slightly shorter than the Directive, which 
was accomplished in five years. The contrasting MSs preferences were very difficult to 
converge already in the 1995 Directive, which was an instrument which granted a certain 
room for manoeuvre to the MSs during the implementation phase. This notwithstanding, 
the GDPR’s predecessor was perceived as too open-ended (Simitis, 1995). While already 
building on the initial degree of harmonisation introduced by the Directive, and also tabled 
for the negotiations with even higher ambitions for harmonisation, since the new law was 
proposed in the form of a directly applicable Regulation, the current data protection 
reform, as mentioned above, did not escape the issue of derogations. In fact, as analysed in 
Subsection 4.5.1, the degree of flexibility clauses in the GDPR ended up being so 
excessive that it placed this new legislation somewhere between a Directive and a 
Regulation, marking probably also the least achieved goal in terms of the reform ideas. The 
reasons behind these derogations vary, with some being more political ones as, for 
instance, exceptions in Article 23 for national and public security, and the others, such as 
in Article 80 on collective redress, can be linked to the very unequal adjustment costs 
across MSs, due to the presence or absence of related national laws (discussed in Section 
5.7). As it can be seen, here the historical institutionalism perspective overlaps with the 
rational choice one, i.e. previously adopted policies or their absence may shape the 
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strategic interests of the actors. However, despite these weaknesses, further unification of 
data protection rules still occurred on the whole, and the replacement of the Directive by a 
Regulation can be viewed as an incremental historical policy development in the EU. 
Another interesting side concerning historical processes has to do with the presence of 
such actors as the WP29 and the EDPS and their prominent role in the debates surrounding 
this data protection reform (see Sections 5.5 and 5.6, respectively) that is a result of 
previously made policy decisions through which these institutions emerged. The process of 
adoption of the GDPR encompassed a growing institutional significance attributed to these 
actors. Their functional mechanism has been consolidating with the establishment of the 
EDPB, although the actual powers of this new body were far from having been architecture 
in a straightforward fashion. Many of these powers were repositioned by the EP and the 
Council from the remit of the Commission, as in its draft proposal of 2012, to the remit of 
the DPAs’ authority and their collective decision-making within the EDPB. While the 
EDPS, representing a unique European perspective in privacy matters, has already been 
part of the WP29 predominantly formed from national DPAs, the further merger of the two 
realms can be envisaged in the move of the WP29 secretariat from being provided by the 
Commission to being provided by the EDPS. It is very interesting to see how this 
convergence and the consolidating institutionalisation of the EU network of DPAs, taken 
to another level in the form of the EDPB now endowed with legally-binding powers, will 
be developing in the future, and whether it will ever evolve into an EU Data Protection 
Agency. The idea of a need of such an agency, which has been around since the 1990s 
(Simitis, 1995; Newman, 2007), was reiterated recently during the discussions on the one-
stop-shop mechanism, but has been long resisted by the national DPAs and many MSs 
governments. It was not at this stage aimed for by the Commission, either (see Section 
4.5.4 and Commission, 2013a; Van Quathem, 2015). It is interesting to note that very 
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similar processes have been occurring in the construction of the regulatory governance in 
the telecoms sector, where, about a decade ago, unsuccessful Commission proposals to 
move from the networked EU governance to a more centralised one under the European 
Electronic Communications Market Authority where opposed by the national regulators, 
the EP and the MSs (Simpson, 2009). Currently similar centralisation proposals that would 
entail the replacement of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications71 by a European agency have been revived by the Commission, but again 
do not seem to be welcome by other actors (Stupp, 2016). While the presence of the 
networks of national regulators directly link to the policy networks perspective and the role 
of epistemic communities in the policy-making, since, as mentioned in Section 5.5, even in 
institutionalised regulatory networks such as the WP29 there is also a significant amount of 
informal policy coordination, the governance through two-level regulatory networks, “even 
regarding policy deliberation which occurs in European level contexts”, predominantly 
encompasses the elements of intergovernmentalism (Simpson, 2009:7; see also the 
Commission referring to the EDPB (the upgraded WP29) as to an “intergovernmental 
club” in Commission, 2013a). Thus, it reinstates the state-centric paradigm that this thesis 
draws on. 
Sociological dimensions also played an interesting role in the process of the GDPR 
negotiations. Different national contexts and varying institutional adherence in the Council 
delegations were affecting the course of the talks. Very different sociological dynamics has 
been observed within different institutional venues, e.g. the Council with more formally 
unfolding deliberations, and the EP and the WP29, where there is more social cohesion 
(Section 5.4). Further, such an attribute as technical expertise has been a source of 
                                                          
71 that similarly to the WP29 transition to the EDPB evolved from the advisory European Regulators Group 
for electronic communications. 
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authority and influence in the process for such actors as the DPAs and the EDPS formally 
playing mainly an advisory role at the EU level. 
Of all the strands of the institutional theory, the elements of the rational choice perspective, 
looking into the interplay of strategic interests and the power contest, were the most 
significant in explaining the process of adoption of the GDPR. 
7.3 Conclusions 
This study finds that, in congruence with the state-centric paradigm applied to this 
research, the process and the outcome of the GDPR drafting was hugely influenced by the 
national cleavages in this policy area and the MSs’ sovereignty concerns. This manifested 
itself in the process of transition from a Directive to a Regulation which, even though it 
took the degree of harmonisation further, resulted in extraordinarily numerous derogations, 
and in the difficulty of agreement on the one-stop-shop mechanism and the public sector in 
the Council negotiations. There has been a substantial repositioning of decision-making 
powers that shifted from the Commission to the WP29 reborn as the EDPB pursuant to the 
adoption of the GDPR, maintaining a decentralised data protection oversight model that is, 
at the same time, more state-centric. It can be argued that the DPAs accrued most gains 
from the reform in terms of their power base and the degree to which the implementation 
and enforcement of the GDPR will rely on their functions and toolbox. Individual rights, 
after a very intense drafting process balancing between a risk-based approach promoted by 
the Council and a more prescriptive approach advanced by the EP and the Commission, 
have been upgraded, although not to the extent expected in the original proposals. The 
EP’s role was very significant in defending a stronger data protection regime and together 
stronger users’ rights. This institution was behind one of the most prominent outcomes of 
the reform – the level of fines imposable for data breaches – with which, alongside a 
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number of other provisions, the GDPR has set a new global precedent in data protection. 
The institutional factors – the internal dynamics within the main EU institutions, and how 
they are located and strive to position themselves in the processes of the EU integration – 
played a decisive role in influencing the outcomes of this reform. Therefore, while in many 
aspects the GDPR stood out as a particular policy dossier, it was nevertheless part of 
various processes of “politics as usual”.  
The research accomplished for this thesis brought to the fore some interesting phenomena 
worth a more in-depth exploration that could not be offered due to the comprehensive 
nature of this study, its scope and limited resources. These, however, provide some 
important indications for future research. Among some of the subjects for further research 
to be considered as dedicated stand-alone studies are the complexity of the Council 
deliberations revealed in this analysis, the controversial position of Germany in the GDPR 
negotiations that contrasted with the expectations based on the country’s strong data 
protection culture, the evolving and multi-faceted governance model surrounding the role 
of the DPAs and the politics around it. 
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ANNEX 
List of the interviews 
 
Interview with EP source A, 21 January 2014, Brussels;  
interview with privacy advocacy organisation representative, 10 July 2014, London; 
interview with Permanent Representation official A, 20 January 2015, Brussels; 
interview with national data protection authority official, 22 January 2015;   
interview with EU official A, 29 January 2015, Brussels; 
interview with EDPS official, 30 January 2015, Brussels; 
interview with EP source B, 5 February 2015, Brussels;  
interview with EU official B, 13 February 2015, Brussels; 
interview with EP source C, 16 February 2015, Brussels; 
interview with EU official C, 23 February 2015, Brussels; 
interview with EU official D, 27 February 2015, Brussels; 
interview with national Ministry of Justice official, 18 March 2015; 
interview with European digital rights organisation representative, 8 December 2015, 
Brussels; 
interview with international digital rights organisation representative, 8 December 2015, 
Brussels; 
interview with European consumer rights organisation representative, 11 December 2015, 
Brussels; 
interview with EU official A, 01 February 2016, Brussels; 
interview with Permanent Representation official B, 3 February 2016, Brussels; 
interview with EP source B, 4 February 2016, Brussels;  
interview with EP source C, 8 February 2016, Brussels. 
 
 
  
  242 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES AND THE BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Acar, G., Eubank, C., Englehardt, S., Juarez, M., Narayanan, A., and Diaz, C. (2014) The 
Web never forgets: Persistent tracking mechanisms in the wild. Available at 
https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/the_web_never_forgets.pdf 
Accessed 14.06.2015. 
Acar, G., Van Alsenoy, B., Piessens, F., Diaz, C. and Preneel, B. (2015) Facebook 
Tracking Through Social Plug-ins. Available at 
https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/fb_tracking/fb_plugins.pdf Accessed 
01.06.2015. 
Access Now (2013) European Parliament vote on Privacy Regulation: major losses 
obscure other gains. Available at https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2013/10/21/european-
parliament-vote-on-privacy-regulation-major-losses-obscure-other-g Accessed 20.08.2015. 
Access Now (2014) Big brother’s little helper inside the European Commission. Available 
at https://www.accessnow.org/big-brothers-little-helper-inside-the-european-commission/ 
Accessed 01.07.2016.   
Access Now (2016) Europe approves privacy-invasive PNR Directive and privacy-
protecting GDPR in one day. Available at https://www.accessnow.org/europe-approves-
privacy-invasive-pnr-directive-privacy-protecting-gdpr-one-day/ Accessed 09.08.2016. 
Ackrill, R., Kay, A. and Zahariadis, N. (2013) Ambiguity, multiple streams, and EU 
policy, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 20(6), pp. 871-887. 
Acquisti, A. (2010) The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of Privacy. 
Background Paper for OECD Joint WPISP-WPIE Roundtable, 1 December 2010, Paris. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968784.pdf Accessed 14.06.2015. 
Acquisti, A. (2013) Why privacy matters. Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H_pqhMO3ZSY and 
http://www.ted.com/talks/alessandro_acquisti_why_privacy_matters/transcript Accessed 
18.06.2015. 
Alter, K.J. (1998) Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty?: European Governments and the 
European Court of Justice, International Organisation, Vol. 52(1), pp. 121 – 147. 
Alter, K.J. (2002) Establishing the supremacy of European law: the making of an 
international rule of law in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
AmCham (2015) AmCham EU statement on Article 43(a) in the GDPR. Available at 
http://www.amchameu.eu/system/files/position_papers/amcham_position_on_article_43a_
gdpr.pdf Accessed 12.10.2015. 
  243 
 
Amnesty International (2006) Undermining freedom of expression in China. The role of 
Yahoo!, Microsoft and Google. Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/POL30/026/2006/en/ Accessed 15.07.2014. 
Andersen, S.S. and Eliassen, K.A. (2001) “Introduction: the EU as a new political system” 
in Andersen, S.S. and Eliassen, K.A. (eds) Making policy in Europe, London: Sage, 2nd 
ed., pp. 3-19. 
Andersen, S.S., Eliassen, K.A. and Sitter, N. (2001) “Formal Processes: EU Institutions 
and Actors” in Andersen, S.S. and Eliassen, K.A. (eds) Making policy in Europe, London: 
Sage, 2nd ed., pp. 20-43. 
Anderson, C.  (2010) Free: how today's smartest businesses profit by giving something for 
nothing, London: Random House Business Books. 
Angwin, J. and Valentino-Devries, J. (2010) Race Is On to 'Fingerprint' Phones, PCs. 
Available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704679204575646704100959546 
Accessed 14.06.2015.  
Aspinwall, M. and Schneider, G. (2001) “Institutional research on the European Union: 
mapping the field” in Schneider, G. and Aspinwall, M. (eds) The rules of integration: 
institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, pp.1-18. 
Bache, I. and George, S. (2006) Politics in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed. 
Bache, I., George, S. and Bulmer, S. (2011) Politics in the European Union, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 3rd ed.  
Baldwin, D.A. (ed) (1993) Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate, New 
York; Chichester: Columbia University Press. 
Ball, J. (2013) Leaked memos reveal GCHQ efforts to keep mass surveillance secret. 
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-
surveillance-secret-snowden Accessed 28.03.2015. 
Barbière, C. (2014) National parliaments raise the pressure on data protection. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/infosociety/national-parliaments-raise-pressure-data-
protection-308581 Accessed 11.08.2015. 
Barbière, C. (2016) MEPs refuse to vote on PNR before Council strengthens data 
protection. Available at http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/meps-
refuse-to-vote-on-pnr-before-council-strengthens-data-protection/ Accessed 10.05.2016.   
Barnard-Wills, D., Pauner Chulvi, C. and De Hert, P. (2016) Data protection authority 
perspectives on the impact of data protection reform on cooperation in the EU, Computer 
  244 
 
Law & Security Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice, 
Vol.32(4), pp.587-598. 
Batra, N.D. (2008) Digital freedom: how much can you handle? Lanham; Plymouth: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
BBC (2007a) Q&A: EU passenger data row. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5029258.stm Accessed 12.07.2015. 
BBC (2010) US to access Europeans' bank data in new deal. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10552630 Accessed 12.07.2015. 
BBC (2011) Yahoo! criticised over e-mail 'snooping' for advertising. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/14077856/yahoo-criticised-over-e-mail-snooping-
for-advertising Accessed 10.05.2015. 
BBC (2012a) Google fined over Safari cookie privacy row. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19200279 Accessed 10.05.2015. 
BBC (2012b) Privacy groups call for Facebook changes U-turn. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20509264 Accessed 12.06.2014. 
BBC (2012c) MEPs back deal to give air passenger data to US. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17764365 Accessed 15.05.2016.   
BBC (2013a) Facebook 'likes' predict personality. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21699305 Accessed 14.05.2015 
BBC (2013b) Link to Snowden encrypted email service closes. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23627656 Accessed 31.05.2015. 
BBC (2013c) Google reading private emails in Gmail service? Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23724191 Accessed 09.05.2014. 
BBC (2013d) Edward Snowden shortlisted for EU's Sakharov prize. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24347225 Accessed 07.12.2014. 
BBC (2013e) US National Security Agency 'spied on French diplomats'. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24628947 Accessed 10.12. 2014. 
BBC (2013f) NSA 'monitored 60m Spanish calls in a month'. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24699733 Accessed 31.05.2015. 
BBC (2013g) Adobe hack: At least 38 million accounts breached. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-24740873 Accessed 01.06.2014. 
BBC (2013h) Stolen Facebook and Yahoo passwords dumped on-line. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25213846 Accessed 01.06.2014. 
  245 
 
BBC (2013i) Data haul by Android Flashlight app. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25258621 Accessed 15.05.2015. 
BBC (2013j) Technology firms seek government surveillance reform. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25297044 Accessed 31.05.2015. 
BBC (2013k) European data watchdogs target Google over privacy. Available at    
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22003551 Accessed 26.04.2013. 
BBC (2013l) Spain's Gibraltar checks lawful – EU. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24954881 Accessed 20.03.2014. 
BBC (2013m) Google privacy policy criticised by data watchdog. Available at    
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-23187771 Accessed 01.07. 2016. 
BBC (2013n) Critics condemn new EU data-protection legislation. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-24622919 Accessed 08.04.2016. 
BBC (2014a) Lavabit appeal against data handover. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25930222 Accessed 31.05.2015. 
BBC (2014b) Wm Morrison employee arrested after payroll data theft. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26609264 Accessed 27.06.2014. 
BBC (2014c) Cloak 'anti-social' app helps you avoid your friends. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25554192 Accessed 27.06.2014. 
BBC (2014d) LinkedIn email addresses exposed by plug-in software. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26833863 Accessed 22.06.2014. 
BBC (2014e) Google under fire from European media tycoon. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27063372 Accessed 22.06.2014. 
BBC (2014f) Target's chief executive resigns. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27283872 Accessed 22.06.2014. 
BBC (2014g) Cisco calls for curb on NSA surveillance efforts. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27468794 Accessed 31.05.2015. 
BBC (2014h) Google sets up 'right to be forgotten' form after EU ruling. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27631001 Accessed 05.04.2015. 
BBC (2014i) Google and Facebook can be legally intercepted, says UK spy boss. 
Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27887639 Accessed 05.04.2015. 
BBC (2014j) UK rural broadband fund winners revealed. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27924187 Accessed 09.05.2015.  
  246 
 
BBC (2014k) Facebook emotion experiment sparks criticism. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28051930 Accessed 09.09.2014. 
BBC (2014l) Parliament passes emergency Data Retention Bill. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-28352673 Accessed 04.06.2015. 
BBC (2014m) Facebook privacy challenge attracts 25,000 users. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28677667 Accessed 01.06.2015. 
BBC (2014n) Amnesty releases anti-spying program for activists. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30115679 Accessed 03.06.2015.   
BBC (2014o) Vodafone sent 1,000 News UK workers' data to police. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30203808 Accessed 05.04.2015. 
BBC (2014p) Dame Wendy Hall on MPs scrutinising on-line privacy. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30502376 Accessed 25.03.2016. 
BBC (2014q) How Eurosceptic is the new European Parliament? Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28107633 Accessed 02.08.2016. 
BBC (2015a) David Cameron says new on-line data laws needed. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30778424 Accessed 04.06.2015. 
BBC (2015b) Germany's Merkel urges new EU law on data tracking. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30828197 Accessed 04.06.2015. 
BBC (2015c) Safari users win right to sue Google over privacy. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-32083188 Accessed 10.05.2015. 
BBC (2015d) Europol chief warns on computer encryption. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32087919 Accessed 11.04.2015. 
BBC (2015e) Spam email levels at 12-year low. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-33564016 Accessed 18.05.2016. 
BBC (2016a) EU should 'interfere' less - Commission boss Juncker. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36087022 Accessed 10.09.2016. 
BBC (2016b) Barack Obama says Brexit would leave UK 'back of the queue' on trade. 
Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36115138 Accessed 23.04.2016. 
BBC (2016c) TTIP in further doubt as Hollande questions timing. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37220701 Accessed 05.11.2016.   
BBC (2016d) Euroscepticism on rise in Europe, poll suggests. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36471989 Accessed 02.08.2016. 
  247 
 
BBC (2016e) Austria presidential poll result overturned. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36681475 Accessed 02.08.2016. 
Beddoes, Z. M. (2013) Europe’s reluctant hegemon. Available at 
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21579140-germany-now-dominant-
country-europe-needs-rethink-way-it-sees-itself-and Accessed 28.11.2016. 
Bendrath, R. and Mueller, M. (2011) The end of the net as we know it? Deep packet 
inspection and internet governance, New Media & Society, Vol.13(7), pp.1142-1160. 
Bendrath, R. (2014) Trading away privacy: TTIP, TiSA and European data protection. 
Available at http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-12-19-bendrath-en.html Accessed 
24.02.2015.  
Bendrath, R. (ed.) (2015) The EU’s Data Protection Reform, European Parliament: Jan 
Philipp Albrecht MEP.  
Bennett, C.J. and Raab, C. D. (2006) The governance of privacy: policy instruments in 
global perspective, Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press. 
Bernet, D. (2015) Democracy – Im Rausch der Daten. Germany: Indi Film. 
BEUC (2011) Country survey of collective redress mechanisms. Where does collective 
redress for individual damages exist? Available at http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2011-
10006-01-e.pdf Accessed 24.07.2016. 
BEUC (2012a) Major EU update of Data Protection laws: Consumers handed greater 
control of their data. Available at http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2012-00048-01-e.pdf 
Accessed 10.08.2015. 
BEUC (2012b) Data Protection Proposal for a Regulation/BEUC Position Paper. Available 
at http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2012-00531-01-e.pdf Accessed 10.08.2015.  
BEUC (2013) EU takes baby step towards collective consumer court actions. Available at 
http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2013-00408-01-e.pdf Accessed 24.07.2016. 
BEUC (2014) EU introduces new consumer rights. Available at 
http://www.beuc.eu/publications/pr2014_018e_crd.pdf Accessed 25.02.2015. 
BEUC (2015a) Justice Council meeting 15 June – Council General Approach on the 
General Data Protection Regulation, Letter sent to the Ambassadors 11 June 2015. 
Available at http://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2015-
059_dma_justice_council_meeting_15_june.pdf Accessed 20.11.2015. 
BEUC (2015b) EU data protection law gets much needed update. Available at 
http://www.beuc.eu/publications/eu-data-protection-law-gets-much-needed-update/html 
Accessed 10.10.2016.  
  248 
 
Big Brother Watch (2014) NHS patient confidentiality breached 5 times every week. 
Available at http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/home/2011/10/nhs-data-protection.html 
Accessed 20.10.2013. 
Bignami, F. (2005) Transgovernmental networks vs. democracy: the case of the European 
information privacy network, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 26(3), pp. 807-
868. 
Bigo, D. et al (2011) Towards a New EU Legal Framework for Data Protection and 
Privacy. Challenges, Principles and the Role of the European Parliament 2011. Available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2011/453216/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2011)453216_EN.pdf Accessed 19.08.2016. 
Bjurulf, B. and Elgström, O. (2005) “Negotiating transparency: the role of institutions” in 
Elgström, O. and Jönsson, C. (eds) European Union negotiations: processes, networks and 
institutions, New York; London: Routledge, pp. 45-62. 
Borger, J. (2013) GCHQ and European spy agencies worked together on mass 
surveillance. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/01/gchq-europe-
spy-agencies-mass-surveillance-snowden Accessed 16.05.2015. 
Bowcott, O. (2013) Britain seeks opt-out of new European social media privacy laws. 
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/apr/04/britain-opt-out-right-to-
be-forgotten-law Accessed 05.08.2015. 
Bowman, J. (2015) After hard DAPIX work, GDPR stage is set. Available at 
https://iapp.org/news/a/dapix-concludes-gdpr-discussions-ahead-of-june-council/ Accessed 
11.07.2016.  
Bradford, A. (2012) The Brussels effect. (Global economy harmonization of economic 
laws),  
Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 107(1), pp.1-68.  
Braman, S. (2006) Change of state: information, policy, and power, Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press. 
Brems, P. (2013) Privacy te koop, Belgium: Panorama, Canvas – VRT. Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zi7aHMgIbzc Accessed 03.03.2015. 
Brewster, T. (2012) Facebook lobbies Brussels in earnest on EU data privacy proposals. 
Available at http://www.silicon.co.uk/workspace/facebook-lobbying-eu-data-privacy-
98645 Accessed 15.06.2013.   
Brown, C. and Ainley, K. (2009) Understanding International Relations, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
  249 
 
Brown, T. and Halter, H. (2010) "The Internet" in Grant, A.E. and Meadows, J.H. (eds) 
Communication Technology Update and Fundamentals, Amsterdam; Boston: Focal 
Press/Elsevier. 
Brown, I. and Marsden, C.T. (2013c) Regulating code: good governance and better 
regulation in the information age, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W.E. (2013) Germany as the EU's reluctant hegemon? Of 
economic strength and political constraints, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 
20(10), pp. 1387-1405. 
Buonanno, L. and Nugent, N. (2013) Policies and policy processes of the European Union, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Burn-Murdoch, J. (2013) Europe deadlocked over data protection reform. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/aug/12/europe-data-protection-directive-
eu Accessed 22.06.2014. 
Burri, M. (2014) “Trade versus culture: the policy of cultural exception and the WTO” in 
Donders, K., Pauwels, C., and Loisen, J. (eds) The Palgrave handbook of European media 
policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 479-492. 
Buttarelli, G. (2015) The General Data Protection Regulation: Making the world a better 
place? Keynote speech at ‘EU Data Protection 2015 Regulation Meets Innovation’ event, 
San Francisco, 8 December 2015. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pu
blications/Speeches/2015/15-12-08_Truste_speech_EN.pdf Accessed 05.10.2016.  
Buttarelli, G. (2016) The EU GDPR as a clarion call for a new global digital gold standard. 
Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/site/mySite/EU_GDPR_as_clarion_call 
Accessed 12.09.2016. 
Buttolph Johnson, J., Reynolds, H.T. and Mycoff, J.D. (2008c) Political science research 
methods, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 6th ed.  
Cellan-Jones, R. (2014) US v Europe - a cultural gap on the right to be forgotten. Available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27421969 Accessed 15.08.2014. 
Cellan-Jones, R. (2015) Google's Schmidt - Apple is wrong about our privacy. 
Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33200503 Accessed 28.06.2016. 
CEO (2013a) Crowdsourced lobby exposé shows Internet giants have footprints on our 
data privacy laws. Available at 
http://corporateeurope.org/lobbycracy/2013/02/crowdsourced-lobby-expos-shows-internet-
giants-have-footprints-our-data-privacy Accessed 10.04.2016. 
  250 
 
CEO (2013b) Belgian MEP in lobby amendments scandal. Available at 
http://corporateeurope.org/lobbycracy/2013/11/belgian-mep-lobby-amendments-scandal 
Accessed 17.03.2016. 
CEO (2013c) Complaint forces European Privacy Association to confirm Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft and Yahoo are corporate backers. Available at 
https://corporateeurope.org/lobbycracy/2013/06/complaint-forces-european-privacy-
association-confirm-facebook-google-microsoft Accessed 10.08.2016.  
Chadwick, A. (2006) Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communications 
Technologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Chryssochoou, D. N. (1997) “New Challenges to the Study of European Integration: 
Implications for Theory‐Building”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35(4), pp. 
521-542. 
Chryssochoou, D. N. (2009) Theorizing European integration, London: Routledge, 2nd ed.  
CJEU (2015) The Court of Justice declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour 
Decision is invalid. Press release No 117/15. Available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf Accessed 
08.10.2015. 
Clarke, R. (1988) Information technology and dataveillance, Communications of the ACM, 
Vol. 31(5), pp. 498-512. 
CNIL (2013a) Google Glass: a global cooperation initiative launched by the Canadian Data 
Protection Authority, the Article 29 Working Party and several APEC members. Available 
at http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/google-glass-a-global-
cooperation-initiative-launched-by-the-canadian-data-protection-authority-th Accessed 
01.06.2015. 
CNIL (2013b) Privacy Towards 2020. Available at 
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/CAHIER_IP_EN2.pdf Accessed 20.08.2015. 
CNIL (2013c) EU data protection regulation: a major step forward at the European 
Parliament. Available at http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/eu-data-
protection-regulation-a-major-step-forward-at-the-european-parliament/ Accessed 
19.01.2014. 
Coen, D. and Richardson, J.J. (eds) (2009) Lobbying the European Union: institutions, 
actors, and issues, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Coleman, A. (2014) Germany's Privacy Stance Boosts Berlin's Tech Startups. Available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alisoncoleman/2014/01/20/germanys-privacy-stance-boosts-
berlins-tech-start-ups/#1eb66bbe1f85 Accessed 10.03.2015. 
  251 
 
Commission (no date) Winston Churchill: calling for a United States of Europe. Available 
at https://europa.eu/european-
union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/winston_churchill_en.pdf Accessed 20.03.2016. 
Commission (2000) Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided 
by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the 
US Department of Commerce (2000/520/EC). Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000D0520&from=en Accessed 12.06.2015. 
Commission (2007) Roaming: Commission welcomes political agreement in today's EU 
Telecom Council. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-
233_en.htm Accessed 01.07.2016. 
Commission (2009) Telecoms: Commission launches case against UK over privacy and 
personal data protection. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-
570_en.htm Accessed 23.07.2016.     
Commission (2009-2011) Review of the data protection legal framework. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/opinion/090501_en.htm Accessed 
05.08.2015 
Commission (2010) Summary of replies to the public consultation about the future legal 
framework for protecting personal data. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/summary_replies_en.pdf Accessed 
20.07.2016.  
Commission (2011a) European Commission's comprehensive approach. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/opinion/101104_en.htm Accessed 
20.07.2016. 
Commission (2011b) New EU rules on consumer rights to enter into force. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-675_en.htm?locale=en Accessed 
08.07.2016. 
Commission (2012a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions; Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European Data Protection 
Framework for the 21st Century /* COM/2012/09 final */. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0009 Accessed 23.11.2015.      
Commission (2012b) Data protection reform: Frequently asked questions. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-41_en.htm?locale=en memo Accessed 
23.11.2015.  
Commission (2012c) Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection 
rules to increase users' control of their data and to cut costs for businesses. Press release. 
  252 
 
Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm?locale=en press release 
Accessed 23.11.2015. 
Commission (2012d) Commission staff working paper. Executive summary of the impact 
assessment. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/sec_2012_73_en.pdf Accessed 14.11.2015.     
Commission (2012e) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 
final. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf Accessed 20.11.2013.    
Commission (2013a) The Proposed General Data Protection Regulation: The Consistency 
Mechanism Explained. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-
protection/news/130206_en.htm?cookies=disabled Accessed 03.07.2016. 
Commission (2013b) LIBE Committee vote backs new EU data protection rules. Available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-923_en.htm Accessed 20.11.2015.    
Commission (2013c) Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU of 11 June 2013 on 
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the 
Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law (OJ L 201, 
26.7.2013, 60–65). 
Commission (2014a) Progress on EU data protection reform now irreversible following 
European Parliament vote. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
186_de.htm Accessed 20.03.2014.     
Commission (2014b) European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2012/0011(COD)
&l=en#tab-0 Accessed 19.11.2015.    
Commission (2015a) First Vice-President Timmermans and Commissioner Jourová's press 
conference on Safe Harbour following the Court ruling in case C-362/14 (Schrems). 
Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5782_en.htm Accessed 
02.07.2016. 
Commission (2015b) Agreement on Commission’s EU data protection reform will boost 
Digital Single Market. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
6321_en.htm Accessed 01.07.2016. 
  253 
 
Commission (2016a) European Commission launches EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: stronger 
protection for transatlantic data flows. Press release. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2461_en.htm Accessed 17.07.2016. 
Commission (2016b) Statement by Commissioner Věra Jourová on the European 
Parliament consent vote on the conclusion of the EU-U.S. data protection "Umbrella 
Agreement". Available at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=50732 Accessed 19.02.2017.  
Cooper, A. (2011) “Doing the DPI dance, assessing the privacy impact of deep packet 
inspection” in Aspray, W. and Doty, P. (eds) Privacy in America interdisciplinary 
perspectives, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, pp.139 – 165. 
COR (2012) Opinion of the Committee of the Regions Data Protection Package; 97th 
plenary session, 8-10 October 2012; EDUC-V-022. Available at 
https://dm.cor.europa.eu/CORDocumentSearch/Pages/opinionsresults.aspx?k=(documentty
pe:AC)%20(documentlanguage:en)%20(documentnumber:625)%20(documentyear:2012) 
Accessed 10.03.2014. 
Corera, G. (2013) Anti-cyber threat centre launched. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-21945702 Accessed 10.03.2015.  
Corera, G. (2016) How the British and Americans started listening in. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35491822 Accessed 08.06.2016.   
Council (2012) Press release, 3207th Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs Brussels, 
6 and 7 December 2012. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-12-
509_en.htm Accessed 15.12.2013. 
Council (2014) 3354th Council meeting, Justice and Home Affairs; Press release, 
16526/14. Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/146049.pdf 
Accessed 17.01.2015. 
Council Legal Service (2013) Contribution of the Legal Service. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-18031-2013-INIT/en/pdf Accessed 
14.11.2015. 
CPDP (2014) EU Data Protection Reform: State of Play, Youtube. Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kl8an9Myrek Accessed 15.08.2015   
CPDP (2015) EU data protection reform: Have we found the right balance between 
fundamental rights and economic interests? Youtube. Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPHsz9Y6SZM Accessed 18.02.2016. 
Crain, M. (2015) The biggest myth about phone privacy. Available at    
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150206-biggest-myth-about-phone-privacy 
Accessed 10.05.2015. 
  254 
 
Cram, L. (1997) Policy-making in the European Union: conceptual lenses and the 
integration process, London: Routledge. 
Crisp, J. (2015) Secretive 'trilogue' talks to agree EU law face investigation. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/secretive-trilogue-talks-agree-eu-law-
face-investigation-313936 Accessed 11.07.2015.  
Croft, A. and Mohammed, A. (2013) France summons U.S. ambassador over spying 
report. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-france-nsa-
idUSBRE99K04920131021 Accessed 05.04.2015. 
Crowley, P.J. (2014) PJ Crowley: US-German relations have 'Groundhog Day'. 
Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28257762 Accessed 
05.04.2015. 
DataIQ (2015) Acxiom privacy chief warns EU laws will put off investors. Available at 
http://www.dataiq.co.uk/news/201509/acxiom-privacy-chief-warns-eu-laws-will-put-
investors Accessed 01.10.2015. 
 
 
Data Now (2015) Cultivating entrepreneurship during economic recovery. Available at 
http://www.data-now.eu/case_study/7/cultivating-entrepreneurship-during-economic-
recovery Accessed 17.06.2016.   
Datoo, S. (2014) How tracking customers in-store will soon be the norm. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2014/jan/10/how-tracking-customers-in-
store-will-soon-be-the-norm Accessed 05.04.2015. 
Davies, S. (2012) Why no European institution can afford to ignore privacy. Available at 
http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/why-no-european-institution-can-afford-to-
ignore-privacy/ Accessed 05.08.2014.  
Davies, S. (2013) EU Council deals killer blow to privacy reforms. Available at 
http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/eu-council-deals-killer-blow-to-privacy-
reforms/ Accessed 12.08.2015. 
Deacon, D. et al (2010) Researching communications: a practical guide to methods in 
media and cultural analysis, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2nd ed. 
DecisionMarketing (2013) ICO issues funding ‘cry for help’. Available at 
http://www.decisionmarketing.co.uk/news/ico-issues-funding-cry-for-help Accessed 
12.02.2014. 
De Hert, P. and Papakonstantinou, V. (2014) “The EDPS as a unique stakeholder in the 
European data protection landscape, fulfilling the explicit and non-explicit expectations”, 
in Hijmans, H. and Kranenborg, H. (eds) Data Protection anno 2014: How to Restore 
Trust? Contributions in honour of Peter Hustinx, European Data Protection Supervisor 
  255 
 
(2004-2014), Cambridge England; Antwerp Belgium; Portland Oregon: Intersentia, pp. 
237-252. 
De Hert, P. and Papakonstantinou, V. (2016) The new General Data Protection Regulation: 
Still a sound system for the protection of individuals? Computer Law & Security Review: 
The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice, Vol.32(2), pp. 179–194. 
Dehousse, R. (2003) Comitology: who watches the watchmen? Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol.10(5), p.798-813. 
Deighton, J. (2003) “Market solutions to privacy problems?” in Nicoll, C., Prins, C., Van 
Dellen, M. J. M. (eds) Digital anonymity and the Law: tensions and dimensions, The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 
DePillis, L. (2013) Talks over a huge U.S.-Europe trade deal start this week. Here’s what 
you need to know. Available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/08/talks-over-a-huge-u-s-
europe-trade-deal-start-this-week-heres-what-you-need-to-know/ Accessed 04.11.2013 
De Souza, L. (2013) Draft EU Data Protection Regulation Discussions Stall on One-Stop-
Shop Issue. Available at http://www.hldataprotection.com/2013/10/articles/international-
eu-privacy/draft-eu-data-protection-regulation-discussions-stall-on-one-stop-shop-issue/ 
Accessed 18.01.2014. 
Digital minds (2014) Digital Minds for a New Europe. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/content/digital-minds-new-
europe.html Accessed 05.05.2015. 
Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others (2014) Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-
594/12, CJEU. 
Dinan, D. (2000c) Encyclopedia of the European Union, Basingstoke: Macmillan, Updated 
ed. 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data. Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050.  
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications). Official 
Journal L 201, 31/07/2002 P. 0037 – 0047. 
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on 
the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC. Official Journal L 105, 13/04/2006 P. 0054 – 0063. 
  256 
 
Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws. Official Journal L 337, 
18/12/2009, P. 11–36. 
Donnelly, B. (2008) Justice and home affairs in the Lisbon Treaty: a constitutionalising 
clarification? Available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/11043/1/20080509184107_SCOPE2008-1-4_BrendanDonnelly.pdf 
Accessed 22.03.2016. 
Drezner, D.W. (2007) All politics is global: explaining international regulatory regimes, 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
ECHR (1950) The European Convention on Human Rights. Available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Collection_Convention_1950_ENG.pdf Accessed 
10.06.2015. 
EDC (2015a) Re: International data transfers. Available at 
http://europeandatacoalition.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Coalition-reaction-on-Ch-
V3.pdf Accessed 20.07.2016.  
EDC (2015b) No need to capitulate on a prosperous European digital economy to 
safeguard the fundamental right to privacy. Available at 
http://europeandatacoalition.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/European-Data-Coalition-
Letter-to-the-Members-of-the-Council.pdf Accessed 11.01.2016.  
EDC (2015c) After more than 4 years of hard work it’s disappointing that EU policy 
makers have stumbled at the finishing line. Available at 
http://europeandatacoalition.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Coalitions-statement-on-the-
outcome-of-the-trilogue-negotiations.pdf Accessed 19.07.2016. 
EDPS, Privacy by design, Glossary. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Dataprotection/Glossary/pid/84 
Accessed 28.05.2015. 
EDPS (2008) Annual Report 2007. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pu
blications/Annualreport/2007/AR2007_EN.pdf Accessed 08.02.2015. 
EDPS (2012a) EDPS welcomes a "huge step forward for data protection in Europe", but 
regrets inadequate rules for the police and justice area, PRESS RELEASE, Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pr
essNews/Press/2012/EDPS-2012-02_EC_DP_Proposal_EN.pdf Accessed 12.07.2015. 
  257 
 
EDPS (2012b) EDPS applauds strengthening of the right to data protection in Europe, but 
still regrets the lack of comprehensiveness Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pr
essNews/Press/2012/EDPS-2012-07_DPReform_package_EN.pdf Accessed 12.07.2015. 
EDPS (2012c) Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the data protection 
reform package Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultat
ion/Opinions/2012/12-03-07_EDPS_Reform_package_EN.pdf Accessed 12.07.2015. 
EDPS (2012d) Executive summary EDPS Opinion of 7 March 2012 on the data protection 
reform package, Official Journal of the European Union, C 192/7 Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2012.192.01.0007.01.ENG 
Accessed 30.07.2015. 
EDPS (2014a) Letter by Peter Hustinx to Mr Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the 
European Commission; Mr Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Chairman of the European 
Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and to Ambassador 
Théodoros N. Sotiropoulos, Permanent Representative of Greece regarding the 
appointment of the European Data Protection Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor. 
Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pr
essNews/News/14-01-07_Letter_to_EC_PH_EN.pdf Accessed 17.08.2015. 
EDPS (2014b) Urgent reform of EU data protection framework is essential for a connected 
continent, Press release. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pr
essNews/Press/2014/EDPS-2014-02-NN_EN.pdf Accessed 17.08.2015. 
EDPS (2014c) Progress on the data protection reform package. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultat
ion/Comments/2014/14-02-14_letter_Council_reform_package_EN.pdf Accessed 
17.08.2015. 
EDPS (2014d) Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The interplay between 
data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital Economy. 
Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultat
ion/Opinions/2014/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf Accessed 04.04.2015. 
EDPS (2014e) Newsletter Nr. 41. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pr
essNews/Newsletters/Newsletter_41_EN.pdf Accessed 20.05.2014.  
EDPS (2014f) The EDPS as an advisor to EU institutions on policy and legislation: 
building on ten years of experience. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pu
blications/Papers/PolicyP/14-06-04_PP_EDPSadvisor_EN.pdf Accessed 10.08.2016.  
  258 
 
EDPS (2014g) EDPS calls on the Council to make urgent progress on Data Protection 
Reform, Press statement. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pr
essNews/Press/2014/EDPS-2014-
10_Press_statement_Data_Protection_Reform_Package_EN.pdf Accessed 17.08.2015.  
EDPS (2014h) European Council strategic guidelines for the future development of justice 
and home affairs in the EU. Data protection aspects. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pr
essNews/News/14-06-18_Letter_Van_Rompuy_EN.pdf Accessed 14.11.2015. 
EDPS (2015a) EDPS meets international civil liberties groups. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Pressnews/Videos/GDPR_civil_soc 
Accessed 14.11.2015. 
EDPS (2015b) Opinion 3/2015 (with addendum) Europe’s big opportunity. EDPS 
recommendations on the EU’s options for data protection reform. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultat
ion/Opinions/2015/15-10-09_GDPR_with_addendum_EN.pdf Accessed 17.08.2016. 
EDPS (2015c) Annex to Opinion 3/2015: Comparative table of GDPR texts with EDPS 
recommendations. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultat
ion/Opinions/2015/15-07-27_GDPR_Recommendations_Annex_EN.pdf Accessed 
17.08.2015. 
EDPS (2015d) Opinion 4/2015 Towards a new digital ethics Data, dignity and technology. 
Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultat
ion/Opinions/2015/15-09-11_Data_Ethics_EN.pdf Accessed 17.08.2016.   
EDPS (2016a) EDPS starts work on a New Digital Ethics. Press release. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pr
essNews/Press/2016/EDPS-2016-05-EDPS_Ethics_Advisory_Group_EN.pdf Accessed 
17.08.2016. 
EDPS (2016b) 2016 EDPS-civil society summit. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Pressnews/Videos/2016_EDPS_Civi
l_Society_Summit Accessed 17.08.2016. 
EDRi (no date) Industry Coalition for Data Protection members. Available at 
https://edri.org/files/ICDP.pdf Accessed 17.07.2016.   
EDRi (2011) The slide from self-regulation to corporate censorship. Available at 
https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/selfregualation_paper_20110925_web.pdf 
Accessed 20.07.2015.  
EDRi (2012a) EU surveillance. Available at https://edri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/paper02_web_20120123.pdf Accessed 20.07.2015. 
  259 
 
EDRi (2012b) Activist guide to the Brussels maze. Available at 
https://edri.org/files/activist_guide_to_the_EU_2012.pdf Accessed 03.06.2015. 
EDRi (2012c) Position on the Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation). Available at https://edri.org/files/1012EDRi_full_position.pdf 
Accessed 10.08.2015. 
EDRi (2015a) Leaked documents: European data protection reform is badly broken. 
Available at https://edri.org/broken_badly/ Accessed 17.08.2015. 
EDRi (2015b) A letter to the First Vice-President Timmermans, Vice-President Ansip, 
Commissioner Jourova. Available at https://edri.org/files/DP_letter_Juncker_20150421.pdf 
Accessed 17.08.2015.  
EDRi (2015c) Fifteen years late, Safe Harbor hits the rocks. Available at 
https://edri.org/safeharbor-the-end/ Accessed 07.10.2015. 
EDRi (2015d) EU Data Protection Package – Lacking ambition but saving the basics. 
Available at https://edri.org/eu-data-protection-package-lacking-ambition-but-saving-the-
basics/ Accessed 12.01.2016.  
EDRi (2015e) Press Release: Privacy and Data Protection under threat from EU Council 
agreement. Available at: https://edri.org/press-release-privacy-and-data-protection-under-
threat-from-eu-council-agreement/ Accessed 21.06.2015. 
EDRi (2016a) Transatlantic coalition of civil society groups: Privacy Shield is not enough 
– renegotiation is needed. Available at https://edri.org/transatlantic-coalition-of-civil-
society-groups-privacy-shield-is-not-enough-renogitation-is-needed/ Accessed 16.04.2016. 
EDRi (2016b) Massive lobby against personal communications security has started. 
Available at https://edri.org/massive-lobby-personal-communications-security-started/ 
Accessed 17.06.2016. 
EDRi (2016c) Press Release: Vote on Data Protection and Passenger Name Record 
package. Available at: https://edri.org/press-release-data-protection-and-passenger-name-
record-package-to-be-voted-on-tomorrow/Accessed 17.04.2016. 
EDRi (2016d) PROCEED WITH CAUTION: Flexibilities in the General Data Protection 
Regulation. Available at: 
https://edri.org/files/GDPR_analysis/EDRi_analysis_gdpr_flexibilities.pdf Accessed 
28.07.2016. 
Edwards, L. and Howells, G. (2003) “Anonymity, consumers and the Internet: where 
everyone knows you’re a dog” in Nicoll, C., Prins, C., Van Dellen, M. J. M. (eds) Digital 
anonymity and the Law: tensions and dimensions, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 
207-248. 
  260 
 
EESC (2012) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’, (2012/C 229/17). Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012AE1303&from=EN 
Accessed 10.03.2014. 
Eger, J.M. (2014) The US/EU Privacy Debate Could Be Devastating. Available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-m-eger/the-usec-privacy-debate-c_b_4582246.html 
Accessed 07.07.2014. 
EMPL (2013) Opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs for the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011–C7 0025/2012 2012/0011(COD)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-498.045+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
Accessed 18.06.2014. 
EP (no date) Legislative powers. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-
powers Accessed 12.04.2015. 
EP (2011a) REPORT of 22 June 2011 on a comprehensive approach on personal data 
protection in the European Union and motion for a resolution (2011/2025(INI)). Available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-
2011-0244+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en Accessed 12.05.2016. 
EP (2011b) European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2011 on a comprehensive approach 
on personal data protection in the European Union (2011/2025(INI)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-
0323+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN Accessed 17.08.2015.     
EP (2012a) Summary of the 2012/0011(COD) - 25/01/2012 Legislative proposal. 
Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1188884&t=d&l=en Accessed 
12.04.2015. 
EP (2012b) European Parliament rejects ACTA. Press release. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20120703IPR48247/european-
parliament-rejects-acta Accessed 10.11.2014. 
EP (2013a) 20-06-2013 Prism: A wake-up call for data protection. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20130617STO12378/Prism-A-wake-
up-call-for-data-protection Accessed 04.04.2016. 
  261 
 
EP (2013b) European Parliament resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security 
Agency surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their 
impact on EU citizens’ privacy (2013/2682(RSP)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-
0322&language=EN Accessed 18.08.2015. 
EP (2013c) MEPs call for suspension of EU-US bank data deal in response to NSA 
snooping. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20131021IPR22725/html/MEPs-call-for-suspension-of-EU-US-bank-data-
deal-in-response-to-NSA-snooping Accessed 05.03.2015. 
EP (2013d) European Parliament resolution of 10 December 2013 on unleashing the 
potential of cloud computing in Europe (2013/2063(INI)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-
0535&language=EN Accessed 05.03.2015. 
EP (2014a) Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data - 
Processing of personal data for the purposes of crime prevention (debate), 11 March 2014. 
Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20140311&second
Ref=ITEM-013&language=EN Accessed 18.04.2016. 
EP (2014b) European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal 
for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (2012/0011(COD)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-
TA-2014-0212 Accessed 18.11.2015. 
EP (2014c) European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance 
programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ 
fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs 
(2013/2188(INI)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-
TA-2014-0230 Accessed 05.03.2015. 
EP (2014d) MEPs refer EU-Canada air passenger data deal to the EU Court of Justice. 
Press release. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20141121IPR79818/meps-refer-eu-canada-air-passenger-data-deal-to-the-eu-court-
of-justice Accessed 12.10.2015. 
EP (2014e) European Parliament resolution of 27 November 2014 on supporting consumer 
rights in the digital single market (2014/2973(RSP)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bTA%2bP8-TA-2014-
0071%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN Accessed 18.04.2016. 
  262 
 
EP (2014f) The ECHELON Affair, The European Parliament and the Global Interception 
System, Study. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/538877/EPRS_STU(2014)538
877_EN.pdf Accessed 05.03.2015. 
EP (2015) European Parliament resolution of 29 October 2015 on the follow-up to the 
European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the electronic mass surveillance of 
EU citizens (2015/2635(RSP)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bTA%2bP8-TA-2015-
0388%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN Accessed 07.09.2016. 
Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt (1969) C-29/69: ECR 419, CJEU. 
Essers, L. (2014) EU ministers backpedal on one-stop data protection shop plan. Available 
at http://www.pcworld.com/article/2856072/eu-ministers-backpedal-on-onestop-data-
protection-shop-plan.html Accessed 10.09.2015. 
ETNO (2005) ETNO Expert Contribution on Data retention in e-communications - 
Council’s Draft Framework Decision, Commission’s Proposal for a Directive. Available at 
https://www.etno.eu/datas/positions-papers/2005/ec075-dpr-data-retention.pdf Accessed 
28.05.2015. 
Eurobarometer (2011) Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European 
Union, Special Eurobarometer 359. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf Accessed 28.08.2015. 
Eurobarometer (2015) Data protection, Special Eurobarometer 431. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_sum_en.pdf Accessed 
28.08.2015. 
EuroChambres (2012) EUROCHAMBRES’ Position Paper – General Data Protection 
Regulation. Available at 
http://www.eurochambres.eu/objects/1/Files/PositionPaperDataProtectionRegulation.pdf 
Accessed 01.12.2016. 
European Council (no date) Intergovernmental conferences. Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/intergovernmental-
conferences/ Accessed 10.08.2017.  
European Council (2009) The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe 
Serving and Protecting Citizens, OJ C 115, 4.5.2010. 
European Council (2013) 24/25 October 2013 Conclusions, EUCO 169/13. Available at   
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/139197.pdf 
Accessed 12.12.2016. 
  263 
 
European Council (2014) European Council 26/27 June 2014 – Conclusions, EUCO 79/14. 
Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143478.pdf 
Accessed 12.12.2016. 
European Council (2015) European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions, 
EUCO 22/15. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/06/26-euco-conclusions/ Accessed 12.12.2016. 
Falkner, G. (2012) “Promoting Policy Dynamism: The Pathways Interlinking Neo-
functionalism and Intergovernmentalism” in Richardson, J. (ed) Constructing a Policy-
Making State? Policy Dynamics in the EU, Oxford University Press, pp. 292-308. 
Farago, J. (2013) In praise of Vallaud-Belkacem, or why not to tolerate hate speech on 
Twitter. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/02/praise-
vallaud-belkacem-hate-speech-twitter Accessed 18.06.2014. 
Farivar, C. (2013) Proposed EU data protection reform could start a trade war, US official 
says, ArsTechnica. Available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/proposed-eu-
data-protection-reform-could-start-a-trade-war-us-officialsays/ Accessed 02.06.2014. 
Farrell, H. (2008c) “Privacy in the Digital Age: States, Private Actors and Hybrid 
Arrangements” in Drake, W.J., and Wilson, E.J. III (eds) Governing global electronic 
networks: international perspectives on policy and power, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
FEDMA (2015) Data protection trilogue factsheet. Available at https://ddma.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/20150707_Trilogue_factsheet.pdf Accessed 10.08.2016. 
FIDH (2014) Surveillance technologies “Made in Europe”: Regulation Needed to Prevent 
Human Rights Abuses. Position paper. Available at 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/surveillance_technologies_made_in_europe-1-2.pdf 
Accessed 28.03.2015. 
Fiedler, K. (2014) We are not accusing the German minister of interior of lying. Available 
at https://edri.org/accusing-german-minister-interior-lying/ Accessed 15.07.2014. 
Finley, K. (2 14) On-line Security Is a Total Pain, But That May Soon Change. Available 
at http://www.wired.com/2014/06/usable-security/ Accessed 29.05.2014.  
Finnegan, R. (2006) “Using documents” in Sapsford, R. and Jupp, V. (eds) Data collection 
and analysis, London: Sage, 2nd ed., pp. 138-151. 
Fioretti, J. (2015a) Facebook 'tramples European privacy law': Belgian watchdog. 
Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-eu-privacy-
iduskbn0o00xw20150515 Accessed 12.05.2016. 
  264 
 
Fioretti, J. (2015b) EU data protection reform may promise more than it delivers. Available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-dataprotection-idUSKBN0U41CQ20151221 
Accessed 20.07.2016.   
Fitzgerald, S. (2014) The Rise of Private Messaging: Yahoo Buys Blink. Available at 
http://www.newsfactor.com/news/Yahoo-Buys-Messaging-App-
Blink/story.xhtml?story_id=033003AHAMC3 Accessed 28.05.2015. 
Fleischer, P. (2014) Turning our Backs on 2013. Available at 
http://peterfleischer.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/turning-our-backs-on-2013.html Accessed 
17.08.2015. 
Fleming, J. (2012) Data privacy tsar warns EU countries not to dilute rules. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/data-tsar-warns-council-dilute-r-news-513480 
Accessed 10.10.2015. 
Fleming, J. (2013a) Booming data economy puts EU to the test. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-internet-europes-f/controlling-measuring-booming-
da-news-517534 Accessed 14.04.2016. 
Fleming, J. (2013b) US makes first public comment over draft EU data privacy law. 
Available at http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/us-airs-views-eu-privacy-rules-news-
519279 Accessed 01.07.2016. 
Fleming, J. (2013c) EU institutions seek exclusion, extra time on data protection. Available 
at http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/eu-institutions-seek-exclusion-extra-time-
on-data-protection/ Accessed 03.07.2016. 
Fleming, J. (2013d) Data protection reform in peril as Germany stymies deal. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/data-protection-reform-in-peril-as-germany-
stymies-deal/ Accessed 11.07.2016. 
Fox, B. (2013) EU commission 'stood firm' on US data privacy. Available at 
https://euobserver.com/justice/120490 Accessed 01.07.2016. 
FRA (no date) Information society, privacy and data protection. Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/information-society-privacy-and-data-protection Accessed 
22.06.2015. 
FRA (2010) Data Protection in the European Union: the role of National Data Protection 
Authorities (Strengthening the fundamental rights architecture in the EU II). Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/815-Data-protection_en.pdf Accessed 
03.07.2016.  
FRA (2012) Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the 
proposed data protection reform package, FRA Opinion – 2/2012. Available at 
  265 
 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-opinion-data-protection-oct-2012.pdf Accessed 
05.11.2015. 
FRA (2013) Annual report 2012 - Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 
2012. Available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annual-report-2012-chapter-
3_en.pdf Accessed 07.04.2016. 
FRA (2014) Access to data protection remedies in EU Member States/Summary. Available 
at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-access-data-protection-remedies-
summary_en.pdf Accessed 17.03.2015. 
FRA (2015) Freedom to conduct a business: exploring the dimensions of a fundamental 
right. Available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2015-freedom-
conduct-business_en.pdf Accessed 01.12.2016. 
French delegation Note (2013) General Data Protection Regulation - One -stop -shop 
mechanism and minor cases, 15601/13. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015601%202013%20INIT 
Accessed 10.07.2014. 
FTC (2014) Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were 
False. Available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-
ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were Accessed 24.06.2015. 
Gabbatt, A. (2013) Dropbox joins tech giants in quest to publish government user data 
requests. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/25/dropbox-
google-yahoo-surveillance-data-requests Accessed 02.04.2015. 
Galperin, H. (2004) Beyond Interests, Ideas, and Technology: An Institutional Approach to 
Communication and Information Policy, The Information Society, Vol. 20(3), pp.159-168. 
Garfinkel, S. and Spafford, G. (2002) Web security, privacy and commerce, United States: 
O'Reilly, 2nd ed. 
Garside, J. and Ross, A. (2016) A high-powered network: how Google became embedded 
in British politics. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/29/how-
google-became-embedded-british-politics-tax Accessed 17.06.2016.  
GDPR final (2016) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation). 
Gellert, R. and Gutwirth, S. (2013) The legal construction of privacy and data protection, 
Computer Law & Security Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and 
Practice, Vol.29(5), pp.522-530. 
  266 
 
Gellman, R. and Dixon, P. (2011) WPF Report: many failures – a brief history of privacy 
self-regulation in the United States, Available at 
https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2011/10/report-many-failures-a-brief-history-of-
privacy-self-regulation/ Accessed 10.09.2016. 
General Secretariat Note (2014) Member States comments on Public sector and Chapter 
IX, 14098/1/14 REV 1. Available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
14098-2014-REV-1/en/pdf Accessed 20.11.2014.  
General Secretariat Note (2016a) Statements by Austria and by Commission. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5455-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf Accessed 
10.07.2016.  
General Secretariat Note (2016b) Voting result. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7920-2016-INIT/en/pdf Accessed 
10.07.2016. 
Gershman, J. (2014) FBI Director ‘Concerned’ About New Smartphone Encryption. 
Available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/09/25/fbi-director-concerned-about-new-
smartphone-encryption/ Accessed 30.05.2015. 
Gibbs, S. (2015) EU agrees draft text of pan-European data privacy rules, The Guardian. 
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/16/eu-agrees-draft-text-
pan-european-data-privacy-rules Accessed 10.10.2016. 
Gibbs, S. (2016) European parliament approves tougher data privacy rules, The Guardian. 
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/14/european-parliament-
approve-tougher-data-privacy-rules Accessed 10.10.2016. 
Gittleson, K. (2014) Whispers, secrets, and the return of anonymity on the web. Available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27397811 Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Goemans, C. and Dumortier, J. (2003) “Enforcement issues - mandatory retention of traffic 
data in the EU: possible impact on privacy and on-line anonymity” in  Nicoll, C.,  Prins, 
C., Van Dellen, M. J. M. (eds) Digital anonymity and the Law: tensions and dimensions, 
The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 
Goldsmith, J.L. and Wu, T. (2006) Who controls the Internet: illusions of a borderless 
world, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
González Fuster, G. (2014) The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU, Springer Cham Heidelberg: New York Dordrecht London. 
González Fuster, G. and Scherrer, A. (2015) Big Data and smart devices and their impact 
on privacy. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536455/IPOL_STU(2015)536
455_EN.pdf Accessed 03.04.2016.  
  267 
 
Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) 
and Mario Costeja González (2014) Case C-131/12, CJEU. 
Gotev, G. (2016) MEPs concerned that amendments could ‘kill’ PNR directive. Available 
at http://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/meps-concerned-that-
amendments-could-kill-pnr-directive/ Accessed 12.04.2016. 
Greek Presidency Note (2014) Partial General Approach on Chapter V, 10349/14. 
Available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10349-2014-INIT/en/pdf 
Accessed 09.08.2014.   
Green Cowles, M. (1998) "The changing architecture of big business" in Greenwood, J. 
and Aspinwall, M. (eds) Collective action in the European Union: interests and the new 
politics of associability, London: Routlege, pp.108-125. 
Greenslade, R. (2014) Media buccaneer Rupert Murdoch dares to complain about Google's 
'piracy', The Guardian. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/sep/18/rupert-murdoch-google 
Accessed 15.02.2015.  
Greens/EFA (2015) Press conference of 24 June 2015 with Jan Albrecht (Greens/EFA), 
author of the Report on Data Protection, Available at http://www.greens-efa.eu/recorded-
press-conference-14223.html Accessed 30.06.2015.   
Gros, D. (2015) The end of German hegemony. Available at 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-end-of-german-hegemony Accessed 28.11.2016. 
GSMA (2014) Mobile privacy: Consumer research insights and considerations for 
policymakers. Available at http://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/GSMA-Mobile-Privacy-Booklet_WEBv2.pdf Accessed 
15.06.2014. 
GSMIS (2013) Global social media impact study. Available at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/global-social-media Accessed 28.12.2013.  
Guarascio, F. (2012) US lobbying waters down EU data protection reform. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/us-lobbying-waters-down-eu-data-
protection-reform/ Accessed 01.07.2016. 
Gustin, S. (2013) NSA Spying Scandal Could Cost U.S. Tech Giants Billions. Available at 
http://business.time.com/2013/12/10/nsa-spying-scandal-could-cost-u-s-tech-giants-
billions/ Accessed 02.04.2015. 
Gutwirth, S. (2002) Privacy and the information age, Lanham, Md.; Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Haas, E.B. (1975) The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Berkeley: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.  
  268 
 
Haas, E.B. (2001) “Does constructivism subsume neo-functionalism?” in Christiansen, T., 
Jørgensen, K.E. and Wiener, A. (eds) The Social Construction of Europe, Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 22 – 31. 
Haas, P.M. (1992) “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy 
coordination”, International Organisation, Vol. 46(1), pp. 1-35. 
Hakim, D. and Lipton, E. (2013) U.S.-European Trade Talks Inch Ahead Amid Flurry of 
Corporate Wish Lists, The New York Times. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/world/europe/corporate-spin-already-on-us-europe-
trade-talks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& Accessed 04.11.2013. 
Hansen, A., et al. (1998) Mass Communication Research Methods, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Harper, J. (2011) “Privacy-invasive technologies and their origins” in Aspray, W. 
and Doty, P. (eds) Privacy in America interdisciplinary perspectives, Lanham, MD: 
Scarecrow Press, pp.113-135. 
Harrison, L. and Deicke, W. (2001) “Conducting interviews in political research” in 
Harrison, L. (ed) Political research: an introduction, London; New York: Routledge. 
Hastings, R. (2013a) British internet users' personal information on major 'cloud' storage 
services can be spied upon routinely by US authorities, The Independent. Available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/british-internet-users-
personal-information-on-major-cloud-storage-services-can-be-spied-upon-routinely-by-us-
authorities-8471819.html Accessed 02.02. 2014. 
Hastings, R. (2013b) Lobbyists’ demands were ‘copied into law by MEPs’. Available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/lobbyists-demands-were-copied-into-
law-by-meps-8493933.html?origin=internalSearch Accessed 16.04.2016. 
Harford, T. (2016) The iPhone at 10: How the smartphone became so smart. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38320198 Accessed 29.12.2016. 
Hayward, J. E. S. (2008) (ed) Leaderless Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hecking, C. and Schultz, S. (2013) Spying 'Out of Control': EU Official Questions Trade 
Negotiations. Available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-officials-furious-at-
nsa-spying-in-brussels-and-germany-a-908614.html  31.03.2014.  
Heinelt, H. and Smith, R. (1996c) “Introduction”, in Heinelt, H. and Smith, R. (eds) Policy 
networks and European structural funds, Aldershot: Avebury, pp. 1-8. 
Hewitt, G. (2013a) US spying: Pragmatism tempers EU anger. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24666477 Accessed 10.02.2014. 
  269 
 
Hewitt, G. (2013b) Merkel's mobile and US spying. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24651735 Accessed 04.04.2015. 
Hijmans, H. (2006) The European Data Protection Supervisor: the institutions of 
the EC controlled by an independent authority, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 43(5), 
pp.1313-1342. 
Hijmans, H. (2016) The European Union as a constitutional guardian of internet privacy 
and data protection, PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam. Available at 
https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2676807/169421_DEFINITIEF_ZELF_AANGEPAST_full_tex
t_.pdf Accessed 10.11.2016   
Hill, J. (2015) Germany spy scandal turns tables on Merkel government. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32529017 Accessed 12.06.2016. 
Hills, J. (2006) What's New? War, Censorship and Global Transmission: From the 
Telegraph to the Internet, International Communication Gazette, Vol. 68(3), pp.195-216.  
Hix, S. (2015) Is the UK marginalised in the EU? Available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2015/10/21/is-the-uk-marginalised-in-the-eu/ Accessed 
22.02.2016.  
Hoofnagle, C. J., Soltani, A., Good, N., Wambach, D.J. and Ayenson, M., (2012) 
Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 Harvard Law & Policy Review 
273; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2137601. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137601 Accessed 10.06.2014. 
Hooghe, L. (2001) “Top Commission officials on capitalism: an institutionalist 
understanding of preferences” in Schneider, G. and Aspinwall, M. (eds) 
The rules of integration: institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press., pp. 152-173. 
Hope, K. (2015) Facebook now used by half of world's on-line users. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33712729 Accessed 29.08.2015. 
Hopkins, N. and Morris, J. (2015) 'Innocent people' on police photos database. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31105678 Accessed 28.06.2015. 
Hornung, G. (2012) A General Data Protection Regulation for Europe? Light and shade in 
the Commission’s draft of 25 January 2012, SCRIPTed, Vol 9(1), pp.64-81. Available at 
https://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/hornung.pdf Accessed 01.07.2016.  
Hornung, G. and Schnabel, C. (2009) Data protection in Germany I: The population census 
decision and the right to informational self-determination, Computer Law and Security 
Review: The International Journal of Technology and Practice, Vol.25(1), pp. 84-88. 
  270 
 
Horten, M. (2012) Reding handbags DeGucht over ECJ referral. Available 
at http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/acta/746-reding-handbags-degucht-over-ecj-referral 
Accessed 28.05.2016. 
Hudson, A. (2013a) How much 'lifelogging' could you tolerate? Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22193299 Accessed 04.04.2014. 
Hudson, A. (2013b) Targeted real-life adverts 'know who you are'. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23425297 Accessed 04.04.2014. 
Hunt, A. (2014) UKIP: The story of the UK Independence Party's rise. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21614073 Accessed 23.11.2014. 
Hustinx, P. (2014) EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the 
Proposed General Data Protection Regulation. Available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Pu
blications/Speeches/2014/14-09-15_Article_EUI_EN.pdf Accessed 15.06.2016. 
ICO (2013) Draft EU General Data Protection Regulation. Available at 
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1042558/rt-hon-chris-grayling-ministry-
of-justice-20130603.pdf Accessed 12.02.2014. 
ICO (2014) Global survey finds 85% of mobile apps fail to provide basic privacy 
information. Available at https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-
blogs/2014/09/global-survey-finds-85-of-mobile-apps-fail-to-provide-basic-privacy-
information/ Accessed 23.06.2015. 
ICDP (2012) Reforming Europe’s Privacy Framework - How to find the right balance. 
Available at 
http://www.bsa.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Security/Privacy/ICDPStatementEUDataProtecti
onReform.pdf Accessed 10.08.2015. 
ICDP (2013a) Industry concerned over negative impact of Albrecht draft report. Available 
at http://www.iabeurope.eu/news/industry-concerned-over-negative-impact-albrecht-draft-
repor Accessed 17.07.2015. 
ICDP (2013b) Industry groups call on Council, European Parliament to achieve workable 
data protection regulation, concerns remain following LIBE Committee vote on draft text. 
Available at 
http://www.digitaleurope.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Comm
and=Core_Download&EntryId=624&PortalId=0&TabId=353 Accessed 17.07.2015. 
ICDP (2013c) European Parliament vote on data protection proposal constitutes a missed 
opportunity, say industry groups. Available at 
http://www.fedma.org/fileadmin/documents/Press_releases/ICDP_Mar_Plenary_EP__Fina
l.pdf Accessed 17.07.2015. 
  271 
 
ICDP (2015) Eu data protection reform: industry cautious on Council general approach. 
Available at 
http://www.fedma.org/fileadmin/documents/Legal_A_Eth_C/20150615_ICDP_Press_Rele
ase_-_June_JHA_Council.pdf Accessed 17.07.2015. 
IHS-IAB Europe (2015) Paving the way: how on-line advertising enables the digital 
economy of the future. Available at 
http://www.iabeurope.eu/files/9614/4844/3542/IAB_IHS_Euro_Ad_Macro_FINALpdf.pdf 
Accessed 22.04.2016. 
IMCO (2013) Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011–C70025/2012–2012/0011(COD)). 
Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-496.497+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
Accessed 20.08.2015.  
Interact (2013) Sean Kelly Member for the European Parliament at Interact, Youtube. 
Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7myH7wPP1Rs#t=37 Accessed 
15.05.2016. 
IOCCO (2015) Half-yearly report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner, 
July 2015. Available at http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/2015%20Half-
yearly%20report%20(web%20version).pdf Accessed 20.04.2016. 
IOCCO (2016) Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner Annual 
Report for 2015. Available at http://www.iocco-
uk.info/docs/56850%20HC%20255%20ICCO%20Web%20only.pdf Accessed 01.09.2016. 
Irion, K. and Luchetta, G. (2013) On-line Personal Data Processing and EU Data 
Protection Reform, CEPS Task Force Report of the CEPS Digital Forum. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2275267 Accessed 20.08.2015  
Irish Presidency Note (2013a) Key issues of Chapters I-IV, 10227/13. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010227%202013%20INIT 
Accessed 09.12.2013. 
Irish Presidency Note (2013b) Key issues of Chapters I-IV, 10227/13 ADD 1. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010227%202013%20ADD%20
1 Accessed 09.12.2013. 
ISPA (2014) ISPA Response: Investigatory Powers Review: Call for Evidence. Available 
at http://www.ispa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Andeson-review-response.pdf Accessed 
05.06.2015. 
  272 
 
ISPA (2015) ISPA calls on parliament to not let the Communications Data Bill be 
introduced by the back door. Available at http://www.ispa.org.uk/ispa-calls-parliament-
not-let-communications-data-bill-introduced-back-door/ Accessed 05.06.2015. 
ISPA (no date) ISPA response to joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill.  
Available at http://www.ispa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ISPA-response-to-Joint-
Committee-on-the-draft-Communications-Data-Bill.pdf Accessed 05.06.2015. 
Italian Presidency Note (2014a) Chapter IV, 13772/14. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13772-2014-INIT/en/pdf Accessed 
30.01.2015. 
Italian Presidency Note (2014b) Chapter II, Article 21 and Chapter IX, 14270/14. 
Available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14270-2014-INIT/en/pdf 
Accessed 15.01.2015.  
Italian Presidency Note (2014c) Public sector; Partial General approach, 15389 /14. 
Available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15389-2014-INIT/en/pdf 
Accessed 12.01.2015.  
Italian Presidency Note (2014d) The one-stop-shop mechanism; Orientation debate, 
15656/1/14 REV 1. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015656%202014%20REV%20
1 Accessed 12.01.2015. 
Italian Presidency Note (2014e) Partial general approach; Orientation debate, 16140/14. 
Available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16140-2014-INIT/en/pdf 
Accessed 12.01.2015. 
ITRE (2013) Opinion of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy for the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011–C7 0025/2012 2012/0011(COD)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-496.562+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (1997) From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative 
Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, European Law Journal, Vol. 
3(3), pp.273-299.  
Jönsson, C. and Elgström, O. (2005) “Introduction” in Elgström, O. and Jönsson, C. (eds) 
European Union negotiations: processes, networks and institutions, New York; London: 
Routledge, pp. 1-9. 
  273 
 
Jönsson, C. and Strömvik, M. (2005) “Negotiations in networks” in Elgström, O. and 
Jönsson, C. (eds) European Union negotiations: processes, networks and institutions, New 
York; London: Routledge, pp. 13-28. 
JURI (2013) Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs for the Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011–C7 0025/2012 2012/0011(COD)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-494.710+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
Accessed 10.08.2015 
Just, N. and Puppis, M. (2011) “Communication policy research: Looking back, moving 
forward” in Just, N. and Puppis M. (eds) Trends in Communication Policy Research: New 
Theories, Methods and Subjects, Bristol: Intellect. 
Karppinen, K. and Moe, H. (2011) “What we talk about when we talk about document 
analysis” in Just, N. and Puppis M. (eds) Trends in Communication Policy Research: New 
Theories, Methods and Subjects, Bristol: Intellect. 
Katzenbach, C. (2012) “Technologies as Institutions: rethinking the role of technology in 
media governance constellations” in Just, N. and Puppis M. (eds) Trends in 
Communication Policy Research: New Theories, Methods and Subjects, Bristol: Intellect, 
pp. 117-137. 
Kelion, L. (2013) LG investigates Smart TV 'unauthorised spying' claim. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25018225 Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Kelion, L. (2014a) LaCie warns of suspected credit card data breach. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27046971 Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Kelion, L. (2014b) eBay makes users change their passwords after hack. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27503290 Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Kelion, L. (2015) Vitality gives Facebook pledge after health privacy row. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/33344529 Accessed 08.07.2015.   
Kelly, S. (2014) Process of Data Privacy reform at EU level. GPDR Speech for the 
National Data Protection Conference. Available at http://www.seankelly.eu/news-and-
events/199-gpdr-speech-for-the-national-data-protection-conference Accessed 05.04.2016. 
Kennard, W.E. (2012) Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to the EU at Forum Europe’s 3rd 
Annual European Data Protection and Privacy Conference. Available at 
https://useu.usmission.gov/kennard_120412.html Accessed 01.07.2016. 
Kerry, C. F. (2012) Remarks to the European Parliament Interparliamentary Committee 
Meeting on The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework: Building Trust in a Digital 
  274 
 
and Global World, Session VII: Data Protection in the global context - The transatlantic 
dimension. Available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/usau/231771/PDFs/general-
counsel-kerry-libe-submission-10-10-12.pdf Accessed 01.07.2016. 
Kingdon, J.W. (1995c) Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Harlow; New York: 
Longman, 2nd edition.  
Kjær, A.M. (2004) Governance, Cambridge: Polity.  
Kleinman, Z. (2014) Tech rivals join Microsoft in fight over US data demand. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30494562 Accessed 03.04.2015.   
Kleinman, Z. (2016) Three criticised over plans for network-wide ad-blockers. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35615430 Accessed 15.04.2016. 
Kloza, D. and Galetta, A. (2015) Towards efficient cooperation between supervisory 
authorities in the area of data privacy law. Working paper, Brussels Privacy Hub, Vol. 
1(3), pp. 1-25. Available at http://brusselsprivacyhub.org/Resources/BPH-Working-Paper-
VOL1-N3.pdf Accessed 12.08.2016. 
Klug, F. (2012) Human rights: Cameron's message to Europe, The Guardian. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/25/human-rights-cameron-europe# 
Accessed 18.04.2016  
Kobie, N. (2015) Tech firms need to use data ethically around the internet of things. 
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/10/tech-firms-need-use-
data-ethically-internet-of-things Accessed 08.07.2015. 
Latvian Presidency Note (2015a) Chapter II, 17072/1/14 REV 1. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-17072-2014-REV-1/en/pdf Accessed 
19.04.2015. 
 
Latvian Presidency Note (2015b) Chapter II, 17072/3 /14 REV 3. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-17072-2014-REV-3/en/pdf Accessed 
19.04.2015. 
Latvian Presidency Note (2015c) The one-stop-shop mechanism, 6833/15. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6833-2015-INIT/en/pdf Accessed 
15.08.2015.  
Latvian Presidency Note (2015d) Chapter II, 6834/15. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6834-2015-INIT/en/pdf Accessed 
15.08.2015.  
Latvian Presidency Note (2015e) Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, 
9657/15. Available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9657-2015-
INIT/en/pdf Accessed 28.07.2015.  
  275 
 
Latvian Presidency Note (2015f) Preparation of a general approach, 9565/15. Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf Accessed 
28.07.2015.  
Lee, D. (2014a) How to defend yourself against the 'two-week' attack. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27681236 Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Lee, D. (2014b) Google faces data watchdogs over 'right to be forgotten'. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28458194 Accessed 12.06.2016. 
Lee, D. (2015) Apple boss Tim Cook hits out at Facebook and Google. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32991036 Accessed 12.07.2016.  
Lessig, L. (2006) Code V2.0, New York: Basic Books. 
Lexology (2010) European Court of Justice rules on German DPA system. Available at 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dc79f450-22a4-4d51-97e7-9041a5aaf537 
Accessed 01.12.2016.   
LIBE (2012) Working document on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation). Available at 
https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/59673/att_20130508ATT65778-
6509204932056639431.pdf Accessed 03.07.2016. 
LIBE (2013a) Draft report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-
0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-501.927+04+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
Accessed 15.07.2015. 
LIBE (2013b) Committee meeting – 20-03-2013. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20130320-1500-
COMMITTEE-LIBE Accessed 20.08.2015.  
LIBE (2013c) Committee meeting – 06-05-2013. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20130506-1500-
COMMITTEE-LIBE Accessed 20.08.2015.  
LIBE (2013d) Committee meeting – 19-06-2013. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20130619-1500-
COMMITTEE-LIBE Accessed 20.08.2015. 
  276 
 
LIBE (2013e) Civil Liberties MEPs pave the way for stronger data protection in the EU. 
Press release. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20131021IPR22706/html/Civil-Liberties-MEPs-pave-the-way-for-stronger-
data-protection-in-the-EU Accessed 26.07.2015. 
LIBE report, (2013f) Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=
A7-2013-0402&language=EN Accessed 29.01.2014.   
LIBE (2014) Committee meeting – 22-07-2014. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/oj/1031/1031562/103
1562en.pdf / http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/committees/video?event=20140722-1500-COMMITTEE-LIBE Accessed 
28.07.2015. 
LIBE (2015a) Newsletter/Issue 10. Available at 
https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/73094799-bf73-4796-989c-
95bea0ad4a20/issue10_LIBEnewsletter.pdf Accessed 10.10.2015. 
LIBE (2015b) Committee meeting - 12-10-2015. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20151012-1500-
COMMITTEE-LIBE Accessed 11.12.2015. 
Lindsay, D. and Ricketson, S. (2010) “Copyright, privacy and digital rights management 
(DRM)” in Kenyon, A. T. and Richardson, M. (eds) New dimensions in privacy law: 
international and comparative perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
121-153. 
Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in plural societies: a comparative exploration, New Haven; 
London: Yale University Press.  
Lijphart, A. (2012) Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-
six countries, New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 2nd ed. 
Lithuanian Presidency Note (2013a) The one-stop-shop mechanism, 14260/13. Available 
at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014260%202013%20INIT 
Accessed 12.02.2014. 
Lithuanian Presidency Note (2013b) Essential elements of the one-stop-shop mechanism, 
17025/13. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2017025%202013%20INIT 
Accessed 15.02.2014. 
  277 
 
Lithuanian Presidency Note (2013c) The one-stop-shop mechanism: partial general 
approach on essential elements, 16626 /1/13 REV 1. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2016626%202013%20REV%20
1 Accessed 15.02.2014. 
Llansó, E. and Jeppesen, J-H. (2016) EU’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ policy sets bad 
precedent for free expression. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/eus-right-to-be-forgotten-policy-sets-bad-
precedent-for-free-expression/ Accessed 07.08.2016.     
Lowndes, V. and Roberts, M. (2013) Why institutions matter: the new institutionalism in 
political science, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Luke, T.W. (2011) “Developing a new speech for global security: exploring the rhetoric of 
evil in the Bush administration response to 9.11.01” in Lacy, M.J. and Wilkin, P. (eds) 
Global politics in the information age, Manchester: Manchester University Press; New 
York: Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, pp. 21-38. 
Lynskey, O. (2013) “From market-making tool to fundamental right: the role of the Court 
of Justice in data protection’s identity crisis” in Gutwirth, S., Leenes, R., de Hert, P. 
Poullet, Y. (eds) European Data Protection: Coming of Age, Springer, London, UK, pp. 
59-84. 
Lyon, D. (ed) (2003) Surveillance as social sorting: privacy, risk, and digital 
discrimination, London; New York: Routledge. 
Lyon, D. (2007c) Surveillance studies: an overview, Cambridge: Polity. 
Macrae, D. (2016) GDPR: Verdict of Google, Microsoft & Adobe Privacy Leaders. 
Available at http://www.silicon.co.uk/e-regulation/187157-
187157?inf_by=59c7c164681db8ec798b49c0 Accessed 17.06.2016.  
Majone, G. (1997) From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of 
Changes in the Mode of Governance. Journal of Public Policy, Volume 17(02), pp. 139-
167. 
Manheim, J. B., Rich, R.C. and Willnat, L. (2002c) Empirical political 
analysis: research methods in political science, New York; London: Longman, 5th ed. 
Marcus, J. (2013) NSA spying allegations: Are US allies really shocked? Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24676392 Accessed 10.03.2015. 
Mariotto, C. and Franchino, F. (2011) Explaining outcomes of Conciliation Committee's 
negotiations, Decision-making before and after Lisbon (Workshop 3-4 November 2011) 
University of Leiden. Available at 
http://ces.ufl.edu/files/FranchinoMariotto_DEUBAL_110411.pdf Accessed 12.09.2015. 
Marquis, G. (2003) “Private security and surveillance: from the "dossier society” to 
  278 
 
database networks" in Lyon, D. (ed) Surveillance as social sorting: privacy, risk, and 
digital discrimination, London; New York: Routledge. 
Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (2015) Case C-362/14, CJEU. 
McMullan, T. (2015) The world's first hack: the telegraph and the invention of privacy. 
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/15/first-hack-telegraph-
invention-privacy-gchq-nsa Accessed 06.01.2016. 
McNamee, J. (2015) Data protection package concluded – 1420 days after being launched. 
Available at https://edri.org/data-protection-package-concluded-1420-days-after-being-
launched/ Accessed 20.01.2016. 
Melik, J. (2012) Internet privacy: Genuine concerns or paranoia? Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17369659 Accessed 01.06.2014. 
Menon, A. (2008) Europe: the state of the union, London: Atlantic. 
Meyer, D. (2015) Industry issues plea over data reform. Available at 
http://www.politico.eu/article/industry-plea-data-reform-protection-privacy/ Accessed 
14.07.2016. 
Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum (2013) Case C-291/12, CJEU.  
Michalis, M. (2007c) Governing European communications: from unification to 
coordination, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Michalowitz, I. (2004c) EU lobbying - principals, agents and targets: strategic interest 
intermediation in EU policy-making, Münster: Lit.  
Mignon, J. (2012) European court of human rights is not perfect, but it's still precious, The 
Guardian. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/apr/19/european-court-of-
human-rights-human-rights Accessed 18.04.2016  
Miller, J. (2013) City of London calls halt to smartphone tracking bins. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23665490 Accessed 01.07.2014. 
Miller, J. (2014) Facebook fights 'largest ever' US court data request. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28055909 Accessed 01.07.2014. 
Mirani, L. (2014) How a bureaucrat in a struggling country at the edge of Europe found 
himself safeguarding the world’s data. Available at http://qz.com/162791/how-a-
bureaucrat-in-a-struggling-country-at-the-edge-of-europe-found-himself-safeguarding-the-
worlds-data/ Accessed 10.02.2015. 
Moody, G. (2015) Germany will investigate legality of post-Safe Harbour EU-US data 
transfers immediately. Available at https://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2015/10/germany-
to-begin-investigating-legality-of-eu-us-data-transfers-immediately/ Accessed 25.08.2016. 
  279 
 
Moravcsik, A. (1995) Liberal intergovernmentalism and integration: A rejoinder, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 33(4), pp. 611-628. 
Moravcsik, A. (2002) Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 40(4), pp. 603-624. 
Moravcsik, A. (2005) The European constitutional compromise and the neofunctionalist 
legacy, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.12(2), pp. 349-386. 
Morozov, E. (2011) The net delusion: how not to liberate the world, London: Allen Lane. 
Morozov, E. (2013) To save everything, click here: technology, solutionism, and the urge 
to fix problems that don't exist, London: Allen Lane. 
Morris, C. (2014) EU wrestles with privacy v security. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-26944931 Accessed 21.05.2015. 
Mörth, U. (2003) “Framing an American threat: the European Commission and the 
technology gap” in Knodt, M. and Princen, S. (eds) Understanding the European Union's 
external relations, London; New York: Routledge, pp. 75-91. 
Mosco, V. (2005) The digital sublime: myth, power, and cyberspace, Cambridge, Mass.; 
London: MIT. 
Movius, L.B. and Krup, N. (2009) U.S. and EU Privacy Policy: Comparison of Regulatory 
Approaches, International Journal of Communication, Vol. 3, pp.169-187. 
Mueller, M. (2010) Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance, 
Cambridge Mass.; London: The MIT Press.  
Naspers (2016) Naspers to sell Allegro Group to Cinven, Permira and Mid Europa. 
Available at https://www.naspers.com/home/news/naspers-to-sell-allegro-group-to-cinven,-
permira-a Accessed 17.11.2016. 
Naughton, J. (2013) Why big data has made your privacy a thing of the past, The 
Guardian, Available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/06/big-data-
predictive-analytics-privacy?CMP=fb_gu Accessed 05.11.2013 
Naurin, D. and Wallace, H. (eds.) (2008) Unveiling the Council of the European Union: 
Games Governments Play in Brussels, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Newman, A. L. (2007) "Protecting privacy in Europe: administrative feedbacks and 
regional politics" in Meunier, S. and Kathleen R. McNamara, K.R. (eds) Making history: 
European integration and institutional change at fifty, Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 123-138 
  280 
 
Newman, A.L. (2011) Watching the watchers: transgovernmental implementation of data 
privacy policy in Europe, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 
Vol. 13(2), pp.181-194. 
Nicoll, C. and Prins, C. (2003) “Anonymity: challenges for politics and law” in Nicoll, C., 
Prins, C., Van Dellen, M. J. M. (eds) Digital anonymity and the Law: tensions and 
dimensions, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 
Nicoll, C., Prins, C., Van Dellen, M. J. M. (2003) (eds) Digital anonymity and the Law: 
tensions and dimensions, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 
Nielsen, N. (2013a) New EU data law could end up weaker than old one. Available at 
https://euobserver.com/justice/120301 Accessed 15.04.2015. 
Nielsen, N. (2013b) EU countries back pro-business data bill. Available at 
https://euobserver.com/justice/120407 Accessed 18.04.2016. 
Note from delegations (2013) Comments on Chapter VI and VII, 7105/6/13. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%207105%202013%20REV%206 
Accessed 14.01.2014. 
OECD (2011) Thirty years after the OECD privacy guidelines. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49710223.pdf Accessed 27.04.2013. 
Oettinger, G.H. (2015) Speech at the Digital4Europe Stakeholder Meeting. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/content/speech-digital4europe-stakeholder-meeting_en 
Accessed 28.05.2016. 
Official EU website (no date) About the EU. Available at http://europa.eu/about-
eu/index_en.htm Accessed 29.06.2015. 
Official EU website (no date) EU Treaties. Available at http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/index_en.htm Accessed 29.06.2015. 
Ohm, P. (2010) Broken promises of privacy: responding to the surprising failure of 
anonymization, UCLA Law Review, Vol.57(6), pp.1701-1777. 
Olivarez-Giles, N. (2014) Snapchat Data Breach Exposes Millions of Names, Phone 
Numbers. Available at http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/01/snapchat-alleged-leak-4-
million-users/ Accessed 30.05.2015. 
Oltermann, P. (2013a) Britain accused of trying to impede EU data protection law. The 
Guardian, Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/27/britain-eu-
data-protection-law Accessed 10.04.2016. 
Oltermann, P. (2013b) Germany summons US ambassador over claim NSA bugged 
Merkel's phone. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/germany-
summons-us-ambassador-nsa-merkel-phone Accessed 31.05.2015.  
  281 
 
Oltermann, P. (2014) Turkey summons German ambassador over BND spying allegations. 
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/18/turkey-summons-german-
ambassador-bnd-spying Accessed 12.06.2016. 
ORG (2013a) Data protection regulation: a brief guide to the issues. Available at 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/data-protection-regulation:-a-brief-
guide-to-the-issues Accessed 10.08.2015.  
ORG (2013b) EU Commission caved to US demands to drop anti-PRISM privacy clause. 
Available at https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2013/how-the-eu-commission-caved-
to-us-demands-to-water-down-its-privacy-law Accessed 09.04.2016. 
Pariser, E. (2011) The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you, London: Viking. 
Peters, B. (2012) Institutional theory in political science: the new institutionalism, London: 
Continuum, 3rd ed. 
Peterson, J. (1995) Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework for  
analysis, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 2(1), pp. 69-93. 
Peterson, J. (2009) “Policy networks”, in Wiener, A. and Diez, T. (eds) European 
integration theory, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., pp. 105-124. 
Peterson, J. and Shackleton, M. (2012c) “Conclusion” in Peterson, J. and Shackleton, M. 
(eds) The institutions of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., pp. 
382-402. 
Petiteville, F. (2003) “Exporting values: EU external co-operation as a soft diplomacy” in 
Knodt, M. and Princen, S. (eds) Understanding the European Union's external relations, 
London; New York: Routledge, pp. 127-141. 
Pfeifle, S. (2016) Next on the EU agenda? The ePrivacy Directive. Available at 
https://iapp.org/news/a/next-on-the-eu-agenda-the-eprivacy-directive/ Accessed 
20.05.2016. 
Pierce, R. (2008) Research methods in politics a practical guide, Los Angeles, Calif.; 
London: Sage. 
Poullet, Y. and Dinant, J.M. (2010) “The Internet and private life in Europe: risks and 
aspirations” in Kenyon, A.T. and Richardson, M. New dimensions in privacy law: 
international and comparative perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Powles, J. (2015) Why the BBC is wrong to republish ‘right to be forgotten’ links. 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/01/bbc-wrong-right-to-be-forgotten 
Accessed 07.08.2016. 
  282 
 
Powers, S. (2015) Where did the principle of secrecy in correspondence go? Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/12/where-did-the-principle-of-secrecy-
in-correspondence-go Accessed 06.01.2016. 
PPI (2016) App economy jobs in Europe (Part 1). Available at 
http://www.progressivepolicy.org/blog/app-economy-jobs-in-europe-part-1/ Accessed 
09.04.2016. 
Price, M. (2014) US seeks partners among MEPs. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-eu-26889824 Accessed 15.05.2016. 
Princen, S. (2003) “Exporting regulatory standards: the cases of trapping and data 
protection” in Knodt, M. and Princen, S. (eds) Understanding the European Union's 
external relations, London; New York: Routledge, pp. 142-157. 
Princen, S. and Knodt, M. (2003) “Understanding the EU's external relations: the move 
from actors to processes” in Knodt, M. and Princen, S. (eds) Understanding the European 
Union's external relations, London; New York: Routledge. 
Prins, C. (2006) “Should ICT regulation be undertaken at an international level?” in Bert-
Jaap Koops et al (eds) Starting points for ICT regulation: deconstructing prevalent policy 
one-liners, The Hague: TMC Asser, pp. 151-201. 
Privacy International (2013) EU parliamentarians propose to strip citizens of their privacy 
rights. Available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/199 Accessed 01.10.2015. 
Privacy Laws & Business (2015a) Italians concerned about privacy but willing to exchange 
data for commercial incentives. Available at 
http://www.privacylaws.com/Publications/enews/International-E-
news/Dates/2015/5/Italians-concerned-about-privacy-but-willing-to-exchange-data-for-
commercial-incentives2/ Accessed 14.06.2015. 
Privacy Laws & Business (2015b) Progress report on the EU Data Protection draft 
Regulation - Privacy Laws & Business 28th Annual International Conference, Privacy in a 
Connected World. Youtube, Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpFW6dTKXAs Accessed 22.07.2016. 
Privacy Laws & Business (2015c) EU Commissioner Vĕra Jourová says protection of 
personal data more than a “European” fundamental right. Available at 
https://www.privacylaws.com/Int_enews_30_10_15 Accessed 01.12.2016. 
Privacy Laws & Business (2016) GDPR will have an impact on the ICO’s business 
friendliness. Available at http://www.privacylaws.com/Publications/enews/UK-E-
news/Dates/2016/5/GDPR-will-have-an-impact-on-the-ICOs-business-friendliness/ 
Accessed 20.08.2016. 
  283 
 
Ramesh, R. (2014a) NHS patient data to be made available for sale to drug and insurance 
firms. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/19/nhs-patient-data-
available-companies-buy Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Ramesh, R. (2014b) Police will have 'backdoor' access to health records despite opt-out, 
says MP. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/feb/06/police-backdoor-
access-nhs-health-records Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Rawlinson, K. (2014) Facebook's WhatsApp purchase challenged. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26481654 Accessed 23.06.2015. 
Rawlinson, K. (2015a) 'Sanction tech firms over hate speech', says Hollande. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31020415 Accessed 22.06.2015. 
Rawlinson, K. (2015b) EU data roaming and net neutrality plans attacked. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-31748592 Accessed 22.06.2015. 
Recode (2015) Obama Says Europe’s Aggressiveness Toward Google Comes from 
Protecting Lesser Competitors. Available at http://recode.net/2015/02/13/obama-says-
europes-aggressiveness-towards-google-comes-from-protecting-lesser-competitors/ 
Accessed 25.04.2015. 
Reding, V. (2013a) Vice-President Reding's intervention during Justice Council Press 
Conference, 6 June 2013. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
514_en.htm Accessed 25.10.2015. 
Reding, V. (2013b) Justice Council: We need a simple solution for citizens and business on 
data protection. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-1029_fr.htm 
Accessed 27.10.2015. 
Reding, V. (2014a) A data protection compact for Europe. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-62_en.htm Accessed 14.01.2015. 
Reding, V. (2014b) “Preface”, in Hijmans, H. and Kranenborg, H. (eds) Data Protection 
anno 2014: How to Restore Trust? Contributions in honour of Peter Hustinx, European 
Data Protection Supervisor (2004-2014), Cambridge England; Antwerp Belgium; Portland 
Oregon: Intersentia, pp. v-vi. 
Reding, V. (2015) More data protection is better than less. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/infosociety/more-data-protection-better-less-315404 
Accessed 11.08.2015.  
Reilly, B. (2012) Institutional Designs for Diverse Democracies: Consociationalism, 
Centripetalism and Communalism Compared, European Political Science, Vol. 11, pp. 
259–270 Available at http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/eps/journal/v11/n2/full/eps201136a.html, Accessed 12.02.2013. 
  284 
 
Reinhold, T. (2016) Civil society and telecom industry urge EU policy makers to safeguard 
broadband competition. Available at https://edri.org/civil-society-and-telecom-industry-
urge-eu-policy-makers-to-safeguard-broadband-competition/ Accessed 18.04.2016. 
Reuters (2014a) Merkel, Hollande to discuss European communication network avoiding 
U.S. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-germany-france-
idUSBREA1E0IG20140215 Accessed 25.01.2015. 
Reuters (2014b) German government cancels Verizon contract in wake of U.S. spying row. 
Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-germany-security-verizon-
idUSKBN0F11WJ20140626 Accessed 25.01.2015. 
Reuters (2016) U.S. lobby say many economies like China pursue policies detrimental to 
infocomm sector. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-regulations-
idUSKCN1180VE Accessed 01.07.2016. 
Rice, C. (2013) Apps must respect privacy over data, says Information Commissioner. 
Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25422629 Accessed 23.06.2015.  
Richardson, J.J. (ed) (2012) Constructing a policy-making state?: policy dynamics in the 
EU, Oxford University Press. 
Richter, S. and Albrecht, J.P. (2013) NSA spying on Europe reflects the transatlantic 
culture gap. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/30/nsa-
spying-europe-transatlantic-culture-gap Accessed 21.06.2014. 
Rittberger, B. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2007) “The constitutionalization of the European 
Union: explaining the parliamentarization and institutionalization of human rights” in 
Meunier, S. and McNamara, K.R. (eds) Making history: European integration and 
institutional change at fifty, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 213-229. 
Roosendaal, A. (2013) Digital personae and profiles in law: protecting individuals' rights 
in on-line contexts, Thesis (Ph. D.)--Tilburg University. 
Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Rosamond, B. (2013) “Theorizing the European Union after integration theory” in Cini, M. 
and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (eds) European Union politics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed., pp. 85-102. 
Rutkin, A. (2015) Just four credit card clues can identify anyone. Available at 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn26879-just-four-credit-card-clues-can-identify-
anyone.html#.VNojwO6o_LX Accessed 22.06.2015. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1998) The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for 
Europe, Journal of European Public Policy, 5:1, pp. 98-130. 
  285 
 
Scally, D. (2015) Germany double-dealing over data legislation, say negotiators. Available 
at http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/germany-double-dealing-over-data-
legislation-say-negotiators-1.2129889 Accessed 10.03.2016. 
Schmidt, S. K. (2001) “A constrained Commission: informal practices of agenda-setting in 
the Council” in Schneider, G. and Aspinwall, M. (eds) The rules of integration: 
institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, pp. 125-146. 
Schulz, M. (2016) Keynote speech at #CPDP2016 on Technological Totalitarianism, 
Politics and Democracy. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-
president/en/press-room/keynote-speech-at-cpdp2016-on-technological-totalitarianism-
politics-and-democracy Accessed 15.06.2016. 
Schwartz, P. M. and Solove, D. J., (2013) Reconciling Personal Information in the United 
States and European Union, 102 California Law Review (2014 Forthcoming); UC Berkeley 
Public Law Research Paper No. 2271442; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper 
No. 2013-77. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271442 Accessed 14.12.2013. 
Schwarzer, D. and Lang, K. (2012) The Myth of German Hegemony. Available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2012-10-02/myth-german-hegemony 
Accessed 28.11.2016.  
Shane, S. (2013) No morsel too minuscule for all consuming NSA. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-
nsa.html?_r=0 Accessed 20.9.2014. 
Shaw, J. and Wiener, A. (2000) “The paradox of the European polity” in Green Cowles, 
M. and Smith, M. (eds) The state of the European Union. Vol. 5, Risks, reform, resistance, 
and revival, European Community Studies Association, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 64- 88. 
Siddique, H. and Holpuch, A. (2013) NSA and GCHQ targeted aid agencies and European 
officials – live updates. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/20/nsa-
gchq-spied-aid-agencies-eu-edward-snowden-live Accessed 20.11.2014. 
Siegelbaum, D. (2014) Could new net neutrality rules fuel piracy? Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-27161270 Accessed 11.02.2015. 
Simitis, S. (1995) “From the market to the polis: The EU Directive on the protection of 
personal dataˮ, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 80(3), pp. 445-469. 
Simpson, S. (2009) Supranationalism and its limits in European telecommunications 
governance: the European Electronic Communications Markets Authority initiative, 
Manchester: University of Salford. Available at 
http://usir.salford.ac.uk/12515/2/ICS(30_1_09).pdf Accessed 20.09.2016. 
  286 
 
Smith, M. (2016) Human error behind nearly two thirds of data breaches, ICO figures 
show. Available at https://business-reporter.co.uk/2016/06/02/human-error-behind-nearly-
two-thirds-data-breaches-ico-figures -show/ Accessed 05.07.2016. 
Stupp, C. (2015) Buttarelli: No compromise on data protection reform. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/buttarelli-no-compromise-on-data-
protection-reform/ Accessed 10.06.2015. 
Stupp, C. (2016) Telecoms regulators fight back against Commission plan for new EU 
agency. Available at http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/telecoms-regulators-
fight-back-against-commission-plan-for-new-eu-agency/ Accessed 19.11.2016. 
Symantec (2015) State of privacy report 2015. Available at 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/presskits/b-state-of-privacy-report-2015.pdf 
Accessed 08.07.2015. 
Tambini, D., Leonardi, D. and Marsden, C. (2008) Codifying cyberspace: communications 
self-regulation in the age of Internet convergence, London: Routledge. 
Tapscott, D. (1996c) The digital economy: promise and peril in the age of networked 
intelligence, New York; London: McGraw-Hill. 
Taylor, P. (1990a) “Supranationalism: the power and authority of international institutions” 
in Groom, A. J. R. and Taylor, P. (eds) Frameworks for international cooperation, 
London: Pinter, pp.109-122. 
Taylor, P. (1990b) “Consociationalism and federalism as approaches to international 
integration” in Groom, A. J. R. and Taylor, P. (eds) Frameworks for international 
cooperation, London: Pinter, pp.172-184. 
Taylor, P.G. (2003) International organisation in the age of globalization, London: 
Continuum. 
The Register (2007) Privacy laws should be overhauled, says European regulator. 
Available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2007/11/12/privacy_law_debate/ Accessed 
23.10.2015. 
Thomas, G. (2011) The case: generalisation, theory and phronesis in case study, Oxford 
Review of Education, Vol. 37(1), pp. 21-35. 
Toobin, J. (2014) The solace of oblivion. Available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion Accessed 23.06.2015. 
Traynor, I.  (2014) Internet governance too US-centric, says European commission.  
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/12/internet-governance-us-
european-commission Accessed 05.07.2015. 
  287 
 
Traynor, I. et al (2014) 30,000 lobbyists and counting: is Brussels under corporate sway? 
The Guardian. Available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/lobbyists-european-parliament-brussels-
corporate Accessed 11.04.2016. 
Trottier, D. (2012) Policing Social Media, Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue 
canadienne de sociologie, Vol. 49(4), pp.411-425. 
Trottier, D. (2012c) Social media as surveillance rethinking visibility in a converging 
world, Farnham: Ashgate. 
Tufnell, N. (2014) Big risks for small businesses who ignore data security. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27052250 Accessed 14.06.2014. 
UK Parliament (2010) European Convention on Human Rights (Withdrawal) Bill 2010-12. 
Available at http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-
12/europeanconventiononhumanrightswithdrawal.html Accessed 10.03.2016. 
UK Parliament (2014) Social media firms told to simplify terms and conditions, The 
Science and Technology Committee. Available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/science-
and-technology-committee/news/141124-data-report-op-note/ Accessed 17.02.2015. 
UK Parliament (2016) General Data Protection Regulation: Written statement – 
HLWS500. Available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Lords/2016-02-04/HLWS500/ Accessed 
06.04.2016.    
UN (2014) The right to privacy in the digital age, Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC
.27.37_en.pdf Accessed 10.08.2015. 
UN (2015) Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council on the use of 
encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in 
the digital age. Available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/095/85/PDF/G1509585.pdf?OpenElement Accessed 
10.08.2015.  
Valero, J. (2016) Ansip: ‘I am strongly against any backdoor to encrypted systems’. 
Available at http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/interview/ansip-i-am-strongly-
against-any-backdoor-to-encrypted-systems/ Accessed 15.04.2016.  
Van den Bulck, H. and Donders, K. (2014) “Analyzing European media policy: 
stakeholders and advocacy coalitions” in Donders, K., Pauwels, C., and Loisen, J. (eds) 
The Palgrave handbook of European media policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp.19-35. 
  288 
 
Van Dijk, J. (2012) The Network society, London: SAGE, 3rd ed. 
Van Quathem, K. (2015) Belgian Government Calls for EU Data Protection Authority. 
Available at https://www.insideprivacy.com/international/belgian-government-calls-for-eu-
data-protection-authority/ Accessed 01.02.2015.  
Versluis, E., van Keulen, M. and Stephenson, P. (2011) Analyzing the European Union 
policy process, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Vihar, G. (2013) Too much executive power? Delegated law-making and comitology in 
perspective, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 20(4), pp.535-551. 
Voss, A. and Padova, Y. (2015) We need to make big data into an opportunity for Europe. 
Available at http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/we-need-to-make-big-data-
into-an-opportunity-for-europe/ Accessed 15.05.2016.  
Wakefield, J. (2014a) eBay faces investigations over massive data breach. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27539799 Accessed 01.07.2016. 
Wakefield, J. (2014b) GCHQ, terrorists, and the internet: What are the issues? Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-29897196 Accessed 02.04.2015. 
Walker, M. (1999) Santer told to go after damning EU report, The Guardian. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/mar/16/martinwalker Accessed 15.10.2014. 
Wall, M. (2014) Location tech and mobile map out way to better business. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27781078 Accessed 20.06.2014. 
Wallace, H. (1997) “Introduction” in Young, A.R. and Wallace, H. (eds) Participation and 
policy making in the European Union, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Ward, M. (2014) Big data: Should it come with a big health warning? Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27683581 Accessed 05.04.2015. 
Watt, N. and Bowcott, O. (2014) Tories plan to withdraw UK from European convention 
on human rights, The Guardian. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/03/tories-plan-uk-withdrawal-european-
convention-on-human-rights Accessed 19.05.2016. 
Wearden, G. and Treanor, J. (2015) UN needs agency for data protection, European 
commissioner tells Davos, The Guardian. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/22/un-agency-data-protection-davos-
edward-snowden Accessed 28.06.2016.     
Weiss, L. (1998) The myth of the powerless state: governing the economy in a global era, 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
  289 
 
White House (2014a) Big data and privacy: a technological perspective, Report to the 
President, Available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and
_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf Accessed 02.02.2015. 
White House (2014b) Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values, Executive 
Office of the President of the United States. Available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf 
Accessed 05.04.2015. 
Willems and Others (2015) Joined Cases C-446/12 to C-449/12, CJEU 
Winnett, R. and Mason, R. (2013) David Cameron to take on the 'Ukip fruitcakes’ with EU 
referendum. The Telegraph.  Available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10032073/David-Cameron-to-
take-on-the-Ukip-fruitcakes-with-EU-referendum.html Accessed 10.04.2016. 
Wisman, T. (2015) Willems: Giving Member States the Prints and Data Protection the 
Finger, European Data Protection Law Review, Vol. 1(3), pp. 245-248. 
WP29 (2009) The Future of Privacy. Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European 
Commission on the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of personal 
data. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp168_en.pdf Accessed 
23.10.2015. 
WP29 (2012a) Opinion 01/2012 on the data protection reform proposals. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2012/wp191_en.pdf Accessed 14.07.2014.  
WP29 (2012b) Opinion 08/2012 providing further input on the data protection reform 
discussions. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp199_en.pdf Accessed 
14.07.2014. 
WP29 (2013a) Working Document 01/2013 Input on the proposed implementing acts. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp200_en.pdf Accessed 15.07.2014. 
WP29 (2013b) Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf Accessed 16.07.2014. 
WP29 (2014) Statement of the WP29 on current discussions in the Council regarding the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation. Main points for a one-stop-shop and consistency 
mechanism for businesses and individuals. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
  290 
 
protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2014/20140416_wp29_statement_oss.pdf Accessed 16.07.2014. 
WP29 (2015) A letter of the ARTICLE 29 Data Protection Working Party on trilogue to 
Ms Ilze JUHANSONE, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent 
Representative to the European Union. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2015/20150617_letter_from_the_art29_wp_on_trilogue_to_msjuhansone_e
n.pdf accessed 17.10.2015. 
www.londonist.com Accessed 12.08.2015 
www.lobbyplag.eu Accessed 04.10.2015 
www.lobbyplag.eu/influence Accessed 04.10.2015 
www.lobbyplag.eu/map Accessed 04.10.2015 
Young, A.R. and Wallace, H. (2000) Regulatory politics in the enlarging European Union: 
weighing civic and producer interests, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Zanfir, G. (2013) Tracing the Right to be Forgotten in the Short History of Data Protection 
Law: The “New Clothes” of an Old Right Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2501312 
Accessed 10.07.2015. 
Zweifel, T. (2002) ...Who is without sin cast the first stone: the EU's democratic deficit in 
comparison, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9(5), p.812-840. 
 
